Ross v. Mayor
| Decision Date | 20 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-14-369 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
| Parties | REGINA ROSS, Plaintiff, v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, et al., Defendants. |
REGINA ROSS, Plaintiff,
v.
MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. ELH-14-369
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Date: June 20, 2014
Regina Ross, plaintiff, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on December 23, 2013, raising allegations of negligence against two defendants: the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the "City"), and Devon W. Mack. See ECF 2 ("Complaint").1 Suit arises from a motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff and Mr. Mack, who plaintiff identifies as an employee of the City. See id. ¶ 1. Defendants removed the action to this Court on February 6, 2014, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See ECF 1 (Joint Notice of Removal).2
Two motions are now pending. Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Remand (ECF 17-1, "Remand Mot.") and a supporting memorandum (ECF 17-2, "Remand Mem."). The City has filed an opposition to plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF 18) and a supporting memorandum
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(ECF 18-1, "City Opp."), to which plaintiff replied (ECF 21-1). Mack also filed an opposition to the Motion to Remand (ECF 20) and a supporting memorandum (ECF 20-1, "Mack Opp."), to which plaintiff has also replied (ECF 24-1).
In addition, Mack has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF 15, the "Motion to Dismiss"), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and a supporting memorandum (ECF 15-1, "MTD Mem.").3 Plaintiff filed an opposition to Mack's Motion to Dismiss (ECF 19-1) and a supporting memorandum (ECF 19-2, the "MTD Opp.").
No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I will deny both motions.
The motor vehicle accident occurred in the late morning of August 18, 2011, in Baltimore, Maryland. ECF 14 ("Amended Complaint") ¶ 1. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was "seated in her tractor trailer, stopped in a parked position facing southbound on Monument Street at its intersection with Pulaski Highway." Her vehicle was struck by another truck, owned by the City "and operated by its agent and employee, [Mr. Mack], in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner . . . ." Id. Specifically, Mack acted negligently by, inter alia, failing to keep his truck "under proper control"; failing to operate it "at a reasonable and proper speed under the
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then existing highway and traffic and weather conditions"; "[f]ailing to keep a proper lookout"; maneuvering his truck "from a lane of traffic into a parking lane occupied by" plaintiff's tractor trailer, when such a move "could not be safely made"; and "[f]ailing to avoid a collision" when it was apparent that continuing along the same course would result in a collision. Id. ¶ 3. Due to the collision, plaintiff suffered "serious painful and probably permanent injuries about her head[,] body[,] and limbs, with consequent physical pain and mental anguish requiring medical care and treatment incurred at great expense," as well as lost wages. Id. ¶ 2.
A. Subject matter jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and "may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). "A court is to presume, therefore, that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper." United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
The "burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on . . . the party asserting jurisdiction." Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2010); accord McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, "[i]f a plaintiff files suit in state court and the defendant seeks to adjudicate the matter in federal court through removal, it is the defendant who carries the burden of alleging in his notice of removal and, if challenged, demonstrating the court's jurisdiction over the matter." Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008).
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"A challenge to a federal court's jurisdiction 'can never be forfeited or waived' because it concerns [the court's] 'very power to hear a case.'" Gaines Motor Lines, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Industries, Inc., 734 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, even in the absence of a challenge to jurisdiction, federal courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. . . ." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010); accord Gaines Motor Lines, 734 F.3d at 301.
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant with "fair notice" of the claim and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 n.3 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
A plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. But, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Id.; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). To satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at
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556. In other words, the complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684; Simmons v. United Mortg. and Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011).
In reviewing such a motion, a court "'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,'" and must "'draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'" E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 402 (2011); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 991 (2010). However, a complaint that provides no more than "labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Monroe, 579 F.3d at 385-86.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted if the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1960 (2012). "'Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.'" Hartmann v. Calif. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114,
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1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); accord Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2011) ("When reviewing a 12(b)(6) dismissal, 'we must determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.' Dismissal is appropriate if the law simply affords no relief.") (citation omitted).
A motion asserting failure to state a claim typically "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses," Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), unless such a defense can be resolved on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint. See Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). "This principle only applies, however, if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ' clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint,'" or in other documents that are proper subjects of consideration under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in Goodman).
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