Ross v. Nutt
| Decision Date | 16 December 1964 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 38615 and 38616,s. 38615 and 38616 |
| Citation | 177 Ohio St. 113,203 N.E.2d 118,29 O.O.2d 313 |
| Parties | , 29 O.O.2d 313 ROSS et al., Appellants, v. NUTT, Appellee (two cases). |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The violation by the operator of a motor vehicle of a city ordinance prohibiting the leaving of an unattended motor vehicle without locking the ignition and removing the key does not impose liability on such operator for the negligent operation of such vehicle by a thief, causing injuries to a third person.
These causes are actions for personal injuries received as a result of an automobile collision. On February 11, 1961, defendant, appellee herein, parked his car near the intersection of 11th Street and Moorish Street in the city of Toledo. The evidence is apparently conflicting as to whether defendant removed the key from the ignition. However, this is not determinative in the present actions inasmuch as defendant testified that he had known for three or four months that the ignition was not lockable. In other words, a key was not necessary to turn on the ignition. He left the car, and while he was away the car was stolen and some 90 minutes later, while in possession of the thief, was involved in the accident which gave rise to the present actions.
At the time of the accident, the following ordinance was in effect in the city of Toledo:
'No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the motor, locking the ignition, and removing the key * * *.'
On the basis of this ordinance plaintiffs, appellants herein, brought the present actions, contending that defendant's failure to comply therewith constituted negligence which rendered him liable for plaintiffs' injuries.
The trial court directed verdicts in favor of defendant at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence.
These judgments were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The causes are before this court pursuant to the allowance of motions to certify the records.
Cubbon & Rice and David R. Goldberg, Toledo, for appellants.
Moan & Andrews and Harold C. Moan, Toledo, for appellee.
The question raised in these cases is whether the violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the leaving of an unattended automobile without locking the ignition and removing the key renders the owner thereof liable for injuries resulting from the operation of such automobile by a thief.
It is a basic prerequisite that in order to recover for an alleged negligent injury the act complained of must be the direct and proximate cause of the injury. 39 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 525, Negligence, Section 26.
For an act to be the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of such act. Foss-Schneider Brewing Co. v. Ulland, 97 Ohio St. 210, 119 N.E. 454, 4 A.L.R. 1098.
To find that an injury was the natural and probable consequence of an act, it must appear that the injury complained of could have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated from the alleged negligent act. As is said in Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Rd. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, at page 325, 85 N.E. 499, at page 504, 18 L.R.A.,N.S., 949, 'the rule is elementary that a defendant in an action for negligence can be held to respond in damages only for the immediate and proximate result of the negligent act complained of, and in determining what is direct or proximate cause the rule requires that the injury sustained shall be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence alleged; that is, such consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by the wrongdoer as likely to follow his negligent act.'
This brings us to the issue in the instant cases. Could defendant reasonably have foreseen or anticipated that by leaving his key in his car that it would be stolen, and if stolen, would be operated in a negligent manner so as to cause injury to a member of the public?
The mere statement of the question shows that to hold defendant liable would require him to have anticipated not one but two probable consequences as a result of his leaving his key in his car. He must have foreseen, first, that his car would be stolen, and, second, that the thief...
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