Ross v. Peters
| Decision Date | 09 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 76059,76059 |
| Parties | Cathy ROSS, Mona White, and Russ Burns, Appellants, v. H.W. "Pete" PETERS, Michael Weatherly, Becky Thompson, Barbara Barrowman and Robin Quick, Appellees. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
On appeal from the District Court, Oklahoma County; James L. Gullett, Judge.
The trial court gave summary judgment to the State Board of Examiners of Official Shorthand Reporters [Board] in an action for declaratory relief from the Board's refusal to allow three applicants who employ the stenomask method of reporting to qualify for enrollment as certified shorthand reporters pursuant to 20 O.S.1981 §§ 1501 et seq. and for a declaration of the statutes' constitutional invalidity.
THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.
Karen E. Faulk, Lynn B. Mares, Abel, Musser, Sokolosky & Clark, Oklahoma City, for appellants.
Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., Neal Leader, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Civil Div., Susan Brimer Loving, Atty. Gen., Dan M. Peters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellees.
Two questions are presented on this appeal: (1) Do the terms of 20 O.S.1981 §§ 1501 et seq. authorize the State Board of Examiners of Official Shorthand Reporters to refuse enrollment as a certified shorthand reporter to any person who employs the stenomask method of reporting? and if so, (2) Do these statutes contravene the Oklahoma and U.S. Constitutions? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
Appellants Cathy Ross, Mona White, and Russ Burns [applicants or Ross, White and Burns] are court reporters who employ the stenomask method of reporting. 1 The appellees are members of the State Board of Examiners of Official Shorthand Reporters [Board], which is responsible for the certification of Oklahoma Certified Shorthand Reporters [CSR] and Oklahoma Licensed Shorthand Reporters [LSR]. 2
The event that precipitated this litigation was the legislature's promulgation of 12 O.S.Supp.1986 § 3205, which then provided in part that "on and after January 1, 1990, depositions taken within this state shall only be taken by an officer who is either a certified shorthand reporter (CSR) or a licensed shorthand reporter (LSR)." 3 Recognizing the probable impact of this statute on their occupation and income, Ross and Burns applied in 1988 and 1989 to take the examination for certification; 4 White, who had been a certified court reporter in Texas, sought reciprocity. 5 The Board denied the applications, finding that the stenomask system was not one of the statutorily accepted methods of demonstrating proficiency in court reporting.
In December of 1989 Ross brought an action for relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 12 O.S.1981 §§ 1651 et seq., to declare whether the Board (a) correctly construed the applicable certification statutes and (b) erred in denying her the opportunity for enrollment as a certified shorthand reporter. After the Board moved for summary judgment, but before discovery, White and Burns were allowed to intervene as additional plaintiffs. 6 They were then instructed to submit briefs in response to the Board's summary judgment quest. The trial court gave summary judgment to the Board, 7 and the applicants appealed. We affirm.
Except for those who receive reciprocity, 8 § 1503(b) requires every applicant for enrollment as a certified shorthand reporter to take an examination in which the applicant must demonstrate a "proficiency in reporting testimony and proceedings." 9 The quoted phrase "means proficiency in verbatim reporting by use of any generally recognized system of symbols or abbreviations written with pen or pencil, stenotype or similar machines, or such other method as may be from time to time approved by the Supreme Court." § 1503(c). 10 Taken together, subsections (b) and (c) provide the standard for testing an enrollment quest for CSR and LSR certification.
The applicants contend that the phrase "or similar machines" in § 1503(c) constitutes a clear legislative expression not to foreclose new reporting methodologies, such as the stenomask method of reporting. In support of this position, the applicants argue that 20 O.S.1981 § 106.4(a) constitutes a legislative endorsement of the stenomask method of reporting. Section 106.4(a) provides in part that "[t]he court reporter shall make a full reporting by means of stenographic hand, steno-mask or machine notes, or a combination thereof ... in trials and other judicial proceedings ..." and that "[n]othing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the certification of persons as certified shorthand reporters who rely exclusively upon the steno-mask for reporting judicial proceedings, except as provided by law...." 11 The applicants argue that the Board's construction of the applicable statutes is inconsistent with the statutory scheme because (1) they do not rely exclusively upon the stenomask method, but also employ auxiliary backup devices and take supplemental shorthand notes; (2) § 106.4(a) expressly provides that the stenomask method may be employed in the reporting of judicial proceedings; (3) any other interpretation would, on its face, lead to an absurd result; noncertified stenomask reporters would be permitted to employ the stenomask method in judicial proceedings, but not to take depositions; and (4) the phrase in § 1503(c), "or similar machines," reveals legislative intent not to exclude persons who use differing methodologies like the stenomask method. The applicants urge this court not to construe these statutory provisions to produce inconsistent results, 12 but rather to adopt their view by holding that the Board's construction of the certification statutes was improper. We remain unpersuaded.
We agree that by including the phrase "or similar machines" the legislature did not intend completely to exclude all new court reporting methodologies from the proficiency standard of § 1503(c). Viewed in the abstract, this statutory phrase can mean only that some methods of reporting are permissible and some are not. Our inquiry cannot end here.
It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that, where possible, courts will not construe statutes to reach an absurd or an inconsistent result. 13 An equally well-established rule is that, in order to avoid judicially imposing a different meaning from that the legislature intended, courts will not place a strained construction on the plain words of a statute. 14 The phrase "or similar machines," standing alone, constitutes a nondescript class of reporting methods. That is, the phrase merely identifies one alternative method from among a list of other alternative methods--"pen or pencil, stenotype or similar machines." 15 But once the phrase is anchored in the language of the subsection, the nondescript class of methods is readily narrowed.
Section 1503(c)'s list of specified methods is qualified by the verb form "written." 16 Under a plain-meaning theory of statutory construction, 17 the term "written" is a past participle of the verb "to write," 18 which itself means " [t]o form (letters, for example) on a surface with a tool such as a pen or pencil.... [t]o form (a word, for example) by inscribing letters or symbols on a surface: write one's name. " 19 Reducing this definition further, the term "inscribe" is defined as " a. [t]o write, print, carve, or engrave (words or letters) on or in a surface. b. [t]o mark or engrave (a surface) with words or letters." 20 Taken together, these definitions in no sense suggest the electronic recordation process typified by the stenomask method of reporting.
The applicants' NSVRA exhibits in the evidentiary materials show that the stenomask method is a closed microphone dictation system in which a tape recorder is connected and a verbatim voice record of the proceedings is made. 21 The process of recording electronic impulses on a magnetic medium is distinct from that which is required by § 1503(c). In setting out the proficiency standards, § 1503(c) expressly limits the class of accepted methods to those that are "written." We are buttressed in this conclusion by the knowledge that, clearly, the legislature was aware of the stenomask method of reporting. 22 Had the legislature intended to include the stenomask method as one of the accepted reporting methods, it easily could have done so.
The applicants next assert that, because they do not rely exclusively upon the stenomask 23 but also employ auxiliary backup devices and take supplemental shorthand notes, there is a substantial issue of material fact sufficient to prevent summary judgment for the Board. Their contention necessarily implies that 20 O.S.1981 § 106.4(a) is a certification statute. To this notion we cannot accede.
Section 106.4(a) is not a certification statute. Rather, the subsection merely delineates the general responsibilities of court reporters and permits them to use, among other methods, the stenomask method of reporting and to use supplemental electronic devices in recording judicial proceedings. 24 While the subsection specifically proscribes the certification of shorthand reporters "who rely exclusively upon the stenomask for judicial proceedings," this does not mean that it authorizes the certification of shorthand reporters who do not "rely exclusively" upon the stenomask method of reporting. The negative does not a fortiori state the positive. 25 The most that may be said is that the subsection is permissive, in that, in carrying out their responsibilities, the subsection allows court reporters, within certain specified limits, to choose among alternative reporting methods. Ultimately, the only implication in the subsection's language is that it does not allow the certification of those "who rely exclusively upon the steno-mask for judicial proceedings."
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