Ross v. Ross
| Citation | 557 S.W.3d 334 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 34997,SD 34997 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of: Medina Lynn ROSS (Moran), Appellant, v. Charles Randall ROSS, Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appellant's attorney: William J. Fleischaker
Respondent's attorney: Tina Maree Longnecker
Mother appeals a modification of child-visitation provisions.1 We rarely grant relief to a party who leads a trial court one direction, then complains after judgment that the court ruled that way and not differently, which is what we see here:
We recognize, at least theoretically, several issues and concerns expressed by the dissent. But we will not fault the trial court for visitation terms that, as to Mother's sole point here, cannot be distinguished from what she asked the court to do. Mother invited any error that she now claims, so we deny her point and affirm the judgment.
The parties' marriage was dissolved in 2007. As modified five years later, the judgment provided for joint physical custody of the children, with Mother's address designated for educational and mailing purposes, and included lengthy provisions detailing Father's visitation and parenting time as contemplated by RSMo §§ 452.375.9 and 452.310.8.2
Father sought further modification in 2014, alleging that the children were doing poorly in school and wanted to live with him. In response, Mother proposed a parenting plan that, again, included nearly two pages of provisions detailing visitation and parenting time consistent with §§ 452.375.9 and 452.310.8.
By the time Father's motion was heard in October 2016, all four of the parties' children, who then ranged in age from 12 to 18, resided with Father with Mother's approval. At the beginning of the hearing, Mother's counsel announced that the parties had settled and agreed upon modified custody and parenting-plan terms:
The hearing proceeded on issues other than the agreed parenting plan, after which the court made a docket entry that
Father's counsel sent the judgment form to Mother's counsel, waited months for a response but got none, then submitted it to the court, again copying Mother's counsel. In reply, Mother's counsel advised the court that he had been waiting to see how visitation went through the holidays. Alleging that the children skipped the Thanksgiving visit with Mother and spent only 12 hours with her during Christmas, Mother proposed slightly amending the holiday-visitation provision to read (proposed addition in our italics): "Due to the ages of the children, the holiday schedule shall be at their discretion and as coordinated by the child and the other parent, provided however, that the children shall spend a minimum period of 24 hours with mother during the period of each scheduled holiday visitation. " Voicing no other objection or concern, Mother's proposed provisions for her visiting and parenting time then were as follows:
The court entered the proposed judgment without adding Mother's suggested further clause. She then moved to amend the judgment, complaining for the first time that its visitation terms were less specific than §§ 452.375.9 and 452.310.8 require. Her motion was overruled by operation of Rule 78.06.
On appeal, Mother complains that the court entered a judgment that did not meet § 452.310.8's specificity dictates, and seeks remand for "the trial court to enter a judgment with the statutorily mandated provisions for visitation."
We agree that the above-quoted provisions lack § 452.310.8's specificity, even with Mother's proposed addition, and we share the dissent's concern about visitation frequency and duration being left to the discretion of teenage children (and in one case, a pre-teen). Yet Mother could have foreseen those issues, and plainly did see them when she asked the court to only slightly tweak one of those three provisions before entering the judgment. She raised no other pre-judgment complaint about the parenting plan, statutory or otherwise, and even now does not challenge the court's finding that said plan "is in the best interest of the minor children."3 Rather, Mother makes only a statutory complaint inconsistent with her own pre-judgment proposal to the court.
"[T]his Court is disinclined to grant [Mother] relief based on error she actively invited." Bowers v. Bowers , 543 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Mo. banc 2018). "A party cannot complain on appeal about an alleged error in which that party joined or acquiesced at trial." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). While we do not endorse these visitation provisions, we decline to entertain Mother's objections given her representations to the trial court. Id. ; Hagan v. Hagan , 530 S.W.3d 608, 610 (Mo.App. 2017) ; Marriage of Foster , 391 S.W.3d 500, 50304 (Mo.App. 2013). Point denied. Judgment affirmed.
The primary job of the trial court in a dissolution involving minor children is determining custody in the best interests of the children. We have said it repeatedly, as has the legislature. Section 452.375.91 specifically states the custody plan "approved and ordered by the court shall be in the court's discretion and shall be in the best interest of the child." The legislature repeatedly mandates parenting plans that set out the specifics of custody plans and how to determine custody arrangements, all for the best interests of children. There is no provision in the statute that allows the parents to circumvent the trial court's tremendous discretion and judgment.
Despite that, the trial court here approved a supposed stipulation with no evidence presented at a hearing and seemingly no knowledge of what was in the stipulation until it was presented in writing after the hearing. There was no evidence to support a finding that a parenting plan allowing visitation to be at the children's discretion was in the children's best interests. In this matter, a vague agreement about visitation was announced to the trial court. The issue in this case is simple: Was it error to approve a parenting plan which stated, "visitation shall be at [the children's] discretion and as coordinated by the children and the other parent," for children who were twelve and fifteen years old at the time of the hearing without any evidence supporting such a parenting plan? I believe it was clear error as mandated by the statute and prior cases.
It is a given that the court, not the parties, determines what custody arrangement is in the best interest of the children. Marriage of Hendrix , 183 S.W.3d 582, 591 (Mo. banc 2006). In a dissolution or modification case, the court is not bound by the terms...
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