Ross v. State

• Decision Date: 19 November 1902
• Citation: 70 S.W. 543
• Parties: ROSS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

70 S.W. 543

ROSS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

November 19, 1902.

Appeal from Walker county court; John C. Williams, Judge.

Geo. Ross, Sr., was convicted of crime, and appeals. Affirmed.

Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of keeping a disorderly house, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $200; hence this appeal.

The first bill of exceptions calls in question the action of the court admitting in evidence a certain deed from Woodall and wife to appellant, containing 2.2 acres of land, in the town of Huntsville; the objection being that said deed is void for uncertainty in the description of the premises. It will be seen that this deed refers to certain other deeds of record in Walker county for description. The state was permitted, over the objection of appellant, to introduce one A. T. Randolph, who testified that he could not identify the land from the deed itself, but that he was familiar with the references contained in the deed, and from the deed and references he could identify the land. In the first place, we would remark this bill does not show what the witness testified to as to the identity of the land. If the bill had shown that the witness stated that from the deed and references he identified the land as the same land as that upon which appellant lived, and which he is charged with running as a disorderly house, then it occurs to us that it was competent for him to have given this testimony. But, aside from this, we do not consider that there is any question as to the locus in quo of the alleged disorderly house. All of the witnesses identify the house as the one where appellant, George Ross, resided.

Appellant also objects to the court's charging with reference to appellant keeping the house as owner, lessee, and tenant, claiming that there was no evidence to authorize any charge as to appellant being the lessee or tenant of said house. We agree with appellant in his contention, for the proof is unequivocal to the effect that he owned the house; but we fail to see how the use of "tenant" or "lessee" in that connection could injure appellant.

He also objects to a charge given by the court predicated on the idea that appellant was concerned in keeping said house, etc. Such a charge was not called for by any evidence in the case, because, as stated, the evidence shows that he was the actual owner and keeper of the house, unless it might possibly be considered...