Ross v. State

Decision Date05 February 1980
Docket NumberNo. 35568,35568
Citation245 Ga. 173,263 S.E.2d 913
PartiesROSS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Alex Davis, Butler, for appellant.

William J. Smith, Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

NICHOLS, Chief Justice.

Freddie D. Ross appeals his conviction for the murder of Johnny Jack Robinson. The state sought the death penalty but the jury returned a verdict of life imprisonment.

The jury heard evidence authorizing the following facts to be found: Freddie D. Ross and Ricky Duggar had been planning to rob Johnny Jack Robinson for about three weeks prior to the morning when Ross came to the Duggar residence and told Ricky Duggar that the time for the robbery had arrived. Ross told Ricky to get his mother's gun. Ricky got an unloaded .22 caliber pump rifle from his mother's bedroom closet, and he and Ross, joined by his brother Tommy Duggar, left the Duggar house and stood between the Robinson and Duggar houses awaiting the arrival of Robinson. Ricky told Tommy to walk down the road and watch for other cars. As Robinson pulled into the driveway, Ross and Ricky moved toward him. Ross asked Ricky for the rifle, loaded it with several cartridges, and shot Robinson three times. Ricky saw Robinson being hit by the bullets and saw him fall to the ground.

Ross and Ricky then summoned Tommy. Ricky took Robinson's wallet from Robinson's pocket and handed it to Ross. While Ross and Tommy stood by Robinson, Ricky broke into the Robinson house and took Robinson's .410 shotgun and .22 rifle, which he gave to Ross. Ross handed the wallet back to Ricky, who took $20 for himself and $10 for Tommy and gave the wallet back to Ross still containing a substantial sum of money. The Duggars then took their mother's rifle back to her closet and went to bed.

When Ross was arrested at his home pursuant to a warrant, he was advised of his rights, signed a waiver, and agreed to tell the investigating officer about the case. The officer told Ross that Ricky and Tommy had given statements implicating Ross. Ross replied, "I might have killed Big Jack, but I don't remember it. If Ricky and Tommy said I did I must have." His statement was admitted in evidence after the trial court determined during a Jackson-Denno hearing that it had been given voluntarily.

Ross later denied planning or participating in the robbery or homicide. He denied making the statement to the investigating officer. He testified that he was at his house at the time of the offenses. His mother, brother and sister supported his alibi defense with their testimony. The Duggars pled guilty and testified in behalf of the state.

Medical testimony indicated that Robinson died from injuries caused by three bullets recovered from his body. Ballistics testimony indicated that these three bullets recovered from Robinson's body and the empty .22 caliber cartridge cases found at the scene had been fired in the .22 caliber pump rifle that Mrs. Duggar voluntarily gave to the investigating officers.

The foregoing evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict was sufficient to enable a rational trier of the facts to find Ross guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

1. Ross first contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the results of his polygraph examination. His former retained counsel raised no objection to these test results being admitted in evidence because of a stipulation signed by Ross, his counsel and the district attorney that the "written report will be introduced into evidence, without objection by either side, at the time of the polygraphist's testimony at any trial or hearing involving this indictment." His current counsel contends that State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977), should be reconsidered and reversed, and that this court should declare that the polygraph evidence was inadmissible and without probative value. A majority of this court prefers to adhere to the Chambers decision. The polygraph operator testified that in his opinion the answers given by Ross concerning the homicide were deceptive. As in Chambers, the test evidence was not necessary to support the verdict. The first enumeration of error is without merit.

2. Ross next contends that the trial court should have charged, without request, concerning the meaning of the polygraph evidence. A majority of this court adheres to the ruling in State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 80, 239 S.E.2d 324, 327, supra, that, "When polygraph results are admitted at trial, either party is entitled, upon request, to have the jury charged concerning the meaning of this evidence." (Emphasis supplied.) No request to charge on the meaning of the polygraph evidence was made and no exception to the charge as given was stated. Furthermore, the transcript establishes that the polygraph operator was conceded to be an expert and his opinions were conceded to be opinions of an expert. The trial court charged generally on expert testimony that, "The weight which is to be given the opinions of expert witnesses is for you to decide. You may accept it and act on it, or reject it, and then act on your own judgment as you may apply it to the evidence in this case." The jury was bound to have known that this charge applied to the testimony of the polygraph operator. There is no merit in this enumeration of error.

3. Tommy Duggar testified during direct examination that he had not been promised what his sentence would be if he would testify in the present case. He testified that he did hope he would get lenient or favorable treatment from the court after pleading guilty and testifying. On cross examination, he reiterated that he did not know the penalty he was going to get. The following exchange then occurred: "Q. Do you know what the penalty is for this offense? A. ...

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16 cases
  • Jenkins v. Byrd
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
    • June 21, 2000
    ...However, Section 24-4-8 does not apply where the state does not rely solely on the testimony of a single accomplice. Ross v. State, 245 Ga. 173, 263 S.E.2d 913, 916 (1980); Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E.2d 833, 838 (1978); Belcher v. State, 207 Ga.App. 117, 427 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1993); S......
  • Horton v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1982
    ...248 Ga. 124, 281 S.E.2d 607 (1981), the victim had fired several shots at Burke before Burke returned fire.11 Thus, Ross v. State, 245 Ga. 173, 263 S.E.2d 913 (1980), is distinguishable because Ross, although not a juvenile, was only 18 years old. We also note that Ross presented an alibi t......
  • Huzzie v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 2, 1999
    ...of one corroborating the testimony of the other—that Huzzie planned and participated in the armed robberies. Ross v. State, 245 Ga. 173, 177, 263 S.E.2d 913 (1980). The evidence was sufficient to show that Huzzie was guilty as a party to the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Murphy v. State......
  • Millirons v. State, A04A1236.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 21, 2004
    ...and a Craftsman tool set. The victim later recovered all of the stolen items from the co-defendant. 1. In Ross v. State, 245 Ga. 173, 177(5), 263 S.E.2d 913 (1980), our Supreme Court held that the OCGA § 24-4-8 exception, upon which Millirons relies, "does not apply where the state does not......
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