Rosse v. Comm'r of Revenue, 121399

Decision Date13 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. SJC-08057,SJC-08057
Citation720 N.E.2d 791
Parties(Mass. 1999) THOMAS A. ROSSE & another <A HREF="#fr1-1" name="fn1-1">1 v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board.

Suffolk County

Marshall, C.J., Abrams, Lynch, Greaney, & Ireland, JJ.

Taxation, Income tax, Abatement, Gross income, Deduction from income. Statute, Construction.

Words, "Active conduct of trade or business."

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

William E. Halmkin (David B. Mack with him) for the taxpayers.

Pierce O. Cray, Assistant Attorney General (Anne T. Foley with him) for Commissioner of

Revenue.

ABRAMS, J.

Pursuant to G. L. c. 58A, § 13, the taxpayers appeal from a decision of the

Appellate Tax Board (board). The board affirmed the Commissioner of Revenue's

(commissioner's) denial of the taxpayers' applications for abatement of their 1989 and 1990

personal income taxes. The taxpayers, Thomas and Florence Rosse, sought to apply excess

deductions against dividend income under G. L. c. 62, § 2 (c). The board determined that

an abatement should not be granted because the dividend income was not earned in the active

conduct of a trade or business and because the dividend income was not "effectively connected

with the active conduct of a trade or business of the taxpayer." G. L. c. 62, § 2 (c). We

affirm the decision of the board.

1. Facts. a. Rosse Enterprises, Ltd. In 1983, Allied-Signal, Inc. (Allied), acquired Instrumentation

Laboratory, Inc., a medical and scientific instrumentation company founded by Thomas Rosse

(Rosse). In connection with the acquisition, Rosse exchanged his shares in Instrumentation

Laboratory for approximately one million Allied shares at a basis of less than one cent per share.

Because the Allied shares were worth significantly more than one cent, Rosse would have

realized large capital gains if he sold any of the stock and would have incurred significant taxes

on those gains. Therefore, as of 1989 and 1990, Rosse retained almost all of the Allied shares. In

1989 and 1990, Rosse's only connection with Allied was his ownership of the Allied shares and

his receipt of dividend payments from Allied.

In 1983, the year that Allied acquired Instrumentation Laboratories, Rosse established a sole

proprietorship, Rosse Enterprises Limited (REL). REL provided financing and consulting

services for startup companies, slow-growth companies, and other ventures that appeared to have

long-term potential for growth. Rosse hoped to earn money through REL in three ways: (1)

through interest income from companies to which he loaned money; (2) through increases in the

value of his equity position in companies to which he advanced money; and (3) through fees for

management consulting services provided by REL.

Much or all of the working capital for REL came from a brokerage account at Kidder, Peabody

(Kidder account) that existed long before Rosse founded REL. In each of the tax years at issue,

the taxpayers received approximately $2.3 million in Allied dividends. The dividends were wired

directly into the Kidder account. Other income also flowed into this account, including capital

gains from the sale of various stocks and from the sale of Rosse's yacht. Rosse drew on the

account both to capitalize REL and to pay personal expenses.

Rosse also funded REL by pledging some of the Allied shares as surety for various bank loans.

Rosse retained unrestricted use of the dividends from the pledged shares.

Occasionally, Rosse needed additional capital to fund REL. In these instances, Kidder, Peabody

advanced money at a margin against the contents of the Kidder account, which included the

Allied shares and their dividends, as well as other dividends.

b. The applications for abatement. For tax purposes, Massachusetts divides "Massachusetts gross

income" into two classes. G. L. c. 62, § 2. Part A gross income consists of dividends,

interest and net capital gains (with various exceptions). § 2 (b) (1). Part B gross income

consists of "the remainder of the Massachusetts gross income." § 2 (b) (2).

In 1989 and 1990, the tax rates for Part A income and Part B income varied significantly.2 Part

A income was taxed at a rate of 10% in 1989 and a rate of 12% in 1990. G. L. c. 62, § 4, as

amended through St. 1975, c. 684, § 41, and G. L. c. 62, § 4, as amended through St.

1990, c. 121, §§ 24-26. Part B income was taxed at a rate of 5% in 1989 and a rate

of 5.2% in 1990. Id. The more than $2 million of Allied dividends were Part A income, taxed at

the higher rate. The taxpayers sought to reduce the taxes on their Part A income.

The taxpayers sought an abatement under G. L. c. 62, § 2 (c). Generally, under G. L. c. 62,

a taxpayer may apply business and various other expenses as deductions against Part B income.

G. L. c. 62, § 2 (d). If the amount of the deductions exceeds the amount of Part B income,

then the excess deductions may be applied against Part A income, but only to the extent that the

Part A income is "effectively connected" with a "trade or business" of the taxpayer. G. L. c. 62,

§ 2 (c).

According to the taxpayers, the dividends from the Allied shares which were pledged for loans in

connection with REL were "effectively connected" with the "active trade or business" of REL.

The commissioner disagreed and denied both abatement applications. The taxpayers appealed to

the board, which upheld the commissioner's denial of the abatements.

2. The board's findings of fact. General Laws c. 58A, § 13, limits the scope of our review

of the board's findings of fact: "The decision of the board shall be final as to findings of fact."

However, "the court may consider whether the evidence in the case is sufficient to support the

board's conclusion of law." Kennametal, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 426 Mass. 39, 43

(1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1059 (1998), citing Assessors of Weymouth v. Curtis, 375 Mass.

493, 499 (1978); Boston Edison Co. v. Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 92 (1968). Our

review of the sufficiency of evidence is "limited to 'whether a contrary conclusion is not merely a

possible but a necessary inference from the findings.'" Kennametal, Inc. v. Commissioner of

Revenue, supra, quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 423 Mass. 42, 43

(1996).

The taxpayers make two claims as to the board's findings of fact. The first claim involves the

board's finding that the taxpayers' evidence as to the number of Allied shares pledged against

loans to REL was unsupported by the record. The board found that the taxpayers had presented

evidence that approximately one-half of the Allied shares were committed as pledges against

loans to REL during the 1989 and 1990 tax years. The taxpayers argue that the board's finding is

contrary to the evidence presented. We disagree.

After reviewing the documentation provided by the taxpayers, we conclude that the board's

findings of fact are sufficiently supported by the evidence.3 The board's decision carefully sorts

through copious loan documents to determine which pledges were substantiated in writing. The

board properly exercised its discretion in not crediting the testimony of REL's accountant that

more shares had been pledged than were explicitly evidenced in writing.

The taxpayers also claim that the board's findings as to the extent of Rosse's involvement with

the companies in which he invested were contrary to the evidence presented. We disagree.

The board found that Rosse was, at times, actively engaged in providing advice and assistance to

a few of the companies with which REL had a relationship. However, the board properly

exercised its discretion in not crediting oral testimony that this involvement continued

throughout 1989 and 1990. Nothing in the record contradicts the board's finding that Rosse's

involvement was not regular and continuous throughout the tax years in question.

3. "Active conduct of a trade or business." The taxpayers assert that Rosse's activities, conducted

under the auspices of REL, amounted to the active conduct of a venture capital business. The

board found that the taxpayers failed to establish that Rosse's involvement with the companies in

which he invested was continuous and regular throughout 1989 and 1990. Given this finding,

which accords with the record, the board's conclusion that Rosse's activities did not rise to the

level of "active conduct" was correct.

We also note that REL was not a "venture capital firm" or "business promoter" as those terms

generally are understood. General Laws c. 62, § 1, provides that "[w]hen used in this

chapter . . . 'Trade or business' shall have the same meaning as in section sixty-two of the

[Internal Revenue] Code." A number of decisions under the Code clarify when investments and

other activities constitute a "trade or business."

"Devoting one's time and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not of itself, and without

more, a trade or business of the person so engaged." Whipple v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963). In the context of deductions for bad debts connected with a

trade or business of a taxpayer, the Tax Court has noted that "the management of one's

investment, regardless of how extensive, is not a trade or business, and a loan from a shareholder

to a corporation for the purpose of protecting or enhancing the shareholder's investment in the

corporation is a nonbusiness debt." Bell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo.

1998-136 (1998).

On the other hand, the "business of promoting business entities" has been recognized under the

Code. Id. "To be engaged in a trade or business of promoting business entities, a taxpayer must

seek compensation 'other than the normal investor's return' and must conduct the activity for a fee

or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Dep't of Mental Health
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • August 15, 2014
    ...of Massachusetts, Privatization in Massachusetts: Getting Results 49 (Draft Nov. 1, 1993). See Rosse v. Commissioner of Revenue, 430 Mass. 431, 438 n. 6, 720 N.E.2d 791 (1999), quoting Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 384 Mass. 409, 421, 425 N.E.2d 313 (1981) (This court “may turn to ......
  • Veolia Energy Bos., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of Bos.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • September 11, 2019
    ...v. Boston Edison Co., 310 Mass. 674, 676, 39 N.E.2d 584 (1942), citing G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 58A, § 13. See Rosse v. Commissioner of Revenue, 430 Mass. 431, 433, 720 N.E.2d 791 (1999) (" [G. L.] c. 58A, § 13, limits the scope of our review of the board's findings of fact"). In addition, the b......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT