Rossell v. Armstrong
| Decision Date | 13 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-02737-TLP-dkv,2:14-cv-02737-TLP-dkv |
| Parties | MARICO TREMAYNE ROSSELL Plaintiff, v. TONEY ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
JURY DEMAND
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on April 12, 2017 (ECF No. 25), by Defendants, Former Memphis Police Officer Brett A. Murphy and Memphis Police Officer Jason W. Williford (individually referred to as "Murphy" and "Williford," and collectively as "Defendants"). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
On September 19, 2014, pro se Plaintiff Marico Tremayne Rossell ("Plaintiff"), who, until recently was an inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed his pro se Complaint against Defendants, Retired Memphis Police Chief Toney Armstrong, and a "John Doe" Memphis Police Internal Affairs Officer Defendant, claiming violations of his constitutional rights and seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Williford in particular, used excessive force in effecting Plaintiff's arrest on September 17, 2013, and that Defendants denied Plaintiff adequate medical treatment after his arrest, which violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at PageID 7.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5), and subsequently dismissed portions of the Complaint and directed that process be served on Murphy and Williford, the remaining Defendants. (ECF No. 7.) Murphy is no longer employed with MPD, but Williford is. (ECF Nos. 25-3, 25-4.) Williford filed his Answer on April 28, 2016, and Murphy filed his Answer on December 5, 2016. (ECF No. 23.)
On April 12, 2017, Defendants jointly filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"), arguing that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights and that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. (ECF No. 25.) There was no further activity in this case until it was transferred to the Undersigned on February 26, 2018 (ECF No. 26), and this Court issued a Writ of Habeus Corpus ad testificandum ordering that Plaintiff appear on March 22, 2018 for a Status Conference with Defendants. (ECF Nos. 28, 29.) At the Status Conference, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by April 3, 2018. (ECF No. 33.)
On March 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a "Show Cause Order," purportedly as his response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff's "Response"). (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff's Response expands Plaintiff's account of Defendants' alleged conduct during the course of Plaintiff's arrest on September 17, 2013, but it fails to cite any law or rebut material facts introduced through the sworn statements attached to Defendants' Motion.
The Court draws the following facts from Williford and Murphy's Affidavits and those contained in Plaintiff's Response.
On September 17, 2013, Williford observed Plaintiff driving without his seatbelt on and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 116.)1 Plaintiff did not stop when Williford activated his blue lights and sirens; instead, he drove slowly for a distance, turned on Tunica Street, and pulled into the driveway of 1439 Tunica Street, Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 116; ECF No. 34 at PageID 141.) Plaintiff was unable to produce a driver's license and smelled strongly of alcohol, so Williford asked him to step out of his vehicle to be detained in order for Williford to identify him and investigate the source of the smell. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 116; ECF No. 34 at PageID 142.)
While Williford was patting down Plaintiff and checking his pockets, Plaintiff reached into his pocket, pulled out a bag of cocaine, and tried to throw it onto the vehicle's windshield. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 116; ECF No. 34 at PageID 141.) Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants' sworn statements that, at this time, Plaintiff began resisting Williford's attempts to detain him and tried to flee. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 117; ECF No. 25-4 at PageID 121.) Plaintiff's attempts to flee involved turning toward Williford and placing his arms around his waist, at which time Williford punched Plaintiff in the face three times with his closed fist. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 117; ECF No. 34 at PageID 142.) Immediately following this struggle, Murphy assisted Williford by placing Plaintiff in an arm lock in order to subdue Plaintiff and place him under arrest. (ECF No. 25-4 at PageID 121.) Plaintiff sustained a bloody lip during the struggle but did not request medical transport. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 117; ECF No. 34 at PageID 142.) Plaintiff was then transported to the Shelby County Jail located at 201 Poplar Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No. 25-3 at PageID 117.)
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012). "A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense." Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A dispute over material facts is 'genuine' 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper." Chapman, 670 F.3d at 680 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); accord Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2012).
"The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). "Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact." Id. at 448-49 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 574, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis added)).
"To withstand summary judgment, the nonmovant must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Whitehead v. Bowen, 301 Fed. App'x 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548). A court must draw all reasonableinferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Phelps v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F.3d 725, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 574). "The central issue is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505). "[A] mere 'scintilla' of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party must present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in [his or] her favor." Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
Pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are to be "liberally construed," and pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Cage v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., No. 14-2290-JDT-CGC, 2014 WL 5795544, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2014) (citations omitted). But the leniency accorded to pro se litigants has its limits, and "when a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court rule, the Court need not treat him any differently than a represented litigant." Brittenham v. Dinsa, No. CIVA 10-10257, 2010 WL 1576842, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 2010) () (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Pro se litigants and prisoners are not exempt from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Herron v. Barlow, No. 15-2145-JDT-DKV, 2016 WL 1448883, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 12, 2016).
The Court reads Plaintiff's Complaint to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) "In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force." Grahamv. Connor, 409 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). All of Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendants' alleged use of excessive force during Plaintiff's arrest and their failure to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical treatment shortly thereafter. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) Defendants' Motion argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's excess force claim. Defendants' Motion does not address Plaintiff's claim that Defendants failed to provide adequate medical treatment; however, the Court's analysis covers both of these claims.
Plaintiff's excessive force allegations implicate the Fourth Amendment, and not the Eighth Amendment, because they occurred during his arrest. "The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person...
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