Rosser v. Texas Co.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1935
• Docket Number: 24307.
• Citation: 48 P.2d 327,173 Okla. 309
• Parties: ROSSER v. TEXAS CO.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

48 P.2d 327

173 Okla. 309

ROSSER v. TEXAS CO.

No. 24307.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

July 2, 1935

Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1935.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The essential elements necessary to create an estoppel are First, there must exist a false representation or concealment of material facts. Second, it must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts. Third, the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge, of the real facts. Fourth, it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon. Fifth, the party to whom it was made must have relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice.

2. A person relying on an estoppel must have exercised such reasonable diligence as the circumstances of the case require, and if he conducts himself with a careless indifference to the means of information reasonably at hand or ignores highly suspicious circumstances, which should warn him of danger or loss, he cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel.

3. No estoppel arises where the party setting it up is under as great obligation to inform the person sought to be estopped of the real facts as the latter is to inform himself. There can be no estoppel where the truth is known to both parties or where they both have equal means of knowledge.

4. A party claiming estoppel must have proceeded in good faith. Good faith is defined in section 31, O. S. 1931, as follows "Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious."

5. When the evidence is undisputed, or is so clearly preponderant that it reasonably admits of but one conclusion, the proper disposition of the case upon the evidence becomes a question of law to be determined by the court.

Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Thurman S. Hurst, Judge.

Action by the Texas Company against I. G. Rosser. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Biddison, Campbell, Biddison & Cantrell, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

J. H. Hill, John R. Ramsey, B. W. Griffith, and Sol H. Kauffman, all of Tulsa, for defendant in error.

CORN Justice.

The defendant in error, the Texas Company, a Delaware corporation, in whose name the case was revived, prosecuted this action brought by plaintiff's predecessor against the plaintiff in error, I. G. Rosser, to recover the sum of $8,047.20, the said amount being alleged to have been received as the proceeds of the check of the plaintiff's predecessor wrongfully issued and payable to defendant, alleging that the defendant received fraudulently and without right said sum of money from the plaintiff.

The defendant by his answer and amendment thereto defended upon the ground that the plaintiff's own negligence caused its said loss and plaintiff was estopped to assert or claim that the defendant was liable to plaintiff, and estopped to deny that the check sued upon was issued and delivered to defendant in due course for value without notice on the part of the defendant of any infirmities therein; that said original plaintiff received full value of said check upon the issuance and delivery thereof; and that plaintiff received the benefits thereof and received the oil described in said check.

The case was tried to a jury and at the close of the evidence each party moved the court for an instructed verdict in its and his favor.

The further proceedings are as follows:

"The Court: What does the plaintiff say there is to submit to the jury?

Mr. Moss: Nothing.

The Court: What does the defendant say?

Mr. Biddison: The only thing that could go to the jury, and I say there is no controversy in the evidence about it, is the question of estoppel.

The Court: So both sides say there is no conflict in the testimony to be submitted to this jury, and therefore it is a question of law for the court?

Mr. Moss: Yes, sir.

Mr. Biddison: Yes, sir.

Mr. Moss: Let me suggest to your honor this. These two motions of ours, by these opposite parties, do not withdraw as a matter of law, this case from the jury. If there is anything for the jury to determine I should be glad to stipulate with these gentlemen that the case shall be decided by the court upon these questions, then that will sure bind us.

Mr. Biddison: We say there is absolutely nothing to submit to the jury in the case, except the question of estoppel and there is no dispute upon that proposition. There is no dispute about the evidence."

"The Court: Gentlemen of the jury the court is directing you to render a verdict in this case for the plaintiff for the sum of $8047.20 with interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the 18th day of July, 1923. This is done for the reason that the Court holds as a matter of law that under the undisputed evidence in this case that Mr. Rosser took this money under such circumstances that he ought to have made some inquiry of the true owner, The Texas Company, as to how it should be applied."

The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court. The uncontroverted evidence showed the following facts: That one J. E. Goss, a defendant in the action who defaulted, was in the employ of plaintiff on February 15, 1921, and was then in charge of one of plaintiff's departments; that he either prepared or had the check in question prepared, and in so doing used as a basis for the procurement of the signatures of plaintiff's proper officers thereon and the issuance thereof the amount of 2,299.20 barrels of oil.

The further facts, as disclosed by the record, show that Goss took the check to the defendant and told him that he had purchased some oil from a woman, for his company, and was making a profit on it, and that was against the rules of the company, and, therefore, he had bought the oil in Rosser's name and had a check issued to him. The defendant accepted the said check issued to him by the plaintiff in the sum of $8,047.20, indorsed the check and had the full amount deposited to his credit in the bank, and in turn gave his check to Goss for $8,000.

The defendant testified that he had been acquainted with Goss for a period of ten years prior to the transaction, that he was not in the business of buying and selling oil, and had never sold any oil to said company, and that said company was not indebted to him at the time said check was issued in the sum of $8,047.20, or in any amount, and that he did not purchase the oil from this woman, that he did not have any agreement with Goss prior to the date the check was brought to him at his store, and it was merely an accommodation on his part, an exchange of checks; and he further testified that the difference between the checks in the sum of $47.20 was applied on the account that Goss owed at the Rosser-Casebeer Furniture Company, and that he, Rosser, was president of the said company.

But the further fact as disclosed by the answer filed by said defendant, touching upon the difference in the amount of the two checks, is as follows: "This defendant further alleges that his only connection with the cashing of the check was to cash the same as an accommodation to the said J. E. Goss, Jr., in whom he reposed confidence, without thought of or intent to wrong, deceive or defraud the plaintiff, and that this defendant only received of the proceeds of said check the sum of $47.00 and as he had no intent to defraud the plaintiff either in his own behalf or in behalf of the said J. E. Goss, Jr., he cannot be liable to plaintiff for more than the sum actually received, which he now tenders into court."

The plaintiff in error complains of various rulings of the trial court, but states in his brief that he elects to stand upon the one proposition that his evidence to sustain the plea of estoppel was uncontradicted and was undoubtedly sufficient to entitle him to have it submitted to the jury, and plaintiff in error elects to stand upon the refusal of the court to submit it to the jury, claiming the same to be error, and further states, in his brief: "For the purpose of this...