Rossi v. Univ. of Utah
| Decision Date | 24 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-00767 |
| Parties | CHRISTINA ROSSI, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a Utah state educational institution; F. EDWARD DUDEK, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; KRISTIN A. KEEFE, an individual, in her official and individual capacities; JOHN A. WHITE, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; JEFFREY J. EKSTRAND, an individual, in his official and individual capacities, BRADLEY GREGER, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; JEFFERY R. BOTKIN, an individual, in his official and individual capacities; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Plaintiff Christina Rossi was dismissed from the University of Utah's Ph.D. program in Neuroscience in January 2014. Ms. Rossi challenges the dismissal, which followed over five years of graduate work in the program, as a violation of her procedural and substantive due process rights under federal law and a violation of her rights under various state laws. This matter comes before the court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss the University of Utah and the Faculty Defendants in their Official Capacity [Dkt. No. 28], and defendants' Motion to Dismiss Faculty Defendants in their Individual Capacities [Dkt. No. 29]. The court has carefully reviewed the parties' motions and memoranda, oral arguments, and the relevant law. For the reasons below, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part both motions.
Ms. Rossi's Amended Complaint consists of 303 paragraphs of carefully pled factual allegations asserting eight separate causes of action. Her first and second claims for procedural and substantive due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are brought solely against the faculty defendants in their individual capacities for damages and in their official capacities for injunctive relief. State law claims of negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are brought solely against the University of Utah. Ms. Rossi also brings declaratory relief and injunctive relief claims, state law defamation claims against defendant Dr. Dudek individually, and a state law breach of fiduciary duty claim against both the University of Utah and defendant Dr. Dudek individually.
To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff's complaint "must plead facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal punctuation omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013). The court must "accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and mustconstrue them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Jefferson Cty., 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 2014). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Sutton v. Utah Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).
The court first considers defendants' arguments that the Eleventh Amendment bars Ms. Rossi's claims against the University and the faculty defendants and finds that the claims against the University of Utah are barred. Next, defendants' arguments that the faculty defendants are entitled to qualified immunity are considered and rejected. The court then determines that Ms. Rossi's injunctive relief claim is proper, but dismisses her declaratory relief claim. Thereafter, the court determines that there is an insufficient affirmative link to sustain Ms. Rossi's claims against Dr. Greger in his individual and official capacity, and against Dr. Ekstrand in his individual capacity. Finally, the court retains Ms. Rossi's defamation claims against Dr. Dudek and dismisses her breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Actions in federal court against states and state entities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). The University of Utah is considered an "arm of the state." Roach v. University of Utah, 968 F. Supp. 1446, 1450 (D. Utah 1997). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the court cannot exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to address plaintiff'sstate law claims against the University of Utah. Pettigrew v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 722 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2013) (). There is no substantive allegation of a waiver here. Therefore, the court dismisses all of Ms. Rossi's claims against the University of Utah.
Eleventh Amendment immunity applies not only to actions against states and state entities, but also to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions for damages brought against state officials in their official capacities. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Nevertheless, when sued for prospective injunctive relief, a "person" who violates federal rights while acting under color of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, can include "a state official in his or her official capacity," and such actions "are not treated as actions against the State." Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. See also Cornforth v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir. 2001) (). Because Ms. Rossi's § 1983 claims against the faculty defendants in their official capacities are only for prospective injunctive relief, the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss them in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
State officials can be sued for damages in their individual capacities pursuant to § 1983. Cornforth, 263 F.3d at 1132; see also Chenault v. Broadbent, No. 99-NC-133 K, 2000 WL33710850, *2 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2000) (unpublished) (citation omitted) ("Suits against individual state employees not in their official capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment and may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where proper."). Ms. Rossi's § 1983 claims for relief against the faculty defendants in their individual capacities only seek damages. Accordingly, the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss the faculty defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Ms. Rossi's complaint alleges a deprivation of her liberty and/or property interests that implicates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. The faculty defendants in their individual capacities assert that qualified immunity bars plaintiff from pursuing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims against them. State officials are generally shielded from civil damage liability when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Gomez v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Ms. Rossi bears the burden of showing that the well-pleaded facts in her complaint allege that defendants (1) violated a constitutional or statutory right (2) that was clearly established at the time of the unlawful conduct. Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). If she fails to meet this burden, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The court has discretion to analyze the two prongs of qualified immunity in any order depending on the factual circumstances of the individual case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
The court begins with Ms. Rossi's claim that her dismissal from the Ph.D. program violated her substantive due process rights because defendants arbitrarily responded to her faculty mentor's (Dr. Dudek's) conflict of interest and research misconduct allegations against her. "[I]n order to present a claim of denial of substantive due process by a discharge for arbitrary or capricious reasons, a liberty or property interest must be present to which the protection of due process can attach." Sipes v. United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1420 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held that individuals have a protected property interest in their enrollment in a program of public education. See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975); Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001). Similarly, such individuals also have a protected liberty interest against state actors arbitrarily depriving them of their "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" because it may "interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). Thus, "[t]he Due Process Clause not only provides a procedural safeguard against deprivations of life, liberty, and property but also...
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