Gaspar v. Bruton, No. 74-1197

Decision Date10 April 1975
Docket NumberNo. 74-1197
Citation513 F.2d 843
PartiesDorothy GASPAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John C. BRUTON, Individually and as Superintendent of Gordon Cooper Area Vocational-Technical School, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Stephen Jones, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.

J. C. Winterringer, Shawnee, Okl., for defendants-appellees Greer, Brown, Weaver, Dollar and Coursey.

Wm. G. Smith, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees Burton, Hill, Grider, Mathis and Garrison.

Before SETH, BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge.

Dorothy Gaspar (Gaspar) appeals from the Trial Court Order granting the defendants'-appellees' (hereinafter jointly and individually referred to as "School" for convenience) Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal of her cause of action based upon the pleadings, detailed "discovery" materials, and hearings. Gaspar's suit was initiated when she was dismissed as a student.

FACTS

Gaspar was a student at Gordon-Cooper area Vocational-Technical School pursuing courses, studies and practical training in the Division of Practical Nursing at Shawnee, Oklahoma, from February to November, 1973. Mrs. Gaspar was about 44 years of age when she enrolled in the program. She had married following completion of her high school studies. Her husband had been employed at Tinker Air Field, Oklahoma City, for 25 years. She and her husband have two married daughters, one 28 years of age and one 17. Only one child, a son, resides at the family home in Meeker. He is age 13. Gaspar had been a housewife from the date of her marriage until enrolling in the School program.

School is publicly owned, tax supported. The defendants-appellees, sued individually and in their official capacities, are members of the Board of Directors, the Superintendent, administrative and faculty personnel of the School.

Gaspar and each of the defendants-appellees are citizens of the State of Oklahoma. Gaspar paid the requisite enrollment fees to the School and maintained adequate academic grade points in the objective or classroom portion of the course, i.e., written tests and examinations. The balance of the course involved clinical training, i. e., working with patients in clinical facilities, under supervision. On an annual twelve-month school year basis the course consists of about 725 classroom hours and about 834 clinical training hours covering three trimesters, the last of which involves clinical training exclusively. Gaspar had completed more than two-thirds of the program at the date of her dismissal.

School's Student Manual provides that supervised clinical experience is to be evaluated by the "school faculty". The Manual, under the heading of "Conduct" provides that "any disciplinary action necessary may be taken by the faculty but dismissal from the school of nursing for any reason will be acted upon only after consultation with the staff . . .." Under the heading of "Withdrawal and Dismissal" it is provided, inter alia, that "the faculty reserves the right to dismiss at any time a student whose health, work or conduct demonstrates any lack of fitness to continue the program." Under the heading of "Graduation Information" it is provided that "Satisfactory scholastic average and clinical performance must be achieved." In regard to the clinical performance requirement, the manual recites that upon completion of Trimester III (the final four months of the course), the student "should be able to" assist the patient in identifying and talking about problems, utilize problem-solving in planning and implementing patient care, identify, plan for, and meet the nursing needs of patients of all ages, assist patients in a health crisis, establish and maintain a therapeutic environment, identify and accept the feelings, thought and behaviors of self and others, etc.

Gaspar was placed on probation, September, 1973. At that time she was advised that she would be dismissed if the various clinical deficiencies she had been counseled about were not corrected.

When the dismissal of Gaspar was ultimately determined necessary, a conference was held in Superintendent Bruton's office. Dr. Bruton, Mrs. Mathis, Mrs. Grider, Mrs. Hill and Gaspar were present. The discussion was full, direct, and frank, although informal. Gaspar was informed of her dismissal on November 6, 1973. She met with the School Board that evening in the company of her husband. The Board requested that she appear before Superintendent Bruton for a hearing on her complaint, at which time she and Dr. Bruton could fully and independently interrogate the faculty and others.

When Gaspar met with Dr. Bruton on November 7th, he detailed to her the causes for her dismissal and he then informed her that Mrs. Hill, Mrs. Grider, and other staff-faculty members were in his outer office, available to be questioned so that there could be a complete discussion relating to the dismissal causes. He advised Gaspar she was free to say anything or make any inquiries. Gaspar rejected the conference invitation. She elected to confer solely with Dr. Bruton. She stated that it was her choice not to meet or to talk with anyone else because "Everything has been already said, everybody knows who feels how about what . . . I don't see any point in dragging it out."

On November 23, 1973, Gaspar brought this suit, alleging deprivation of her right to due process of law guaranteed her under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that the dismissal was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and that she was deprived of a property right "paid for and worked for without consultation, notice, hearing or other element of due process, or any sufficient legal cause for dismissal . . . ." (R., Vol. I, p. 4).

Gaspar's complaint claimed jurisdiction pursuant to: (1) 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (to redress alleged deprivation of rights secured to her by the Constitution or laws of the United States under color of Oklahoma state law, regulation, custom or usage); (2) 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (praying for declaratory judgment of her rights); (3) 28 U.S.C.A. § 2202 (further relief in the nature of order of reinstatement as student); and (4) 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (alleging that defendants-appellees, individually and jointly under color of law, regulation, custom or usage of the State of Oklahoma deprived her, as a citizen of the United States, of rights guaranteed her by the Constitution of the United States) violative of her contractual and due process rights. She alleged that she was denied her contractual and due process rights in: (1) that she was dismissed as a student without any just cause; (2) that she was not provided rights in conformance with the rules established in the School's students' pamphlet; and (3) that minimum standards of due process were denied her prior to her dismissal in that she was not accorded the right to be confronted with evidence relied upon to support the dismissal, that she was not accorded the right to cross-examine and challenge any evidence purportedly relied upon for her dismissal, and that she was not accorded the right to present evidence in her defense. She further alleged that her dismissal was without sufficient legal cause.

School acknowledged that Gaspar adequately completed the classroom courses and examination, but contended that she incompetently and unsatisfactorily performed the clinical training program portion of the course in the conduct of her clinical duties with patients and that, accordingly, her continuation in the program would create an unreasonably unsafe and dangerous medical atmosphere for the patients. Furthermore, School alleged that Gaspar received counseling, instructions and guidance as to her deficiencies, but that no improvement on her part occurred; that the dismissal followed consultations with the faculty and staff of the School; that Gaspar was provided a hearing before the Board of Education, followed by an unreported hearing before the Superintendent with an opportunity accorded her to be confronted by faculty and staff, and to freely present her position; and that thereafter a formal, reported hearing was held before the Board, with full opportunity accorded Gaspar to present her views and pose her objections to the dismissal, call any witnesses, and to be confronted with and examine any witnesses against her.

School filed its Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment alleging, inter alia, that there "is no justicable controversy as to the material facts . . . .", with attached exhibits and brief in support thereof.

An evidentiary hearing was held on January 4, 1974, on the motion for temporary restraining order, the motion for permanent restraining order, the motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, at which time the only testimony offered was that of Gaspar, in view of the uncontroverted statement by the Court that it had conducted two prior lengthy hearings and had considered the prior deposition of Gaspar together with the transcript of the hearing held before the Board on December 18, 1973, at Gaspar's request which involved detailed testimony, subject to cross-examination. 1

The hearing involved many exhibits and testimony from School witnesses:

Joyce Abel, R.N., Director of Nursing at Mission Hospital in Shawnee, who supervised and observed Gaspar's clinical work testified that Gaspar was "a very nervous person" and that she continually tried to upgrade herself in the nursing field by her conversation; that the staff reports were adverse in many areas in that Gaspar did not have the ability to organize and complete her assignments, and that she could not, in her opinion, perform adequately as a Practical Nurse.

Genevieve Harrison, Chief R.N. in the newborn nursery of Shawnee Medical Hospital, who supervised and instructed Gaspar in that area testified that she gave Gaspar extra...

To continue reading

Request your trial
68 cases
  • Gardner v. Schumacher
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 13 Enero 2021
    ...as a property interest ... is protected by the Due Process Clause,’ " Lee I, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 1122 (quoting Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) ), but thatdamage to "reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employment," is insufficient to invoke th......
  • Anderson v. Banks
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
    • 17 Junio 1981
    ...affairs where disciplinary matters are not involved. See Horowitz, supra; Greenhill v. Bailey, supra, 519 F.2d at 7; Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1975), and cases noted therein. Plaintiffs' complaint that the notice of the CAT requirement provided was constitutionally inadequate......
  • Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 1 Marzo 1978
    ...institutions can be enjoined if "shown to be clearly arbitrary or capricious." Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d, at 449. See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d, at 850, and citations therein. Even assuming that the courts can review under such a standard an academic decision of a public educational ......
  • Alcorn v. Vaksman
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 12 Mayo 1994
    ...699, 703 (8th Cir.1981)); see Eiland v. Wolf, 764 S.W.2d 827, 833 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir.1975); Wilkenfield v. Powell, 577 F.Supp. 579, 583 (W.D.Tex.1983). Vaksman maintains that his academic dismissal was motivated b......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT