Rosso v. Magraw

Decision Date29 April 1961
Docket NumberNo. 16633.,16633.
Citation288 F.2d 840
PartiesPaul ROSSO, Appellant, v. Daniel B. MAGRAW et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Paul Rosso, Minneapolis, Minn., pro se.

William B. Randall, City Atty., St. Paul, Minn., for appellees (Walter F. Mondale, St. Paul, Minn., for appellee, Joseph L. Donovan, Secretary of State of Minn., Douglas K. Amdahl, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee, Robert F. Fitzsimmons, Auditor of Hennepin County, Minn., Frank S. Farrell, St. Paul, Minn., for appellees-plaintiffs, Owen V. Thompson, Fergus Falls, Minn., for appellee S. B. Johnson, Auditor of Ottertail County, Minn., on the brief).

Before SANBORN, VAN OOSTERHOUT and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court entered September 29, 1960, denying the appellant leave to intervene as a plaintiff in an action brought in 1957 by certain residents and citizens of densely populated areas of Minnesota against the Secretary of State of Minnesota and various County Auditors. The title of the action, as abbreviated, is Magraw v. Donovan. The plaintiffs in that action asked that the 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act (Chap. 91, Minn.Laws 1913; Minn.Stat.1957, § 2.02 et seq.) be declared invalid and that the Secretary of State and County Auditors be enjoined from conducting elections under that statute. Federal jurisdiction was based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 et seq. Motions of three intervening defendants to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied on March 21, 1958. 159 F.Supp. 901. A statutory three-judge court was convened, which heard the case on the merits but, by opinion of July 10, 1958, deferred final decision in order to afford the Minnesota Legislature, at its 1959 Session, an opportunity to deal with the problem of reapportionment of legislative districts. 163 F.Supp. 184.

On August 18, 1959, the plaintiffs moved the District Court for leave to dismiss the action, without prejudice, on the ground that, because of provisions made by the Legislature, at its 1959 Session (see Minn.Laws 1959, Extra Session, c. 45; * * * M.S.A. § 2.02 et seq.), for a reapportionment of legislative districts, the purpose of the plaintiffs in bringing their action had been achieved and they no longer wished to maintain or prosecute it further. The plaintiffs' motion to dismiss was granted on October 26, 1959. Magraw v. Donovan, 177 F. Supp. 803.

The appellant, Rosso, applied for leave to intervene as a plaintiff ...

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4 cases
  • Honsey v. Donovan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • December 4, 1964
    ...172, 9 L.Ed.2d 168. 4 For other aspects of the same litigation see Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F.Supp. 901 (D.Minn.1958), and Rosso v. Magraw, 288 F.2d 840 (8 Cir. 1961). 5 Exceptions as to both Senate and House are (a) the metropolitan counties of Hennepin (Thirtieth District to Forty-second Di......
  • Norman v. Arkansas Dept. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 3, 1996
    ...been brought." In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir.1977); see also Rosso v. Magraw, 288 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir.1961) (per curiam ). We think that this principle applies with equal force when the court dismisses a case without prejudice on its own ......
  • Matthews v. Riviera Equipment, Inc., 58995
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1980
    ...suit had never been brought in the first place." Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 1959). Accord, Rosso v. Magraw, 288 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1961); A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498 (2nd Cir. 1952). We adopt this interpretation, as to allow reinstatement would render m......
  • Johnston v. Cartwright
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 29, 1965
    ...without prejudice, and dismissal was so entered as to them. This terminated all pendency of the litigation as to them. Rosso v. Magraw, 288 F.2d 840, 841 (8 Cir. 1961). Their situation became legally "the same as if the suit had never been brought". Boner v. Ribicoff, 304 F.2d 427, 428 (6 C......

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