Roth v. Mercy Health Ctr. Inc.

Decision Date18 January 2011
Docket Number984.,No. 104,104
Citation246 P.3d 1079,2011 OK 2
PartiesElizabeth ROTH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Geneva M. Roth, deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant/Counter–Appellee,v.MERCY HEALTH CENTER, INC., a/k/a Mercy Health System of Oklahoma, a/k/a Mercy Health Care Corporation, and James D. Dixson, M.D., Defendants/Appellees/Counter–Appellees.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION 1¶ 0 The Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, affirmed the District Court of Oklahoma County, Honorable Daniel Owens' order denying Elizabeth Roth's (Plaintiff) initial request to add additional defendants because Plaintiff commenced this wrongful death action in her individual capacity before being appointed personal representative of her mother's estate, Geneva M. Roth (Decedent). The cause proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants Mercy Health Center, Inc. a/k/a Mercy Health System of Oklahoma a/k/a Mercy Health Care Corporation (Mercy) and James D. Dixson, M.D. (Dr. Dixson). Plaintiff appealed. We conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the same.CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT VACATED; AND CAUSE REMANDED.Rick Bisher, Ryan, Bisher, Ryan, Oklahoma City, for Plaintiff Elizabeth Roth.Chris L. Fox, Heron, Sweet, Fox & Trout, P.C., Oklahoma City, for Defendant Mercy Health Center.Hilton H. Walters, Rife & Walters, Oklahoma City, and Alison A. Cave, Edmond, for Defendant James D. Dixson, M.D.COLBERT, V.C.J.

¶ 1 This is a medical negligence and wrongful death action initiated by Plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of her deceased mother. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's jury verdict in favor of Defendants, Mercy and Dr. Dixson. The inquiry in this appeal concerns the trial court's discretion in denying Plaintiff's first motion to amend.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On January 12, 2003, 80 year-old Decedent slipped and fell at Morrison Floral Company while attending a birthday party and fractured the femur bone in her leg. Decedent was taken to Mercy's emergency room and was admitted for evaluation and treatment. Dr. Dixson, a general internist and a hospitalist, was Decedent's attending physician and coordinated her care. On January 20, 2003, Decedent was sent to Advance Care Hospital for rehabilitation. Advance Care Hospital is a long-term acute care hospital located within Mercy's physical facility. While at Advance Care Hospital, Decedent developed an atrial-flutter (abnormal heart rhythm). On Decedent's behalf, Dr. Dixson consulted with Dr. Brook Scott, a private practice cardiologist. Dr. Claude Nadeau, Dr. Scott's private practice partner, placed a pacemaker in Decedent and prescribed Betapace on February 10, 2003. Decedent went into respiratory distress on March 1, 2003, and was transferred to the ICU at Mercy. Decedent was diagnosed with congestive heart failure, pulmonary edema, and possible pneumonia. On March 2, 2003, Decedent experienced a cardiac arrest and was resuscitated. Dr. Kent Potts, a cardiologist, responded to the code blue and prescribed Amiodarone/Cordarone. Dr. Dixson then deferred administration of Amiodarone to Drs. Scott and Nadeau.

¶ 3 Decedent was discharged from Mercy on March 10, 2003. Dr. Dixson wrote an order for home health care. Dr. Scott wrote a discharge order for Amiodarone 400 mg “TID” (three times a day). Dr. Nadeau wrote a progress note recommending a tapering dose of Amiodarone. However, Dr. Nadeau's tapering dose was not implemented, and no order to change or counter Dr. Scott's discharge order was memorialized in the medical records. Dr. Dixson maintains he did not initiate treatment or make the decision to dose Decedent with Amiodarone; but relied on Dr. Scott's order and wrote the discharge prescription order for Amiodarone 400 mg TID.

¶ 4 From March 11, 2003, until March 21, 2003, Mercy At–Home provided daily home health care to Decedent. Mercy At–Home did not report any significant complications with her health. On March 23, 2003, Decedent became ill, fell, and was taken to Mercy's emergency room. She was admitted to Mercy and died April 11, 2003. Decedent was survived by her spouse, Lawrence K. Roth, and daughter, Elizabeth Roth.

¶ 5 On January 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action asserting medical malpractice and wrongful death claims against defendant Mercy, and a medical negligence claim against defendant Dr. Dixson, alleging Dr. Dixson breached the standard of care by overdosing her mother which caused pulmonary toxicity and death. Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself, individually, and as personal representative of Decedent's estate exactly one year, nine months and one day after her mother's death, but within the two year limitation period in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1053 (2001).

¶ 6 Mercy and Dr. Dixson answered the petition on January 27, and February 23, 2005, respectively, and raised Plaintiff's capacity to sue as an affirmative defense. Although the original petition identified Plaintiff as personal representative of her mother's estate, Plaintiff did not petition the probate court for appointment as Special Administrator/Representative of Decedent's estate until February 8, 2005. In fact, pursuant to Decedent's Last Will and Testament, Lawrence K. Roth was selected and previously served as the estate's personal representative in a separate negligence action.1 Nevertheless, on March 1, 2005, the probate court issued an order appointing Plaintiff as Personal Representative. Plaintiff's counsel promptly mailed copies of the same to Mercy and Dr. Dixson. It should be noted that prior to and during this action, the same counsel represented Decedent's husband and Plaintiff.

¶ 7 On March 23, 2005—at the beginning stages of discovery—Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended petition to add cardiologists Drs. Scott and Nadeau as two new party-defendants. Attached to Plaintiff's motion was the proposed amended petition with the corrected style designating Plaintiff as personal representative and adding the cardiologists as party-defendants. But on April 4, 2005, Mercy and Dr. Dixson objected contending that Plaintiff should not be permitted to amend a defective petition because she was not a proper party when the lawsuit commenced. In support of Defendants' position, Dr. Dixson affixed a copy of Plaintiff's probate Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator/Representative and the probate court's Order granting Plaintiff's petition. Mercy averred to the same, expressly adopting Dr. Dixson's objection in its responsive brief. On April 11, 2005, the statute of limitations expired; and on April 22, 2005, the trial court sustained Defendants' objection. Plaintiff then filed a combined motion to substitute herself as party-plaintiff and amend the petition to name additional party-defendants on April 29, 2005. On June 8, 2005, the trial court permitted Plaintiff to substitute herself as the real party in interest. Yet, the trial court refused to consider Plaintiff's motion to amend to add the cardiologists as party-defendants. It found Plaintiff “was not the proper party-plaintiff when she filed this action” and determined that Plaintiff's substitution as a real party in interest was not through inadvertent error or mistake.

¶ 8 Plaintiff filed a third motion to amend the petition on June 16, 2005, urging that Defendants concealed the identities of Drs. Scott and Nadeau. Plaintiff did not allege concealment in her first and second motions to amend. Dr. Dixson and Mercy objected to the motion asserting the statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claim had run under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2015(C) (2001)—which permits an amendment to relate back to the date of the original pleading for limitations purposes. Once again, the trial court denied Plaintiff's third motion to amend. In its July 29, 2005 order, the trial court found the identities and involvement of the cardiologists were well known by Plaintiff and not concealed; thus, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing good cause to add the cardiologists as party-defendants. Plaintiff's subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied.

¶ 9 Prior to trial, Dr. Dixson moved for summary judgment. He contended Plaintiff was unable to produce expert testimony on the issue of the breach of the standard of care, and thus was unable to sustain her burden of proving the necessary elements of her medical malpractice action. Dr. Dixson contends he followed the written order and dosage for Amiodarone scripted by Decedent's cardiologist. However, the trial court denied Dr. Dixson's motion. Mercy sought partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that Mercy was responsible for the acts and omissions of Drs. Scott and Nadeau under the ostensible agency theory. The trial court sustained Mercy's motion for partial summary judgment.

¶ 10 The matter proceeded to jury trial. During the trial, Defendants offered the video testimony of cardiologists, Drs. Scott and Nadeau. The cardiologists testified to Decedent's medical condition, their decision to treat Decedent with Amiodarone/Cordarone, and the importance of gradually tapering down Decedent's medication to avoid a relapse in Decedent's condition. Both cardiologists expressed their conflicting views on which criteria a cardiologist should follow in administering Amiodarone/Cordarone to a patient. Additionally, the cardiologists testified about their professional relationship with Dr. Dixson and Mercy, including the procedures through which their orders and medical opinions were used in treating Decedent. The jury returned a verdict in Defendants' favor, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. Plaintiff appealed. Defendants counter-appealed in the...

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