Roth v. State, F-2017-702

Decision Date16 September 2021
Docket NumberF-2017-702
PartiesRICHARD RAY ROTH, Appellant v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WAGONER COUNTY THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS KIRKLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES ON REMAND

KATRINA CONRAD-LEGLER OKLA. INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

JACK THORP DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAGONER COUNTY COUNSEL FOR THE STATE

MIKE HUNTER OKLA. ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHLEY L. WILLIS ASST. ATTY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE STATE

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

KATRINA CONRAD-LEGLER OKLA. INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

DAWN CASH, ACTING OKLA. ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHLEY L. WILLIS CAROLINE E.J. HUNT JENNIFER CRABB ASST. ATTYS. GENERALCOUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

SARA HILL CHEROKEE NATION ATTORNEY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE

ROGER WILEY MUSCOGEE NATION ATTORNEY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE

HUDSON, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE

¶1 Appellant, Richard Ray Roth, was tried by jury and convicted of Count 1: First Degree Manslaughter, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 711; and Count 2: Leaving the Scene of a Fatality Accident, in violation of 47 O.S.2011, § 10-102.1, in Wagoner County District Court, Case No CF-2013-592. The jury recommended a sentence of nineteen years imprisonment plus a $7, 500.00 fine on Count 1 and one year imprisonment plus a $1, 000.00 fine on Count 2. The Honorable Darrell Shepherd, District Judge, presided at trial and sentenced Roth in accordance with the jury's verdicts. The trial court ordered these sentences to run consecutively with credit for time served. Appellant must serve 85% of the sentence imposed on Count 1 before becoming eligible for parole. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. Appellant now appeals from these convictions and sentences.

¶2 The record in this case shows twelve-year-old Billy Jack Chuculate Lord died from injuries he sustained after being struck from behind by a Chevy Tahoe driven by Appellant. Lord was either riding or pushing his bicycle on a street in Wagoner at the time of the collision. Appellant drove away from the scene of the accident but later returned with his wife. Police at the scene detected a strong smell of alcohol on Appellant's breath and he admitted drinking two beers prior to the collision. Authorities drew blood from Appellant a short time later at a local hospital. Subsequent laboratory analysis of that blood sample revealed Appellant's BAC was 0.291 grams, well past the legal limit for driving.

* * * * *

¶3 In McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020), the Supreme Court held that the Creek Reservation in eastern Oklahoma was never disestablished by Congress and, thus, constitutes Indian Country for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. The parties in the present case have stipulated during remanded proceedings before the District Court that the victim was Indian and the crimes in this case occurred on the Creek Reservation. In today's decision, we uphold the District Court's adoption of these stipulations and address whether the State of Oklahoma has concurrent jurisdiction along with the United States to prosecute crimes committed on the Creek Reservation by non-Indian defendants against Indian victims. Based on the overwhelming weight of authority governing this issue, we conclude the State has no jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes charged here due to the victim's Indian status and the occurrence of the crimes in Indian Country. We therefore reverse and remand Appellant's convictions with instructions to dismiss.

I. Appellant's Jurisdictional Claim.

¶4 In Proposition One of his brief in chief on appeal, Appellant claims the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him. Appellant argues the victim was a citizen of the Cherokee Nation and the crimes occurred within the boundaries of the Creek Reservation. Pursuant to McGirt, Appellant's claim raises as a threshold matter two separate questions: (a) the Indian status of the victim; and (b) whether the crimes occurred on the Creek Reservation. These issues required fact-finding. We therefore remanded this case to the District Court of Wagoner County for an evidentiary hearing.

¶5 We instructed the District Court to determine whether the victim had some Indian blood and was recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government. The District Court was further ordered to determine whether the crimes in this case occurred in Indian Country. In so doing, the District Court was directed to consider any evidence the parties provided, including but not limited to treaties, statutes, maps, and/or testimony.

¶6 We also directed the District Court that in the event the parties agreed as to what the evidence would show with regard to the questions presented, the parties may enter into a written stipulation setting forth those facts upon which they agree and which answer the questions presented and provide the stipulation to the District Court. Finally, the District Court was ordered to file written findings of fact and conclusions of law with this Court.

II. The Remanded Proceedings.

¶7 A hearing was held in this case on October 19, 2020, before the Honorable Douglas Kirkley, District Judge. An order containing the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law from that hearing was timely filed with this Court along with a transcript of the hearing. The record shows the parties stipulated that the victim had 3/8th Cherokee blood and was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation Tribe at the time of his death; that the Cherokee Nation Tribe of Oklahoma is an Indian Tribal Entity recognized by the federal government; and that the charged crimes in this case occurred within the Creek Reservation. These written stipulations were signed by all counsel and were filed of record with the District Court.

¶8 In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the District Court accepted and found the facts as stipulated by the parties. On these facts, the District Court concluded that the victim was an Indian for purposes of federal law based on the percentage of Indian blood. The District Court further found the victim was recognized as an Indian either by the federal government or a tribe and that the Creek Reservation is Indian Country for purposes of federal law.

III. Post-Remand Supplemental Briefs.

¶9 Both Appellant and the State filed with this Court supplemental briefs after remand. In its brief, the State urges in light of the stipulations that it has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over the charged crimes in this case. Specifically, the State claims it has concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes committed by non-Indians against Indian victims in Indian Country. Alternatively, the State requests in its brief that should this Court find Appellant is entitled to relief based on the District Court's findings, this Court should stay any order reversing the convictions for thirty days so that the appropriate authorities can review his case, determine whether it is appropriate to file charges and take custody of Appellant. Cf. 22 O.S.2011, § 846.

¶10 In his brief, Appellant opposes the State's concurrent jurisdiction argument both procedurally and substantively. Appellant argues we have "no authority to consider" the State's concurrent jurisdiction argument because it goes beyond the scope of the remand order. Appellant complains the State should have raised the issue in its original response brief and not waited until now to raise it before the Court. Appellant further argues this claim substantively lacks merit. Appellant urges that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant's crimes because no federal statute authorizes state jurisdiction in this case.

IV. Analysis.

¶11 We find that under the law and evidence relief is warranted. The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are fully supported by the stipulations jointly made by the parties at the remanded hearing. Appellant has thus met his burden of establishing the victim's status as an Indian, having 3/8th degree Cherokee blood and being a member of the Cherokee Nation Tribe. Appellant has also met his burden of proving that the crimes in this case occurred on the Creek Reservation and, thus, occurred in Indian Country for purposes of federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151; McGirt, supra.

¶12 The State of Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction to prosecute Appellant in this matter. [1] We herein reject the State's concurrent jurisdiction argument. [2] Federal law broadly preempts state criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by, or against, Indians in Indian Country. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1152, the Indian Country Crimes Act, specifically governs Appellant's case. Under Section 1152, the United States has jurisdiction in Indian Country over crimes that non-Indians commit against Indians. McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2479; Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 & n.10 (1946). Section 1152 "extends the general criminal laws of federal maritime and enclave jurisdiction to Indian country, except for those offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian." Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993) (internal quotation omitted).

¶13 Congress's authority to regulate Indian affairs in this manner is well-established and remains exclusive. See e.g., McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2463 ("The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in this Nation's history." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) ("[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as 'plenary and exclusive.'" (quoting Washington...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT