Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 20060158.,20060158.
• Citation: 175 P.3d 560,2007 UT 96
• Parties: William ROTHSTEIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

175 P.3d 560

2007 UT 96

William ROTHSTEIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20060158.

Supreme Court of Utah.

December 18, 2007.

Jesse C. Trentadue, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Gordon Strachan, Kevin J. Simon, Park City, for defendant.

NEHRING, Justice:

¶ 1 William Rothstein, an expert skier, sustained injuries when he collided with a retaining wall while skiing at Snowbird Ski Resort. He sued Snowbird, claiming the resort's negligence caused his injuries. The district court granted Snowbird's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Rothstein's ordinary negligence claim. The district court agreed with Snowbird that Mr. Rothstein had surrendered his right to recover damages for Snowbird's ordinary negligence when he became a party to two agreements releasing Snowbird from liability for its acts of negligence. In this appeal, Mr. Rothstein challenges the enforceability of the releases and the district court's summary judgment based on them. We hold that the releases are contrary to the public policy of this state and are, therefore, unenforceable. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Snowbird.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, as in this case, we review the facts and their reasonable inferences in a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, ¶ 2, 167 P.3d 1011. We present the facts surrounding Mr. Rothstein's injury in this light.

¶ 3 As he was descending Snowbird's Fluffy Bunny run, Mr. Rothstein collided with a retaining wall constructed of stacked railroad ties and embedded partially in the mountain. The collision left Mr. Rothstein with broken ribs, an injured kidney, a bruised heart, a damaged liver, and a collapsed lung. At the time of the accident, a light layer of snow camouflaged the retaining wall from Mr. Rothstein's view. As photographs and the alleged admission of a resort official suggest, the retaining wall was unmarked and no measures had been taken to alert skiers to its presence. Although Snowbird had placed a rope line with orange flagging near the wall, there remained a large gap between the end of the rope and a tree, which Mr. Rothstein incorrectly understood indicated an entrance to the Fluffy Bunny run. Mr. Rothstein filed suit against Snowbird for its ordinary and gross negligence.¹ Snowbird defended itself by asserting that Mr. Rothstein had waived his ability to sue Snowbird for its ordinary negligence when he purchased two resort passes that released the resort from liability for its ordinary negligence.

¶ 4 At the time he was injured, Mr. Rothstein held a season pass to Snowbird and a Seven Summits Club membership which entitled him to bypass lift lines for faster access to the slopes. In order to obtain these benefits, Mr. Rothstein signed two release and indemnify agreements. The first agreement provided:

I hereby waive all of my claims, including claims for personal injury, death and property damage, against Alta and Snowbird, their agents and employees. I agree to assume all risks of personal injury, death or property damage associated with skiing ... or resulting from the fault of Alta or Snowbird, their agents or employees. I agree to hold harmless and indemnify Alta and Snowbird ... from all of my claims, including those caused by the negligence or other fault of Alta or Snowbird, their agents and employees

(emphasis in original). The second agreement stated:

In consideration of my use of the Snowbird Corporation (Snowbird) ski area and facilities, I agree to assume and accept all risks of injury to myself and my guests, including the inherent risk of skiing, the risks associated with the operation of the ski area and risks caused by the negligence of Snowbird, its employees, or agents. I release and agree to indemnify Snowbird, all landowners of the ski area, and their employees and agents from all claims for injury or damage arising out of the operation of the ski area or my activities at Snowbird, whether such injury or damage arises from the risks of skiing or from any other cause including the negligence of Snowbird, its employees and agents

(emphasis in original).

¶ 5 Citing the agreements, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Snowbird on Mr. Rothstein's ordinary negligence claim. (Mr. Rothstein later voluntarily moved to dismiss his gross negligence claim without prejudice.) The issue before us is whether the district court correctly granted Snowbird summary judgment on Mr. Rothstein's ordinary negligence claim on the basis of the existence of the release and indemnify agreements.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6 Preinjury releases from liability for one's negligence pit two bedrock legal concepts against one another: the right to order one's relationship with another by contract and the obligation to answer in damages when one injures another by breaching a duty of care. E.g., Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 442. We have joined the majority of jurisdictions in permitting people to surrender their rights to recover in tort for the negligence of others. Id. ¶ 15. We have made it clear throughout our preinjury release jurisprudence, however, that contract cannot claim victory over tort in every instance. We have indicated that releases that are not sufficiently clear and unambiguous cannot be enforced. Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, ¶ 9 n. 3, 37 P.3d 1062. We have also indicated that we would refuse to enforce releases that offend public policy. Id. ¶ 9. We do not explore the clarity with which Snowbird communicated to Mr. Rothstein its intention to release itself of liability for its negligence because we conclude that the releases offend the public policy of this state as articulated by the Legislature.

¶ 7 We first insisted that preinjury releases be compatible with public policy a century ago when we affirmed Christine Pugmire's jury verdict awarding her damages for injuries she sustained when a locomotive ran into the railroad car in which she lived and worked as a cook.² Pugmire v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 33 Utah 27, 92 P. 762, 763, 767 (1907). Mrs. Pugmire had signed a release absolving the railroad from liability for any injuries she might sustain. We affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that Mrs. Pugmire could be bound by the release, noting that such master-servant agreements "are held to be void ... [because] they are against public policy." Id. at 765.

¶ 8 By the time it was adopted within the Restatement of Torts in 1965, the principle that the interests of public policy could supplant the interests of contract had acquired universal acceptance. See, e.g., Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90, 75 S.Ct. 629, 99 L.Ed. 911 (1955); Am. S.S. Co. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 333 F.2d 426, 428-29 (7th Cir.1964); Mohawk Drilling Co. v. McCullough Tool Co., 271 F.2d 627, 633 (10th Cir.1959); Gilpin v. Abraham, 218 F.Supp. 414, 415 (E.D.Pa.1963). Section 496B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states, "A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy."³ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1965).

¶ 9 Our recent encounters with preinjury releases have uniformly reaffirmed the public policy exception to the general rule that preinjury releases are enforceable. See, e.g., Hawkins, 2001 UT 94, ¶ 1, 37 P.3d 1062 (holding invalid as contrary to public policy a waiver of liability and an indemnity provision that an equestrian group required individuals to sign before riding horses).

¶ 10 Despite our willingness to invoke public policy as the justification for refusing to enforce certain preinjury releases, we are mindful of the caution with which we must proceed when contemplating this analytic approach. Ascertaining when a preinjury release sufficiently offends public policy to warrant stripping the release of its enforceability can be difficult. As the example of preinjury releases for negligence amply illustrates, the quest to identify good public policy in a particular instance often requires a court to account for two or more conflicting policies, each laudable, but none of whose claims on the good can be fully honored. Extracting public policy from statutes can be no less challenging. Moreover, in most instances, our proper role when confronted with a statute should be restricted to interpreting its meaning and application as revealed through its text. To pluck a principle of public policy from the text of a statute and to ground a decision of this court on that principle is to invite judicial mischief. Like its cousin legislative history, public policy is a protean substance that is too often easily shaped to satisfy the preferences of a judge rather than the will of the people or the intentions of the Legislature. We aptly noted the risks of relying on public policy rationales when we stated that "`the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as a basis for judicial determinations, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection.'" Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989) (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930)). When, however, the Legislature clearly articulates public policy, and the implications of that public policy are unmistakable, we have the duty to honor those expressions of policy in our rulings. Such is the case here.

¶ 11 Seldom does a statute address directly the public policy relevant to the precise legal issue confronting a court. Here, no statute or other...