Rounds v. Berryhill, Case No. CIV-16-026-KEW
| Decision Date | 31 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-16-026-KEW |
| Parties | MELISSA F. ROUNDS, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma |
Plaintiff Melissa F. Rounds (the "Claimant") requests judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying Claimant's application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Claimant appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ incorrectly determined that Claimant was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, it is the finding of this Court that the Commissioner's decision should be and is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . ." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.1
Judicial review of the Commissioner's determination is limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's review is limited to two inquiries: first, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and, second, whether the correct legalstandards were applied. Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). The term "substantial evidence" has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the agency. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the court must review the record as a whole, and the "substantiality of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see also, Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant was born on June 25, 1979 and was 36 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. Claimant completed he education through the tenth grade. Claimant has worked in the past as a daycare center aide. Claimant alleges an inability to work beginning October 2, 2007 due to limitations resulting from affective mood disorder (bipolar) and seizures.
On March 23, 2012, Claimant protectively filed for supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI (42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.) of the Social Security Act. Claimant's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. On March 2, 2015, an administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") B.D. Crutchfield in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He issued an unfavorable decision on August 8, 2015. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision on December 24, 2015. As a result, the decision of the ALJ represents the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of further appeal. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. He determined that while Claimant suffered from severe impairments, she did not meet a listing and retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels.
Claimant asserts the ALJ committed error in (1) reaching an RFC which is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) finding at step five that Claimant could perform other jobs; (3) performing an erroneous credibility assessment; and (4) failing to fully developthe record by obtaining further consultative evaluations of Claimant's mental limitations.
In his decision, the ALJ found Claimant suffered from the severe impairment of affective mood disorder. (Tr. 12). The ALJ determined Claimant retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the non-exertional limitations of performing simple tasks with routine supervision; her psychiatric symptoms have a moderate impact on her functioning but with mediation compliance they should not interrupt her ability to work; she could relate to supervisors and peer on a superficial work basis; she could not relate to the general public; she may have moderate difficulty with receiving constructive feedback from supervisors; she may have occasional distracting behavior at the workplace due to her symptoms; and she could adapt to a work situation. (Tr. 14).
After consulting with a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Claimant could perform the representative jobs of hand packager, laundry worker, and dishwasher, all of which the ALJ determined existed in sufficient numbers in both the regional and national economies. (Tr. 20). As a result, the ALJ determined Claimant was not under a disability since March 23, 2012, the date the application was filed. Id.
Claimant contends that the ALJ erred in his RFC assessment. Claimant first asserts that his mental impairments would preclude sustained employment. In particular, Claimant states that the report of Dr. Robert Spray contradicts the ALJ's RFC conclusions. On September 6, 2012, Dr. Spray conducted a mental diagnostic evaluation of Claimant. Among his findings was a moderate impairment of Claimant's concentration and attention. He also found Claimant persisted well during the exam, but her ability to persist with job-like tasks may wax and wane depending upon her mood. Dr. Spray also noted that variable motivation due to her mood disorder and intrusion of thoughts and flashbacks from trauma could interfere with her ability to complete work-like tasks in a timely manner. He noted no indications of symptom exaggeration or malingering. (Tr. 377).
This Court cannot identify in the ALJ's decision where Dr. Spray's opinion was weighed and considered. The ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, and he will consider several factors in deciding the weight that should be given to any medical opinion. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 625-626 (10th Cir. 2006)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)). In evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ must accord each opinion the proper weight on the basis of: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the treatment relationship; (3) the length of the treatment relationship and thefrequency of examinations; (4) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (5) how well the opinion is supported; (6) its consistency with other evidence; and (7) whether the opinion is from a specialist. Id. at 626. See also Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2003); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). The ALJ must give good reasons for the weight assigned to a medical opinion and set forth specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting an opinion of an acceptable treating source. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300-1301. While the ALJ evaluated several other opinions which were somewhat consistent with Dr. Spray's opinion, he did not specifically weigh Dr. Spray's opinion. On remand, the ALJ shall consider this professional's opinion and its effect upon the RFC.
Moreover, this Court agrees with Claimant's assessment of the amorphous and vague terms used by the ALJ in setting out the non-exertional limitations in the RFC. Terms such as "occasional distracting behavior" and the use of the term "moderate difficulty" and "moderate impact" do little to define the restrictions upon Claimant's ability to engage in basic work activities. On remand, the ALJ shall strive to define these terms in order to refine the job base which Claimant can either perform or not.
Claimant contends the ALJ should have ordered a further consultative psychological examination in order to developClaimant's possible conversion disorder, which is referenced in the record on two occasions as well as Claimant's mental condition. Generally, the burden to prove disability in a social security case is on the claimant, and to meet this burden, the claimant must furnish medical and other evidence of the existence of the disability. Branam v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004) citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987). A social security disability hearing is nonadversarial, however, and the ALJ bears responsibility for ensuring that "an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues raised." Id. quoting Henrie v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Services, 13 F.3d 359, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1993). As a result, "[a]n ALJ has the duty to develop the record by obtaining pertinent, available medical records which come to his attention during the course of the hearing." Id. quoting Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1996). This duty exists even when a claimant is represented by counsel. Baca v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 5 F.3d 476, 480 (10th Cir. 1993). The court, however, is not required to act as a claimant's advocate. Henrie, 13 F.3d at 361.
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