Rounds v. City of Des Moines, 40843.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1931
• Docket Number: No. 40843.,40843.
• Citation: 213 Iowa 52,238 N.W. 428
• Parties: ROUNDS v. CITY OF DES MOINES ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

213 Iowa 52

238 N.W. 428

ROUNDS

v.CITY OF DES MOINES ET AL.

No. 40843.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 20, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; W. G. Bonner, Judge.

Certiorari to test the validity of an order of the defendant J. W. Budd, superintendent, department of streets and public improvements in the city of Des Moines, dismissing the plaintiff from his employment as assistant assessment clerk of said city. The writ was quashed upon motion of the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

George M. Faul, of Des Moines, for appellant.

George P. Comfort, Chauncey A. Weaver, and C. R. S. Anderson, all of Des Moines, for appellees.

STEVENS, J.

For several years prior to October 30, 1930, appellant was employed by the appellee city in the capacity of assistant assessment clerk. He is a graduate engineer and an honorably discharged soldier of the United States in the World War. On August 29th, he was dismissed from his employment by the appellee Budd, but continued to serve in the same capacity until the above date. The return of appellees to the writ of certiorari issued from the district court tends to show that the dismissal of appellant was in pursuance of a resolution of the city council previously adopted directing the reduction in the personnel of the engineering department by twelve. The resolution of the council in full is as follows:

“Be It Resolved by the City Council of the City of Des Moines:

That, inasmuch as funds are not available for the current year to maintain the personnel of the Engineering Department as now organized, it is necessary to reduce the number of men now employed by twelve, and such reduction is hereby made; and, the Superintendent of the Department of Streets and Public Improvements is hereby authorized and directed to make the reduction in force accordingly and to carry this Resolution into effect.”

The record is somewhat obscure as to just what is comprehended by the term “engineering department.” For many years the city has maintained an office or employment designated as city assessment clerk. The duty of this officer or employee as disclosed by the testimony offered by appellant is to assist the engineering department in the matter of special assessments. The work of this officer or employee consists largely in the listing of property owners and the making of schedules of property within various sections or assessment districts for the purpose of aiding and facilitating the proper officers in determining and levying special assessments for city improvements. Appellant was employed to examine the records in the recorder's and other county offices for the purpose of obtaining such information and in making plats of the various sections or assessments districts. The work requires some skill and knowledge of county records. Appellant received compensation at the rate of seven dollars per day for his services. The procedure relating to special assessments, so far as shown by the record, is substantially as follows: Upon the adoption by the city council of a resolution of necessity, the city engineer is directed to prepare a plat and schedule. The original of this work is known as a “dummy.” When this plat and schedule has been completed, the chief clerk directs the city assessment clerk to prepare such “dummy” and schedule showing the required data and certify the same to the engineering department. It appears that appellant did much of this work required by the engineering department. The office or employment of city assessment clerk appears to have been created either by the city council or the engineering department for convenience in the preparation of plats and schedules and the ascertainment of other necessary and important information for the use of the engineering department and the council in making special assessments. The showing as to the details of the work performed by the various officers or employees is not clearly disclosed either by the return of appellee or the testimony introduced by appellant.

It further appears from the return of appellees that the office or employment under the designation of city assessment clerk has been abolished. No one was, or has been, employed to succeed appellant.

The writ of certiorari was sought and issued upon the theory that the dismissal of appellant was in violation of chapter 60 of the Code of 1927 (sections 1159-1165), known as the soldier's preference law. So far as material to this controversy, the provisions of this chapter are as follows:

“1159. In every public department and upon all public works in the state, and of the counties, cities, towns, and school boards thereof, including those of cities acting under special charters, honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, marines, and nurses from the army and navy of the United States in the late civil war, Spanish-American war, Philippine insurrection, China relief expedition, or war with Germany, who are citizens and residents of this state, shall, except in the position of school teachers, be entitled to preference in appointment, employment, and promotion over other applicants of no greater qualifications.”

“1163. No person holding a public position by appointment or employment, and belonging to...