Roundtree v. State

• Decision Date: 15 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. A89A1034,A89A1034
• Parties: ROUNDTREE v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 548

386 S.E.2d 548

192 Ga.App. 803

ROUNDTREE v. The STATE.

No. A89A1034.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Sept. 15, 1989.

M.E. Thompson, Jr., Valdosta, for appellant.

H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., J. David Miller, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Roundtree appeals his conviction and sentence for armed robbery of a convenience store employee by use of a handgun, OCGA § 16-8-41(a). His first trial was defective. Roundtree v. State, 181 Ga.App. 594, 353 S.E.2d 88 (1987).

1. Appellant asserts error in denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to provide a speedy trial as required by the State and Federal Constitutions because almost twenty months elapsed between the filing of the remittitur and retrial. Although appellant cites Ga. Const.1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI, he does not develop this ground and relies instead solely on case authority applying only Federal Constitutional law. This passing reference does not adequately raise a separate State Constitutional ground for consideration. See Crapse v. State, 180 Ga.App. 321(1)(b)(n. 1), 349 S.E.2d 190 (1986).

" 'In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), the Supreme Court of the United States identified four factors to be considered by a court in determining whether an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated: ... (a) (t)he length of the delay, (b) the reason for the delay, (c) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (d) the prejudice to the defendant.... The Supreme Court further stated that it regarded none of the factors as either a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial but rather that the factors should be considered together in a balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant.' [Cit.] As to the prejudice factor there are 'three interests which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, the last being the most important: (a) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (b) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (c) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.' [Cit.]; [Cit.]" Heinen v. State, 186 Ga.App. 373, 374, 367 S.E.2d 275 (1988).

(a) Length of delay. " '(T)he mere passage of time is not enough, without more, to constitute a denial of due process.' [Cits.]" State v. Fields, 137 Ga.App. 726, 727, 224 S.E.2d 829 (1976). It may, in fact, work to a defendant's advantage; a 34-month delay was regarded as not violative, in Simpson v. State, 150 Ga.App. 814, 815, 258 S.E.2d 634 (1979). A 27-month delay passed constitutional muster in Treadwell v. State, 233 Ga. 468, 469, 211 S.E.2d 760 (1975).

(b) Reason for delay. Appellant contends that the State gave no reason for the delay. However, the prosecuting assistant district attorney informed the court that prior to his coming to the office, another assistant district attorney, no longer with the office, had handled the initial prosecution. After the first conviction had been reversed, all the files were inexplicably put in the closed section of the office files. Roundtree was later tried for other criminal offenses and the prosecutor obtained a certified copy of what he thought was the armed robbery conviction. At that point he discovered that the conviction had been reversed. Roundtree's case was put on the next available trial calendar and he was tried.

The State's undisputed explanation demonstrates negligence or oversight, but there is no evidence in the record that the State acted in bad faith or deliberately attempted to delay the retrial. See Heinen, 186 Ga.App. supra at 374, 367 S.E.2d 275(b). Upon discovery of the mistake, the State promptly tried the case.

(c) Assertion of right. Appellant contends that he adequately asserted his rights by filing a motion to dismiss, but at no time during the twenty months did appellant demand a speedy trial or otherwise raise the issue until filing the motion five days prior to retrial. See OCGA §§ 17-7-170; 17-8-21; 17-8-22; 17-8-33; State v. King, 137 Ga.App. 26(1), 222 S.E.2d 859 (1975), and Andrews v. State, 175 Ga.App. 22, 332 S.E.2d 299 (1985). His delay in asserting his rights is a factor which weighs heavily against him. Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898(2), 252 S.E.2d 397 (1979); Simpson, 150 Ga.App. supra at 816, 258 S.E.2d 634.

(d) Prejudice to defendant. Appellant's only assertion in this regard is that the delay itself was prejudicial. This is not borne out by the record. After reversal, Roundtree was released on bond upon stipulation of the State. He remained free on that bond until his conviction for an offense committed while on bond. There can be no claim of oppressive pre-trial incarceration. Nor does he advance any claim of anxiety and concern over the delay in retrial. He was at liberty and thus able to commit another criminal offense. There is no evidence that the defense was impaired by the delay. See Heinen, 186 Ga.App. supra at 375, 367 S.E.2d 275.

Consideration of all the factors mandates, on balance, the conclusion that the court did not contravene the Federal Constitution in denying appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial. As in Heinen, supra at 376, 367 S.E.2d 275, "[t]he motion itself was an anomaly, since what defendant sought was not a new trial but rather an acquittal by operation of law...."

2. The second question is whether the State's evidence was sufficient to convince the trier of fact of his identity as the perpetrator. It consisted of the testimony of two witnesses, store employee Hardeman and customer Dykes. Appellant urges that the evidence established merely that the person involved in the robbery bore a resemblance to him.

The victim Hardeman testified that on the evening of September 1, 1985, she was working at the store when the two perpetrators entered between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. T...