Rouse v. Union Tp.
| Decision Date | 26 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1923,93-1923 |
| Citation | 530 N.W.2d 714 |
| Parties | 99 Ed. Law Rep. 591 Carl ROUSE and Linda W. Rouse, Appellants, v. UNION TOWNSHIP, Appellee, and Appanoose County, Iowa, the Moravia Community School District, and any Unknown Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, Assignees, Successors in the Interest and any Unknown Spouses, and the Unknown Claimants of the Following Described Real Estate Situated in Appanoose County, Iowa: That Portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, Section 3, Township 70 North, Range 16 West of the 5th P.M. in Appanoose County, Iowa, Consisting of Approximately one Acre in the Southeast Corner Thereof, Used or Previously Used for Schoolhouse Purposes, or any Similarly Described Real Estate, Defendants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Daniel P. Wilson of Drake, Wilson and Jay, Centerville, and Timothy A. Lynch of Van Orsdel, Lynch & Rouse, L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Mark Kruse, County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
In this equitable action, Carl and Linda Rouse (the Rouses) appeal from the district court's order on a rule 179(b) motion quieting title to a small parcel of land known as Fairview school (school) in Union township (township). See Iowa R.Civ.P. 179(b). (All references in this opinion to "school" refer not only to the building itself, but also to the approximately one-acre of land upon which the building sits, and any improvements located thereon.) Following a bench trial, the court originally ordered that the school revert to the Rouses under the provisions of Iowa Code section 297.15 (1989), upon their payment of the value of the school to the district.
The Rouses raise three issues on appeal. First, they contend that the township's rule 179(b) motion raised a new legal theory with the court, which the rule prohibits. Second, they urge that the court in its order on the rule 179(b) motion erroneously interpreted Iowa Code section 297.22 to strip the Rouses of what they claim is their vested reversionary interest in the school. Last, the Rouses allege their vested reversionary interest invalidates that part of the court's rule 179(b) order quieting title to the school in the township.
We conclude the district court did not err in quieting title to the school in the township. We therefore affirm its judgment doing so. We reach our conclusion on a basis different from that relied on by the district court. So we need not decide whether the district court was correct in deciding the case under the rule 179(b) motion.
The approximately one-acre tract of land at issue is located in Union township, within the Moravia community school district, in Appanoose County. It housed a school beginning about 1874. Over the years, the properties adjoining the school changed hands several times.
The school functioned as such until the end of the 1957-58 school year. The school was then reorganized into the district. It was no longer used as an educational site.
At this point, the township trustees voted to rent the school from the district. The trustees made numerous improvements to the site, including a perimeter fence. They paid all electrical bills on the building until 1990. The building became the site for township, political, and farm organization meetings.
Elvin G. Stocker acquired ownership of all the land bordering the school in 1947. Elvin died in 1985. His wife, Minnie V. Stocker, inherited his interest in the land surrounding the school. She deeded this interest to the Rouses in 1990. Until the final conveyance to the Rouses in 1990, the deeds of conveyance always reserved the one-acre tract for school house purposes.
At this point the dispute over who owned the school began. After considerable wrangling between the township and the Rouses, the district by quit claim deed conveyed its interest in the school to the township.
The Rouses then filed an action against the district and the township, asking the district court to (1) quiet title in the Rouses, and (2) enjoin the district from conveying the school to the township. The court denied the Rouses' injunction request. The district then disclaimed any interest in the school, asking the court to determine ownership.
Following a bench trial, the court rejected the ownership claims of the Rouses and the township, quieting title in the district. This ruling was followed by an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) motion by the township. The court's ruling on this motion quieted title in the township. It is from this ruling that the Rouses appeal.
Quiet title actions are equity actions. So our review of such actions is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4; Iowa Code § 649.6; Hosteng Concrete & Gravel, Inc. v. Tullar, 524 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa App.1994). In our de novo review, we are not bound by the factual findings of the district court nor its legal conclusions. Bernet v. Rogers, 519 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa 1994).
In its initial ruling, the district court reached several conclusions. First, the Rouses are the current title owners of the real estate from which the original one-acre schoolhouse tract was taken.
Second, under Iowa Code section 297.15, the school reverts to the Rouses if they pay the value of the school to the district. See Iowa Code §§ 297.15 (); 297.16 (appraisers appointed to value property if school district and holder of reversionary interest cannot agree on value); 297.17 (notice to parties of time for appraisal); 297.18 (providing for actual appraisal); 297.19 (allowing school district to sell school site to any other person at appraised value if holder of reversionary interest fails to pay appraised value within twenty days of filing of appraisal with county sheriff); 297.20 (improvements on school site may, at request of either party, be appraised and sold separately).
Third, until such time as the conditions in sections 297.15 through 297.20 are met, ownership of the school remains in the district.
Last, the quit-claim deed from the district to the township is void because the district could only dispose of its interest in the school by following the requirements of sections 297.15 through 297.20. The court then quieted title in the school to the district "as against the interests of all parties named in this cause."
In its rule 179(b) ruling, the district court reached quite different conclusions and a different result. First, according to the court, "[Iowa Code] section 297.22 clearly creates an exception to the application of the reversionary rights of a land owner in a former schoolhouse site set out in sections 297.15, et. seq." See Iowa Code § 297.22 ( ). In short, if a school district sells or grants any interest in a school site to a township, the reversionary rights of the landowner from whom the site was taken are abolished.
Second, the quit-claim deed from the district to the township is valid. So the district properly conveyed the ownership of the school to the township.
The district court then quieted title to the school in the township instead of the district.
The Rouses contend that in the township's rule 179(b) motion, the township raised for the first time a claim to the school under Iowa Code section 297.22. The Rouses argue, therefore, that the district court erred when it decided the case under section 297.22. The court's original ruling, the Rouses say, should stand.
A rule 179(b) motion is essential to preserve error when a trial court fails to resolve an issue, claim, defense or legal theory properly submitted. The motion relates to issues properly raised in the district court before entry of final judgment and not ruled on by the court. Kernodle v. Commissioner of Ins., 331 N.W.2d 132, 134 (Iowa 1983).
In ruling on the township's rule 179(b) motion, the district court conceded that the township had not asserted its claim under section 297.22 in its answer, at trial, nor in its posttrial brief. Nevertheless, the court was persuaded that our decision in Baty v. Binns, 354 N.W.2d 777, 779-80 (Iowa 1984), provided a basis for the township's postjudgment assertion of its new legal theory. In interpreting our Baty decision, the district court concluded
the Iowa supreme court has held that erroneous conclusions of law may be challenged by a rule 179(b) motion even though the defendant tried his case-in-chief on an entirely different theory.
Although the Rouses make a strong argument for distinguishing Baty, we need not decide whether the district court erred when it...
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