Rouseau v. Bleau

• Decision Date: 12 February 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 52,131 N.Y. 177
• Parties: ROUSEAU v. BLEAU et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

131 N.Y. 177

30 N.E. 52

ROUSEAU

v.BLEAU et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 12, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.

Action of John Rousseau, as administrator of Mary Rousseau, against Jennie Bleau and others, to set aside a deed of plaintiff's intestate. Defendants appeal from a judgment of the general term affirming a judgment for plaintiff. Reversed.

Myers & Norton, ( John T. Norton, of counsel,) for appellants.

H. D. Bailey, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The plaintiff, as administrator of Mary Rousseau, who died on the 28th of October, 1888, brings this action in behalf of her creditors to set aside a deed of real estate made by the intestate in her life-time, in which the defendant Jennie Bleau is named as the grantee, on the ground that the instrument is fraudulent as against such creditors. The complaint alleged, and the trial court has found, that the deceased left no personal estate except a small sum of money, and that at the time of her death she was indebted to one of her relatives for care and attendance during her last sickness in the sum of $200. The trial court found that the deed was executed by Mary Rousseau on the 6th day of March, 1888, and recorded on the 30th day of October, 1888, but not delivered to the grantee named therein until two or three days after the death of the grantor. It was further found as matter of fact and law that the deed was fraudulent, and that the plaintiff, as the representative of creditors, was entitled to judgment setting it aside, and the general term has affirmed the judgment. Assuming that the plaintiff, under chapter 314 of the Laws of 1858, can maintain such an action as this, upon proper allegations and proof, yet we think that upon the facts found by the trial court the judgment should have been in favor of the defendants. It having been found that the deed in question was not delivered till after the death of the grantor, it did not, so far as appears, become operative as a conveyance during her life, and it follows, therefore, that the plaintiff's intestate died seised of the lands described therein. The rights of creditors against the real estate of deceased persons attaches to the land as a statutory lien immediately upon the death of the owner, and, of course, their rights cannot be impaired by any conveyance which is delivered or takes effect subsequently. Platt v. Platt, 105 N. Y. 488, 12 N. E. Rep. 22. The creditors represented by the plaintiff therefore had a lien upon the land prior to the time that any title could vest in the defendant, if any title vested in her at all. The deed constituted no obstacle whatever to the enforcement of their debts in the usual and ordinary course of administration. There was no need of invoking the aid of a court of equity to set aside the instrument, as it could not, upon the finding, be fraudulent as to creditors. Whatever the consideration or purpose of the conveyance was, it may be good, so far as appears, against every one, so long as the rights of the creditors are protected by the statute; and the administrator had no standing to attack it. He has precisely the same right now to proceed against the land that he would have had if the deed had never been executed. Nor can the judgment be upheld upon the ground that it removed a cloud upon title. The deed was not a cloud upon any right or interest that the creditors of the deceased had, and the statute confers no power upon an administrator to bring an action for that purpose. The theory of the defendants was that the grantor delivered the...