Rowe v. Reneer

• Decision Date: 22 January 1907
• Citation: 99 S.W. 250
• Parties: ROWE v. RENEER ET AL.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

99 S.W. 250

ROWE v. RENEER ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

January 22, 1907

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ohio County.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by Finis Rowe against J. A. Reneer and another. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

H. P Taylor and Little & Slack, for appellant.

Jno. B Wilson, for appellees.

LASSING J.

Appellant was arrested, fined and imprisoned for violating an ordinance of the town of Centertown, and upon his release from custody filed his suit in the Ohio circuit court against the police judge and town marshal, seeking damages in the sum of $2,000 for false arrest and imprisonment. A demurrer was sustained to the petition as amended as to McCarthy, town marshal, and overruled as to Reneer, police judge. Issue was joined, and at the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony the court instructed the jury peremptorily to find for the defendant Reneer, which was done. Plaintiff appeals.

Centertown is a town of the sixth class. The ordinance complained of is as follows: "The board of trustees of the town of Centertown, Kentucky, do ordain as follows: Any person or persons leaving a team on any street or alley hitched to a wagon or any kind of vehicle shall, upon conviction therefor be fined not less than one nor more than five dollars for each offense." Appellant contends that this is a void ordinance, and of no binding force and effect, because it is too vague and uncertain in its terms, and that it does not designate whether the owner of the team or the person in charge of it, or a passenger in the vehicle drawn by it, is to be subjected to the fine imposed by the ordinance; and for the further reason that the word "hitched" as used in the ordinance is too indefinite. This court has held in the case of Hazelgreen, etc., v. McNabb, etc., 64 S.W. 431, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 812, that, where the purpose and intent of the board of trustees can be gathered from the language and wording of the ordinance, it will be upheld even though it is not couched in language as exact and correct as would be required for court records, and that due consideration should be given to the opportunities of those having in control the management and affairs of the city government in towns of the sixth class. Clearly, the ordinance here means that it is unlawful for one in charge of a team to leave it unhitched, or go unattended, upon a public street. It is immaterial whether the person in charge is the owner or not. The duty is imposed upon him by this ordinance to take care of the team, and not leave it unhitched or unattended, so that it may become frightened in his absence and run away, and thereby endanger, if not injure, the lives of citizens or property of the town. It seems to us that in enacting this ordinance the board of trustees acted clearly within the authority given them by the statutes.

In the case of Hall v. Commonwealth, 101 Ky. 385, 41 S.W. 2, this court said: "It is a well-settled rule that an ordinance cannot be assailed as invalid merely because it may be considered as unreasonable, or as working a hardship in a particular case. In other words, what the Legislature expressly authorizes cannot be set aside by the courts because they deem it unreasonable." And again, in the case of Commonwealth v. Fowler, 96 Ky. 179, 28 S.W. 789, 33 L.R.A. 839, this court said: "We cannot hold this or any other law invalid for the reason simply that it violates our opinion of justice, or is oppressive, or, in our opinion, is not required or authorized by public interest. The remedy for unwise or unjust legislation is not to be provided by the judiciary." And in the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 16 S.Ct. 714, 40 L.Ed. 849, the court says: "Whatever is contrary to public policy or inimical to public interest is subject to the police power of the state and within legislative control; and in the exercise of such power the Legislature is vested with a large discretion, which, if exercised bona fide for the protection of the public, is beyond the reach of judicial inquiry." The board of trustees of a town of the sixth class have, by the Legislature, been vested with full power and authority to enact such ordinances or laws for the benefit of the...