Rowe v. State

Decision Date23 October 1981
Docket NumberNo. WW-161,WW-161
Citation404 So.2d 1176
PartiesDouglas McArthur ROWE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James L. Harrison, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Judge.

On this appeal from a conviction for first degree murder, the appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for severance. We agree and reverse.

In late 1979, a grand jury indicted the appellant and one other person, charging them with the murder of Elijah Rowe. The appellant and his co-defendant were scheduled to be tried together. Well before trial, the appellant filed a motion for severance, alleging that "such severance (was) necessary to promote a fair determination of (his) guilt or innocence." At a hearing pertaining to this motion, his defense counsel argued that the defenses for the appellant and his co-defendant were antagonistic, and that unless the motion for severance was granted, "the defendants are going to be in the posture of prosecuting each other with the State standing by."

The trial court denied the motion for severance, and the appellant and his co-defendant were tried together. At trial, each denied responsibility for the murder, and both introduced evidence to support their respective theories of innocence. In this regard, defense counsel for the appellant's co-defendant accused the appellant of being solely responsible for causing the death of the murder victim. Evidence was introduced by the co-defendant in an attempt to support this theory.

"Granting or denying a motion for severance is normally a discretionary matter for the trial court." Crum v. State, 398 So.2d 810, 811 (Fla.1981). In this case, we have determined, based upon Crum, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for severance.

In Crum, the appellant and his co-defendant were indicted and tried together for first degree murder. The appellant moved for severance, alleging that his defense and that of his co-defendant were so antagonistic as to warrant a severance. The appellant represented that he had learned that his codefendant "would accuse him of singularly committing the murder for which the two of them were charged." 398 So.2d at 811. The trial court denied the motion for severance, and the supreme court reversed, stating that "(b)y denying the motion, the trial court forced (the appella...

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4 cases
  • Dean v. State, 79-937
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 5 Abril 1983
    ...motion for severance because of conflicting defenses, that the state is not a wrong-doer is totally irrelevant. In Rowe v. State, 404 So.2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) it was held that where each defendant accused his co-defendant of being solely responsible for the alleged crime and int......
  • Lugo v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 20 Febrero 2003
    ...for separate trials. Similar circumstances did not occur in Lugo's case, nor did circumstances similar to those in Rowe v. State, 404 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), occur here. Lugo's reliance on Rowe is also 53. Testimony from Lugo's federal probation officer established the terms of Lugo......
  • Jones v. Moore
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 5 Julio 2001
    ...core an argument for severance. On direct appeal, appellate counsel argued Crum v. State, 398 So.2d 810 (Fla.1981), and Rowe v. State, 404 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in support of appellate counsel's point on appeal. These cases concern severance. See Crum, 398 So.2d at 811-12; Rowe, 4......
  • Jeffries v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 22 Enero 2001
    ...use credit cards the robbery allegedly yielded. At trial, Mr. Rhodes did in fact testify to this effect. Relying on Rowe v. State, 404 So.2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (holding the trial court "improperly forced the appellant `to stand trial before two accusers: the State and his codefe......
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