Rowland v. Harrison
Decision Date | 01 August 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 25,25 |
Citation | 577 A.2d 51,320 Md. 223 |
Parties | Dorothy C. ROWLAND v. Michael J. HARRISON. Sept. Term 1989. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
C. Stephen Basinger, Baltimore and Jacqueline R. Vaughn, Upperco, on brief, for appellant.
T. Rogers Harrison, William P. Harrison, Mudd, Harrison & Burch, Towson, on brief, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL *, JJ.
This case involves a suit by Dorothy Rowland, the owner of a now-deceased thoroughbred horse named Kluwall, against Dr. Michael Harrison for veterinary malpractice in the care and treatment of Kluwall between June 8 and 27, 1986. The question presented is whether the malpractice action is barred on principles of res judicata because of an earlier judgment obtained by Dr. Harrison against Rowland for the value of veterinary services rendered to Kluwall during the period of the alleged malpractice.
Rowland filed suit against Harrison on April 13, 1988 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. She alleged in her complaint that Harrison maintained a horse farm in connection with his veterinary practice; that on June 8, 1986, she took the horse to Harrison's farm to be boarded and treated for a vaginal infection; that Kluwall was in otherwise good condition on June 8 but thereafter contracted the disease of colic due to the negligence of Dr. Harrison; and that he failed to treat the horse for the disease. Rowland further alleged that after taking the horse from the farm, Kluwall collapsed from the effects of the disease; that Harrison did not respond to her calls for assistance promptly; and that he misdiagnosed the disease and negligently treated the horse, as a result of which Kluwall had to be destroyed. Rowland claimed damages in the amount of one-half million dollars.
Earlier, on September 24, 1987, Harrison had sued Rowland in the District Court of Maryland, claiming $1,215.56 for professional and boarding services rendered to Kluwall at Rowland's request (the debt action). Rowland's defense to the debt action was "breach of contract in the care and maintenance of ... Kluwall ..., negligent care and maintenance of said horse, negligent rendering of professional services below the reasonable skill, diligence and attention ordinarily expected of a trustworthy veterinarian." On February 1, 1988, Rowland prayed a jury trial and the debt action was removed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
On April 13, 1988, when Rowland filed the malpractice action against Harrison, she moved to consolidate that suit with the debt action. Harrison opposed the motion. He argued that while the cases arose from the same events, they involved totally unrelated issues and constituted "two separate and distinct causes of action." On May 5, 1988, Rowland filed a motion to stay Harrison's debt action, or in the alternative, to consolidate it with her malpractice action. These motions were denied on June 8, 1988. Two days later, counsel for Harrison wrote Rowland, advising that he intended to try the debt action on the scheduled trial date of July 13, and that "the results will be res judicata as to all issues existing between our clients." On June 28, Rowland filed a counterclaim in the debt action, asserting the same claim that she had filed against Harrison in her malpractice action.
On the day of trial of the debt action before Judge J. William Hinkel, Rowland sought a postponement or a severance of her counterclaim. She said that while she was prepared to present a defense to the debt action, she was concerned with the potential res judicata effect of a judgment in the debt action; that she had not had adequate time for discovery in her malpractice action; and was not then in a position to present expert witness testimony. Rowland's motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial before Judge Hinkel without a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence presented by Harrison, the docket entries show that Rowland unsuccessfully moved for judgment in her favor. 1 At this point in the proceedings, Rowland moved for a voluntary dismissal of her counterclaim without prejudice. Once again, she maintained that she could not go forward on her counterclaim without the availability of expert witnesses and had not had adequate time for discovery. Judge Hinkel dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice. He said:
Judge Hinkel entered judgment in the debt action in favor of Harrison. His decision, he said, was based "on the evidence presented" which showed that the services were rendered at Rowland's request and that payment had not been made. Judge Hinkel explained that his decision was "strictly on the debt due," and that it did not "deal[ ] with a question of whether or not there was negligence, because there is just not evidence here sufficient to make that kind of judgment." In so holding, the court said that "since the counter-claim has been dismissed, [Rowland] doesn't have the proof to support [a] setoff." In this regard, Judge Hinkel observed that Rowland's "feeling" that Harrison was responsible for Kluwall's illness did not constitute evidence "that would persuade me to award a setoff in the case."
Rowland did not appeal from the judgment in the debt action. Subsequently, a motion for summary judgment was filed by Harrison in Rowland's malpractice action. The motion recited that the debt action was resolved in Harrison's favor; that at that trial Rowland "put forth evidence of Harrison's alleged malpractice and negligent supervision and/or staffing of [his] horse farm"; and that consequently the malpractice action is "barred by both the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."
Judge John F. Fader, II granted summary judgment for Harrison. He first noted that there was no transcript of the testimony adduced at trial of the debt action. He next recognized that Judge Hinkel's decision in Harrison's favor in the debt action did not deal with whether Harrison was negligent but was "strictly on the debt due." Nevertheless, Judge Fader concluded that the doctrine of direct res judicata barred the further prosecution of Rowland's malpractice suit. He said the doctrine "establishes that in a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same cause of action ..., a judgment rendered on the merits constitutes an absolute bar as to all matters which were actually raised, litigated and determined in the former proceeding, as well as to all matters which could have been raised and litigated." Applying this doctrine, Judge Fader held that Rowland's failure to litigate the issue of Harrison's malpractice as a defense or by counterclaim in the debt action resulted in her being precluded "from litigating that issue unless some other compelling issue allows the counterclaim to survive." In so holding, Judge Fader said that the "compulsory counterclaim rule" was in effect in Maryland and required that Rowland "assert her malpractice defense to Harrison's suit for services rendered or lose her right to litigate that issue under the doctrine of res judicata." Judge Fader found it "apparent" that the dismissal of the counterclaim without prejudice was because Rowland was not prepared to go ahead with her malpractice claim in the debt action. He pointed out that under Maryland Rule 2-503(b) the court could have ordered a separate trial of Rowland's counterclaim, as she requested, but it did not do so. Consequently, the court held that the voluntary dismissal of the counterclaim without prejudice did not preclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata since it had the same effect as if the counterclaim had never been filed. Judge Fader explained:
"The doctrine of res judicata holds that the malpractice claim, whether asserted as a defense or as a counter-complaint seeking money damages, must be brought or it will be lost as a right to the party."
Upon Rowland's appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, we granted certiorari prior to decision by that court to decide the important question raised in the case.
Rowland contends that as negligence was neither litigated nor determined in the debt action, either by way of defense or counterclaim, res judicata does not bar her malpractice action. Specifically, she argues that as her counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice, it does not operate as an adjudication on the merits. She further maintains that Judge Fader erroneously held that Maryland has a compulsory counterclaim rule. On the contrary, she claims that Maryland's counterclaim rule (Rule 2-331(a)) is purely permissive. Rowland recognizes that she pleaded Harrison's negligence as a defense in his debt action. But that alone, she says, does not suffice to bar prosecution of her malpractice action within the contemplation of the res judicata doctrine when, as here, the first suit was for a simple debt approximating $1,000 and the subsequent action involved a complex malpractice claim for half-million dollars.
(A)
Our cases have consistently defined the doctrine of res judicata in these terms: a judgment between the same parties and their privies is a final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, and is conclusive, not only as to all matters that have been decided in the original suit, but as to all matters which with propriety could have been litigated in the first suit. Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54, 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 549, 530 A.2d 724 (1987); Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 668-89, 381 A.2d 671 (1978); MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32, 367 A.2d 486 (1977); Missler v. Anne Arundel County,...
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