Rowland v. Herren, No. 03-07-00247-CV (Tex. App. 2/19/2010)
| Decision Date | 19 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-07-00247-CV.,03-07-00247-CV. |
| Parties | MICHAEL ROWLAND, SR., Appellant, v. CAROLINE HERREN AND THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of Comal County, 22nd Judicial District, No. C2006-0028A, Honorable Charles A. Stephens II, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PEMBERTON and WALDROP.
Chief Justice LAW not participating.
Appellant Michael Rowland, Sr., appeals the district court's denial of his motion to vacate an agreed order in a child support enforcement proceeding. Finding the agreement to enter the order to be valid, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Rowland and appellee Caroline Herren were divorced in 1989. There were three children of the marriage. The divorce decree ordered Rowland to pay child support in the amount of "$46.67 per child per week, for a combined total of $140.00 per week" until the youngest child, J.C.R., reached the age of eighteen.
On June 24, 2005, Herren filed a motion to enforce the child support order, and amended her motion on June 26, 2006. Herren sought enforcement by contempt as well as a judgment for arrearage in the amount of $91,899.29, attorneys' fees, and court costs. On October 30, 2006, the day Herren's motion was set to be heard, the parties participated in mediation. Although no agreement was reached at mediation, the parties entered into a settlement agreement later that day and presented their agreement to the court. On the record, the parties confirmed the agreement, and the court approved it. Herren's counsel agreed to prepare the written memorialization of the agreement for entry by the court.
On December 11, 2006, Herren filed a motion to enter the written agreed order. On December 14, 2006, Rowland, who had secured new counsel since reaching the settlement agreement, responded by filing a motion to vacate and to set aside the agreed order, challenging its validity based on his own diminished capacity at the time of signing. He also asserted that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the agreed order, that his counsel failed to fully explain the agreement, and that the agreement was "against the great weight of the evidence" and "contrary to law." The next day, December 15, 2006, the district court signed the agreed order, which was later modified on February 5, 2007, to correct a clerical error. The agreed order held Rowland in contempt for failure to pay child support and granted judgment for back child support in the amount of $60,000 and for attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,500. Rowland's jail sentence of 180 days was suspended on the condition that he make specific scheduled payments toward the back child support owed. On February 9, 2007, the Office of the Attorney General filed a lien on bank accounts it believed belonged to Rowland, including a lien on the bank account of Southland Fabs, Rowland's company. Rowland and Southland Fabs filed a joint motion to release the lien, which the district court heard and granted on February 15, 2007. On February 27, 2007, the Attorney General filed a plea in intervention, which it amended on March 23, 2007. Neither side moved to strike the plea, the Attorney General participated in later proceedings, and Rowland does not challenge the Attorney's General's intervention on appeal.
The district court heard Rowland's motion to vacate in April 2007, and, on April 18, 2007, denied the motion. Rowland appeals. He raises nine issues, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the agreement underlying the agreed order and its validity, the continuing validity of the arrearage judgment following the lien release, and the award of attorneys' fees. As resolution of each of these issues depends on the validity of the settlement agreement, we address this issue first.
Rowland argues that the settlement agreement is invalid because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was competent to enter into the agreement. Specifically, Rowland challenges the district court's finding that he had the requisite mental capacity to enter into the contract at the time he signed it:
The Court finds that Mr. Rowland was competent and had a rational understanding of the agreement he voluntarily entered into on October 30, 2006 before this Court, on the record, with his attorney present.
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence according to the same standards as jury findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). In reviewing legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's finding and will overrule the challenge as long as the evidence offered to support the finding is more than a scintilla. See Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex. 2005). In reviewing factual sufficiency, we consider and weigh all the evidence in the record and will sustain the challenge only if the court's finding is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
When the issue of mental incapacity is raised, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to set aside the agreement to show that the person entering into the agreement did not understand the nature and consequences of his act at the time. Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1969) (); Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673, 675-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ.). Mental capacity, or a lack thereof, may be shown by circumstantial evidence, including: (1) a person's outward conduct, "manifesting an inward and causing condition"; (2) any pre-existing external circumstances tending to produce a special mental condition; and (3) the prior or subsequent existence of a mental condition from which a person's mental capacity (or incapacity) at the time in question may be inferred. See Bach, 596 S.W.2d at 676. In general, the question of whether a person knows or understands the nature and consequences of his act at the time of the contract is a question of fact. See Fox v. Lewis, 344 S.W.2d 731, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to vacate included the testimony of the mediator, Rowland's son, Rowland's business partner, and the general manager of Rowland's business, as well as the testimony of both Rowland and Herren. Rowland presented evidence that he had suffered a stroke in April or May of 2006 and argued that it affected his mental capacity on the day the settlement agreement was negotiated. Herren testified that, based on her knowledge of Rowland after fifteen years of marriage, she believed that he had a rational understanding of what he was doing at the time the parties signed the agreement and asked the court to approve it. Phyllis Offerman, the mediator, testified that, on the day of the mediation, the same day the agreement was signed, she had no concerns about Rowland's mental capacity or ability to understand—that he appeared to have a "sophisticated understanding" of the negotiations. According to Offerman, Rowland had participated fully in the settlement discussions and exhibited no physical manifestations of the stroke. Offerman further testified:
If he had done anything that I had thought, you know, that we weren't on the same page communicating just because his voice was different, I felt that I was communicating with him well. If I had doubted in the least, I wouldn't have continued.
Rowland's son also testified, noting that his father had some physical problems after the stroke, but no diminished mental capacity. According to Rowland's son, even after the stroke, Rowland continued to run his business, including calculating bids and entering into complex negotiations. Rowland's son also observed Rowland make significant purchases after the stroke. Rowland testified that he continues to run the company, although he also relies on the advice and assistance of Michael Klingle, his business partner, and on Keith Davis, the general manager.
Michael Klingle, Rowland's business partner, testified that Rowland had not been the same after his stroke—that Rowland "has difficulty at times processing information and his memory isn't the same as it used to be." Although Klingle testified that he had assumed chief responsibility for the finances of the business following Rowland's stroke, Klingle also testified that Rowland continues to run the day-to-day operations of the business, that he signs paychecks, and that Rowland, who owns seventy-five percent of the business, maintains final decision-making authority on all matters.
Keith Davis, the general manager of Southern Fab, testified that, after the stroke:
He's not comprehending everything that's coming at him because it's coming so fast. You have to back him down and explain things a little more to him than what you would have to before he had the stroke.
Davis also testified that Rowland remains the "head honcho" and continues to run the company. Although Rowland presented some evidence that, after the stroke, he had a more difficult time functioning, both cognitively and emotionally, there is no evidence that, at the time Rowland signed the agreement, he did not appreciate the effect of what he was doing or understand the nature and consequences of his acts. See Mandell & Wright, 441 S.W.2d at 845. Both Herren and Offerman, who were present during the negotiations that day, testified that Rowland appeared mentally capable, exhibiting a full understanding of the proceedings....
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