Rowlands v. State Loan Bd. of Arizona

• Citation: 207 P. 359,24 Ariz. 116
• Decision Date: 26 May 1922
• Docket Number: Civil 1998
• Parties: WILLIAM E. ROWLANDS, Appellant, v. THE STATE LOAN BOARD OF ARIZONA, RAYMOND EARHART, Treasurer of the State of Arizona, THOMAS E. CAMPBELL, Governor of the State of Arizona, and ERNEST R. HALL, Secretary of State of the State of Arizona, as Members of the STATE LOAN BOARD OF ARIZONA; RAYMOND EARHART, as Treasurer of the State of Arizona; and CHARLES W. FAIRFIELD, as Auditor of the State of Arizona, Appellees
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

207 P. 359

24 Ariz. 116

WILLIAM E. ROWLANDS, Appellant, v. THE STATE LOAN BOARD OF ARIZONA, RAYMOND EARHART, Treasurer of the State of Arizona, THOMAS E. CAMPBELL, Governor of the State of Arizona, and ERNEST R. HALL, Secretary of State of the State of Arizona, as Members of the STATE LOAN BOARD OF ARIZONA; RAYMOND EARHART, as Treasurer of the State of Arizona; and CHARLES W. FAIRFIELD, as Auditor of the State of Arizona, Appellees

Civil No. 1998

Supreme Court of Arizona

May 26, 1922

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. R. C. Stanford, Judge. Judgment reversed, with directions.

Messrs Baker & Whitney, for Appellant.

Messrs Armstrong, Lewis & Kramer, for Appellees.

OPINION

ROSS, C. J.

During the years 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919 and 1920, the State Treasurer, by and with the approval of the Governor and the Secretary of State loaned various sums aggregating $637,600 to various persons, under the Lyman dam project in Apache county, and took mortgages on such persons' lands situated in said county, as security for such loans. The moneys loaned were the proceeds of sales of institutional lands granted to the territory of Arizona and to the state by the federal government for the common schools and charitable and penal institutions of the state. The loans bear interest at six per cent per annum, and on July 1, 1921 there was due to the state about $30,000 in interest. The annual interest for the subsequent years, up to and including 1924, will be about $38,400.

The fifth legislature (see chapter 49, Laws 1921) passed an act the title and context of which has to do with the interest on said loans, and, as its own language explains quite clearly its purpose, we give it in full:

"An act for the relief of natural persons owning land in Apache county whose property was damaged or destroyed by floods occasioned by the breaking of the Lyman reservoir, and making an appropriation therefor.

"Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Arizona:

"Section 1. That because of the construction company's not completing the Lyman dam, and the resulting failure to obtain water which has prevented the growing of crops on the Lyman dam project during the past five years and which will limit the growing of crops for at least another year, the interest due the state of Arizona on the money loaned for the purpose of erecting said dam is hereby remitted until the year 1925, as hereinafter provided.

"Sec. 2. The State Loan Board shall ascertain the amount of interest due on the loan made on the farm lands within the Lyman dam project up to the time this act becomes effective and shall make a claim for the amount so determined upon the State Auditor, who will issue his warrant upon the receipt of such claim for a like amount to be credited to the permanent funds invested on such loans. At the end of each calendar year up to and including 1924 the State Loan Board shall ascertain the amount of interest due and if, in their judgment, similar action is necessary, shall have authority to grant the same relief to said mortgagors for the calendar year next preceding.

"Sec. 3. There is hereby annually appropriated out of the general fund, a sufficient sum to carry out the provisions of this act.

"Sec. 4. All acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."

The appellant, Rowlands, as a taxpayer of Maricopa county, in his own behalf, and in behalf of others in like situation, brought an action alleging that the above-named appellees, officials of the state, were threatening to, and would, if not enjoined, take from the general fund of the state the moneys belonging to the state, raised by general taxation, and apply the same in payment of the interest due from the mortgagors up to July 1, 1921, and subsequent years as the interest became due and payable. It is further alleged that said chapter 49 violates various provisions of the Constitution of the state of Arizona (enumerating them) and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and is unconstitutional, null and void, and prayed that the appellees be enjoined and restrained from carrying out the terms of said chapter 49. At a hearing upon the merits of the case, at which the allegations of the complaint were treated as "an agreed statement of facts," the court made and entered its judgment dismissing the complaint. From this judgment the appellant prosecutes this appeal.

The question for decision is apparent from the above statement of the case. It is contended by appellant that the legislature exceeded its powers as limited by the state Constitution in the legislation contained in chapter 49, supra. It is obvious that the legislature in passing the act intended to accomplish one of two things, either: (1) To cancel and forgive the payment of the interest due and becoming due on the mortgages the state holds against the various persons under the Lyman dam project up to 1924, inclusive; or (2) to lend these debtors out of the state's general fund enough money to pay said interest due and to become due until 1925 in case it was needed. It is the contention of appellant that the act forgives the interest to the debtors, and he bases his reason for so claiming upon the meaning of the word "remitted" and the absence of any provision in the act for the repayment to the state of any advances made by it out of the general fund to meet such interest. That the legislative purpose was to relieve the debtors from ever paying the interest for those years in which the state paid it we have no doubt.

Appellees contend that the word "remit" as used in the text means "to defer" the payment of interest. Webster defines the word:

". . . To forgive; to pardon; to remove; to refrain from exacting or enforcing; as, to remit the performance of an obligation."

He gives as synonyms:

"To relax; release; abate; relinquish; forgive; pardon; absolve."

Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary defines "remit":

". . . To refrain from exacting as a penalty; discharge from; countermand the exaction of; as, to remit a fine . . . to defer or put off; postpone."

34 Cyc.:

"To forgive, to pardon, to release from punishment or penalty."

Bouvier:

"To annul a fine or forfeiture."

And the same author defines its derivative "remission" as "a release of a debt." In our statute (paragraph 5552, Civ. Code) it is provided:

"In the construction of the statutes of this state, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature, that is to say:

"(1) All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning."

This we believe to be the general rule, and taking it as our guide we think the word "remit," whether construed according to its popular meaning or according to its "peculiar and appropriate meaning in law," was employed in...