Royal Indem. Co. v. King
| Citation | 532 F.Supp.2d 404 |
| Decision Date | 08 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:03cv2178 (SRU). |
| Parties | ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY and Royal Insurance Company of America, Plaintiffs, v. Pendleton KING, Daphne King, Pendleton King, Jr., and Conor McEntee, Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. National Surety Corporation and New England Brokerage Corporation, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Hartford, CT, John C. Pitblado, Jorden Burt-Simsbury, Simsbury, CT, for Royal Indemnity Co., royal Ins. Co. of America, plaintiffs.
Frederic P. Rickles, Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane-CT, Greenwich, CT, James T. Hargrove, Peter F. Durning, Goulston & Storrs, Boston; MA, for Pendleton King, Daphen King, Pendleton King, Jr., defendants.
John Quinlan Kelly, The Kelly Group, PC, New York, NY, Michael J. Jones, Sonia T. Larossa, Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara, Greenwich, CT, for Conor McAntee, defendant.
Kenneth J. Mulvey, Jr., Mulvey, Oliver & Gould, New Haven, CT, Robert G. Oliver, Mulvey, Oliver, Gould & Crotta, New Haven, CT, James D. Hine, II, Mulvey, Oliver, Gould & Crotta, New Haven, CT, for National Surety Corp.
Christopher B. Weldon, Robert J. Grande, Lustig & Brown-STMFD, Stamford, CT, for New England Brokerage Corp.
Charles W. Pieterse, Whitman, Breed, Abbott & Morgan — CT, Greenwich, CT, for Deer Park Association, Inc.
RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
At a recent conference with the parties, I held that, in light of the summary judgment ruling in this case, the claims, remaining in the case were not Viable and that judgment would enter on all claims. Defendants/third-party plaintiffs now move to reconsider that ruling. For reasons set forth below, their motion is denied.
This dispute arose out of a serious accident involving an all-terrain vehicle ("ATV") owned by Pendleton and Daphne King and operated by Pendleton King, Jr. The accident caused Conor McEntee to suffer a life-threatening head injury. McEntee sued the Kings in state court for damages arising from the accident, and the Kings' insurers, Royal Indemnity. Company ("RIC") and Royal Insurance Company of America ("RICA") (collectively "Royal"), then Med a declaratory judgment action in this court seeking an order that Royal had no duty to defend or indemnify the Kings in their state court action. The Kings brought several counterclaims against Royal and filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendants National Surety Corporation ("National") and New England Brokerage Corporation ("NEBC"). NEBC then filed several crossclaims against Royal for indemnification and contribution.1 Through the course of the litigation, several Of the claims were dismissed. All parties then moved for summary judgment,2 and on September 28, 2007, I granted summary judgment against the Kings on most of the remaining claims. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. King, 512 F.Supp.2d 117, 133 (D.Conn.2007) ("Royal I"). That ruling, With which I assume familiarity, is central to the issues presented here.
A few specific factual findings and legal holdings from Royal I are particularly relevant to the instant motion for reconsideration. At summary judgment, the Kings argued that RIC had a duty to defend and indemnify them under their homeowner's policy. RIC countered that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Kings because, in part, the accident did not occur on an "insured location" as the Kings' policy defined that term.3 The policy defined "insured location" as "either (a) the residence premises; (b) the part of other premises, other structures and grounds used by you as a residence; or (c) any premises used by you in connection with a premises in 8.a or 8.b above." Royal I, 512 F.Supp.2d at 124 (internal quotations omitted). The central issue was thus whether the Kings "used" the portion of Midwood Road upon which the accident occurred "in connection with" their residence Premises.
Virtually all facts relevant to that issue were undisputed. The Kings conceded that the accident occurred on a portion of Midwood Road that the they did not actually use to gain access to their residence instead, they argued that because Deer Park Association was a private homeowners association, and because they had the legal right to use that portion of the road, they satisfied the "use in connection requires an insured to actually use a premises, or whether that clause is satisfied if the insured simply has some legal right to use a premises. Citing several cases that interpreted identical contractual clauses, I rejected the Kings' argument, holding that "[t]he legal right to use property may (or may not) be probative, but it is certainly not dispositive of whether parties actually use a piece of property `in connection with' their residence premises." Royal I, 512 P.Supp.2d at 127. I also concluded that:
actual use is a prerequisite to satisfying a homeowner's policy clause that requires use of piece of property in connection with a residence premises. In this case, the inquiry ends here; I need not engage in a fact-intensive inquiry because the Kings do not contend, nor have they presented any evidence, that they actually used the portion of. North Midwood Road upon which the accident took place. As such, the subject accident, although it occurred close to an insured location — fifty to seventy-five feet away — did not occur on an insured location. The Kings' homeowner's policy therefore does not provide coverage with respect to McEntee's claims.
The Kings also argued at summary judgment that RICA had a duty to defend and indemnify them under their umbrella policy. Again, no factual issues were in dispute and the motion presented two purely interpretive issues: (1) whether the Kings' umbrella policy covered the subject ATV even though it was not listed on the declarations page of the policy; and (2) whether RICA effected a valid change, to the policy to require listing of the ATV and payment of an additional premium for coverage to apply. I held for RICA on both questions. First, the policy's express terms specifically excluded "coverage for motor vehicles unless they are `described as being covered in the declarations,'" id. at 128, and the subject ATV was not listed on the declarations page of the policy. Id. The second issue was slightly more complex. The Kings cited an interpretive bulletin that the State of Connecticut Insurance Department issued May 5, 2004, four years after RICA effected the subject change to the Kings' policy.4 Id. at 128. The Kings argued that the interpretive bulletin had retroactive effect and required RICA to send a conditional nonrenewal notice when it, in effect, renewed the Kings' policy with the additional requirements. I rejected the Kings' argument and declined to give the bulletin retroactive effect, and I also held that the Kings failed to support their assertion that the previous policy would have covered the subject accident.
In addition to their claims against Royal, I also addressed the Kings' negligence claim against NEBC. The Kings had alleged that NEBC was negligent in failing to procure an umbrella policy that failed to follow form to the Kings' homeowner's policy. I held, however, that the Kings' negligence claim "hinges on its previous argument that the homeowner's policy covers McEntee's claimed damages," but that "coverage for McEntee's claims did not exist under the Kings' homeowner's policy." Id. at 133. Consequently, Id. at 133.
Finally, I granted declaratory relief to Royal, directing that "neither RIC, nor RICA, have a duty to defend or indemnify the Kings in connection with any claims arising out of injuries that Conor McEntee sustained in the, May 5, 2002 accident." Id. at 133.
Royal, however, did not move for summary judgment' on all claims and a few remained pending after Royal I.5 Specifically, Royal did not move for summary judgment on the Kings' CUTPA/CUIPA and bad faith claims. Although those claims remained pending, when ruling on summary judgment, I observed that/those claims appear to be "either: (a) moot; (b) hinge upon an interpretation of the Kings' insurance policies explicitly rejected herein; or (c) otherwise inconsistent with my ruling today." Id. at 134. I directed that "[t]he parties shall report to chambers within 20 days of [the summary judgment] ruling whether they intend to pursue any of their remaining claims."6 Id.
The parties then participated in a telephone conference on October 31, 2007 to discuss whether any viable claims remained pending in the case: The Kings argued that their CUTPA/CUIPA and bad faith claims against Royal were still viable. The Kings also argued that they could pursue other theories of negligence against NEBC even though I granted summary judgment to NEBC on the Kings' negligence claim as pleaded. I held at the conference the Kings' CUTPA/CUIPA and bad faith claims could not survive in light of the recent ruling. In addition, although I did not address it directly at the conference, my summary judgment ruling expressly disposed of the Kings' negligence claim, as pleaded, against NEBC. See a at 132-33. The negligence count was thus no longer pending after the summary judgment ruling, so, unlike the CUTPA/CUIPA and bad faith claims, no additional action was necessary to dispose of the negligence count at the subsequent conference. The Kings now move to reconsider the dismissal the remaining claims at the conference.7
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lee v. Aig Cas. Co.
...so that a claim of an independent CUTPA violation may be maintained against an insurance company. Compare Royal Indemnity Co. v. King, 532 F.Supp.2d 404, 410 (D.Conn.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“A plaintiff may not bring a cause of action under CUTPA based on conduct which doe......
-
Tucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc.
...cause of action under CUIPA;” however, “violations of CUIPA may be alleged as a basis for a CUTPA claim.” Royal Indem. Co. v. King , 532 F.Supp.2d 404, 410 (D.Conn.2008) (quoting Bepko v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , No. 3:04 CV 01996 (PCD), 2005 WL 3619253, at *3 (D.Conn. Nov. 10, 200......
-
Tucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc.
...where the allegations in a complaint pertain to a single instance of misconduct.” Id., p. 4. Plaintiff thus cites Royal Indem. Co. v. King, 532 F.Supp.2d 404, 411 (D.Conn.2008), aff'd sub. nom. Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King, 699 F.3d 735 (2d Cir.2012), to establish that in bringing a CUIPA cl......
-
Preferred Display, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y.
...Life and Cas. Co. , 235 Conn. 185, 200, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Royal Indem. Co. v. King , 532 F.Supp.2d 404, 414 (D. Conn. 2008), aff'd sub nom. Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King , 699 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2012) (plaintiff must show that "injurious action......