Tucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 April 2016
• Docket Number: 3:09-CV-1499 (CSH)
• Citation: 179 F.Supp.3d 224
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Teri Tucker, Plaintiff, v. American International Group, Inc.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA., A Subsidiary of American International Group, Inc., Defendants.

179 F.Supp.3d 224

Teri Tucker, Plaintiff,

v.American International Group, Inc.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA., A Subsidiary of American International Group, Inc., Defendants.

3:09-CV-1499 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed April 5, 2016

Douglas J. Varga, Jeffrey S. Bagnell, Scott R. Lucas, Lucas Bagnell Varga LLC, Southport, CT, for Plaintiff.

Dennis O. Brown, Joseph R. Geoghegan, Joseph James Blyskal, III, Kelly M. Kirby, Gordon & Rees LLP, Glastonbury, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CUIPA/CUTPA COUNT [DOC. 170]

HAIGHT

, Senior District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Teri Tucker brings this diversity action on an employment practices liability insurance policy (“the Policy”) issued by the Defendant insurance companies, American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”) (collectively “Defendants”), to her former employer, newspaper publisher Journal Register East.¹ In particular, Plaintiff seeks to collect from Defendants the $4 million judgment entered in her favor in Tucker v. Journal Register East , No. 3:06-CV-307 (SRU) (herein “Tucker I ”), the earlier action Plaintiff filed against her former employer as the result of her allegedly unlawful discharge in 2003.²

In its latest Ruling, the Court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to all counts except Count Four, Plaintiff's claim for violation of CUIPA/CUTPA.³ SeeTucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. , No. 3:09–CV–1499 (CSH), 2015 WL 403195, at *1 (D.Conn. Jan. 28, 2015)

. As to that claim, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice, and ordered submissions from the parties, as follows:

a. “a letter [from Plaintiff], stating whether she intend[ed] to press all or any of the claimed violations by Defendants of CUIPA/CUTPA, as alleged in Count Four of the Amended Complaint:”

b. in the event her letter “declare[d] her intention to press all or any of the CUIPA/CUTPA claims alleged in Count Four,” and if Defendants were so advised, a second motion for summary judgment on those claims; and

c. “[if] Defendant file[d] a motion for summary judgment as to any remaining claims under Count Four,” opposing papers from Plaintiff and a reply by Defendants on or before designated dates.

2015 WL 403195, at *36

.

The parties complied fully with these orders. On February 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed her letter, affirming her intent “to pursue her claims arising under subsections (B), (C), (D), (E), (G), and (N) of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6)

.” Doc. 166, at 1. Plaintiff clarified that “while she [was] not abandoning her claims arising under the other subsections of CUIPA, (A), (F), and (M), and respectfully reserve[d] the right to press them in the event of a successful appeal, she [was] willing to limit the remaining scope of her action to subsections (B), (C), (D), (E), (G) and (N) to conserve time and resources.”⁴

Id.

As one would expect in this historically contentious case, Defendants thereafter promptly filed a motion for summary judgment and detailed supporting memorandum with respect to the CUIPA/CUTPA claim. Doc. 170, 171. Plaintiff then filed thorough reply papers, Doc. 174, and most recently, a supplemental authority, Doc. 176-77. The motion is resolved herein.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

As the Second Circuit has repeatedly articulated, pursuant to Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P

., “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. , 811 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir.2016). See also

Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc. , 805 F.3d 18, 25 (2d Cir.2015) (same).”⁵ “[A] fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and a dispute is genuine if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”' Baldwin , 805 F.3d at 25

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). As the United States Supreme Court explained, the summary judgment standard “provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

“In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must not ‘weigh the evidence, or assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve issues of fact.’ ” Victory v. Pataki , 814 F.3d 47, 59 (2d Cir.2016)⁶

(quoting Kulak v. City of New York , 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1996) ). “If, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper.” Victory , 814 F.3d at 59 (quoting Rodriguez v. City of New York , 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir.1995) ).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)

. As set forth supra , in analyzing the record, the court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Beyer v. County of Nassau , 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.2008), and is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant,” Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n , 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). If the movant succeeds in carrying its burden, “the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir.2011).

The ultimate test “is whether the evidence can reasonably support a verdict in Plaintiff's favor.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n , 233 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir.2000)

. Put simply, summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Wright v. City of Ithaca , 633 Fed.Appx. 63, 64 (2d Cir.2016) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

B. Alleged Violation of CUIPA/CUTPA

Plaintiff's sole remaining claim in this action is Count Four of the Amended Complaint, which alleges violation of numerous subsections of the “unfair settlement practices” provision of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (“CUIPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6)

, asserted through Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a, et seq. In Count 4, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' “acts and omissions” in handling her claim violated CUIPA in that Defendants “failed to properly investigate the facts surrounding Tucker's claim, failed to conduct a timely or thorough investigation of the facts, failed to make any coverage determination for more than four years, and only after an adverse jury verdict against its insured ... [and] outright refused to even participate in the alternative dispute resolution procedures specified in the Policy itself.” Doc. 126, ¶¶ 103-04. Tucker further asserts that she “may bring a private right of action against the defendants for the identified CUIPA violations pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.” Id. , ¶ 105. Lastly, she alleges that Defendants' CUIPA violations “have been the proximate cause of substantial compensatory and actual damages to [her], entitling her to recover treble and other punitive damages, in addition to satisfaction of her judgment.” Id. , ¶ 106.

In the world of private litigation, the CUTPA and CUIPA statutes have a significant but not entirely understood interaction. CUTPA prohibits the use of “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b

. CUIPA defines “unfair methods of competition” as applied to the insurance trade. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-815. “Connecticut courts generally do not recognize a private cause of action under CUIPA;” however, “violations of CUIPA may be alleged as a basis for a CUTPA claim.” Royal Indem. Co. v. King , 532 F.Supp.2d 404, 410 (D.Conn.2008) (quoting Bepko v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , No. 3:04 CV 01996 (PCD), 2005 WL 3619253, at *3 (D.Conn. Nov. 10, 2005) ), aff'd sub nom.,

Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King , 699 F.3d 735 (2d Cir.2012).

It thus follows that a plaintiff may assert a private cause of action based on a substantive violation of CUIPA through CUTPA's enforcement provision. See, e.g. , Belz v. Peerless Ins. Co. , 46 F.Supp.3d 157, 165 (D.Conn.2014)

; Karas v. Liberty Ins. Corp. , 33 F.Supp.3d 110, 116–17 (D.Conn.2014) (citing McCulloch v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co. , 363 F.Supp.2d 169, 181 (D.Conn.2005) and Mead v. Burns , 199 Conn. 651, 663, 509 A.2d 11 (1986) ). See also

Bepko , 2005 WL 3619253, at *3 (“[J]ust as CUTPA is dependent on CUIPA for substantive content, CUIPA is dependent on CUTPA for enforcement by private parties.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); O

&

G Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp. , No. CV010084433S, 2001 WL 1178709, at *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 7, 2001) (a “plaintiff may not bring a cause of action under CUTPA based on conduct which does not also violate CUIPA where the alleged misconduct is related to the insurance industry”) (citation omitted).⁷

CUTPA provides that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 42-110b(a)

. The statute creates a private cause of action for ...