Royal Palm Vill. Residents, Inc. v. Slider
| Decision Date | 12 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-13789 |
| Parties | ROYAL PALM VILLAGE RESIDENTS, INC., on behalf of the homeowner-members in its representative capacity and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Gene Asbury, on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated, James Lemonnier, on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated, Bonnie Lohmeyer, on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated, Fred Osier, on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Monica SLIDER, Sheri Woodworth, Belinda Lawson, Sun Communities, Inc., Royal Palm Village, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Sun Communities Operating Limited Partnership, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Dineen Pashoukos Wasylik, DPW Legal, Wesley Chapel, FL, Daniel W. Perry, Daniel Perry, Esq., Orlando, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Mahlon Herbert Barlow, III, Ali Vakili Mirghahari, Alicia Whiting-Bozich, Sivyer Barlow & Watson, PA, Tampa, FL, J. Allen Bobo, Lutz Bobo Telfair, PA, Sarasota, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before Jordan, Rosenbaum, and Newsom, Circuit Judges.
Florida law awards attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in "proceeding[s] to enforce the provisions" of the Florida Mobile Home Act. See Fla. Stat. § 723.068. As relevant here, the district court ruled that § 723.068 did not provide for an award of fees as to voluntarily-dismissed amended complaints that—though alleging violations of the FMHA—did not include claims for violations of the FMHA, request relief under the FMHA, or seek to enforce compliance with the FMHA. Following oral argument and a review of the record, we agree with the district court and affirm.
Residents of the Royal Palm Village Mobile Home Park in Haines City, Florida, sued the Park's owners in federal court. Generally speaking, the residents alleged that the owners had engaged in fraud by, among other things, illegally passing on costs to the residents, embellishing lot descriptions to justify increased rents, and falsely promising to upgrade roads and other common areas.
The residents filed a succession of complaints. The initial complaint comprised a combination of common-law, state, and federal statutory claims: four under the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ; one under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ; one under the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 et seq. ; one under the Florida Mobile Homes Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 723.001 et seq. ; and one for unjust enrichment. Acting sua sponte , the district court dismissed the residents’ initial complaint as a shotgun pleading.
The residents filed an amended complaint alleging violations of a slightly different collection of state and federal statutes: four counts under both the federal and Florida RICO statutes—as well as one under the ADA. The owners moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for essentially the same reasons that it had dismissed the initial complaint.
In response, the residents filed a more streamlined second amended complaint, which alleged only five federal statutory violations—four federal RICO claims and one federal ADA claim. As in the previous complaints, the predicate acts underlying the residents’ RICO claims were mail and wire fraud, and the theory underlying those violations was that the owners had used mail and wire communications to perpetrate violations of the FMHA. The alleged FMHA violations thus provided the factual bases for the residents’ RICO claims, but the second amended complaint (like its immediate predecessor) didn't request relief under the FMHA itself. Nor did it seek to enforce any provisions of the FMHA. Instead, the second amended complaint requested treble damages for the alleged RICO violations and declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged ADA violations.
The owners again moved to dismiss. Although the residents initially opposed the owners’ motion, they eventually reversed course and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Because the owners hadn't yet answered, the residents’ voluntary dismissal was self-executing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) ; 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2363 (4th ed. & Apr. 2022 update).
Claiming victory, the owners sought attorneys’ fees under § 723.068, which entitles the "prevailing party" to such fees in "proceeding[s] to enforce provisions" of the FMHA. The district court agreed in part. It permitted the owners to recover the fees that they had incurred prior to the dismissal of the initial complaint. Because only the initial complaint asserted an FMHA claim, the district court explained, only that complaint aimed "to enforce" the provisions of the FMHA. And the owners were the "prevailing part[ies]" as to that FMHA claim, the district court held, because "a defendant can be considered a prevailing party on an abandoned claim."
The owners now appeal the district court's rejection of their fee requests pertaining to the first and second amended complaints. Those complaints, the owners argue, were also "to enforce" the FMHA because the residents predicated the RICO claims in those complaints on violations of the FMHA. And, the owners say, they became the "prevailing part[ies]" with respect to those claims when the residents voluntarily dismissed them.
A district court's denial of attorneys’ fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute is usually reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Smalbein ex rel. Estate of Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach , 353 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2003). But here entitlement to fees depends on the interpretation of § 723.068 of the FMHA. Our review is therefore plenary. See, e.g., Jones v. United Space All., L.L.C. , 494 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007).
We affirm the denial of attorneys’ fees to the owners on the residents’ amended complaints for the reason articulated by the district court. As we explain, the amended complaints were not "proceeding[s] to enforce provisions" of the FMHA under § 723.068.
The common-law rule in Florida, as elsewhere, is that "each party pay[s] its own [attorneys’] fees." Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. , 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003). As a fee-shifting statute in derogation of the common law, § 723.068 is "strictly construed." Campbell v. Goldman , 959 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 2007).
What does it mean to "strictly construe" a statute in Florida? One explanation is that statutes in derogation of the common law "will not be interpreted to displace the common law further than is clearly necessary." Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n , 354 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1977). So any doubts about § 723.068 cut against an award of fees.
Fees are awarded to a prevailing party under § 723.068 in "proceeding[s] to enforce provisions" of the FMHA. Where the statute applies, fees are mandatory. See, e.g., Mihevic Mgmt., Inc. v. Gardens Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. , 964 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ; Vidibor v. Adams , 509 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
The key statutory phrase in § 723.068 is "to enforce." As directed by the Florida Supreme Court, see Advisory Opinion to Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020), we look to dictionaries at the time of enactment to determine the phrase's meaning. When § 723.068 became law in 1984, the word "enforce" meant "[t]o compel observance of or obedience to: enforce a regulation " or "[t]o compel." The American Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition 454 (1985). See also Black's Law Dictionary 474 (5th ed. 1979) ("To put into execution; to cause to make effective, as to enforce a particular law ....").
Here the alleged FMHA violations set out in the residents’ amended complaints were not independent legal claims, but rather components of other claims (e.g., the RICO claims). The amended complaints did not seek any relief under the FMHA. Nor did they request compliance with the FMHA. Those complaints, therefore, were not "proceeding[s] to enforce provisions" of the FMHA. See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 315 (2d ed. 1995) ( the context of a contractual dispute, that the term "enforcing" is "not apt unless one is seeking specific performance"). Cf. Nelson's Inc. v. Halifax Const. Co. , 305 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) ().
The Fifth District's decision in T & W Dev., Inc. v. Salmonsen , 31 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) —which the district court relied on—supports this conclusion. In that case, a developer of a mobile home subdivision brought an action against a homeowners’ association and individual residents for injunctive and declaratory relief arising out of the association's amendment of the deed of restrictions. The defendants prevailed on the developer's claim with respect to the amendment of the deed, and the trial court awarded them fees under § 723.068. On the developer's appeal, the defendants argued that the award of fees was appropriate because the developer had asserted that the amendment of the deed violated a provision of the FMHA. But the Fifth District rejected the notion that "simply invoking" the FMHA is "sufficient to confer entitlement to ... fees," and explained that it had to "look at the true nature of the relief requested and argued" by the developer. See id. at 301. Although the developer had claimed...
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