Royal v. Police and Fire Com'n of Ecorse

Decision Date02 April 1956
Docket NumberNo. 75,75
Citation75 N.W.2d 841,345 Mich. 214
PartiesAlvin ROYAL, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. POLICE AND FIRE COMMISSION OF the City of ECORSE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Philip J. Neudeck, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Victor T. Mitea, Ecorse, City Atty., Edward N., Barnard, Detroit, of counsel for defendant and appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

KELLY, Justice.

The Ecorse police and fire commission found plaintiff guilty of insubordination, disrespect toward superior officers and failure to comply with the orders of the commission, and demoted him from chief of police to the rank of detective-lieutenant. Plaintiff appealed by certiorari to the circuit court of Wayne county. The trial court held that the commission adjudged the plaintiff guilty arbitrarily and capriciously and without valid and substantial evidence and further that the 2 commissioners who testified before the board should have disqualified themselves to sit in judgment after having been witnesses. Defendant appeals from said judgment pursuant to leave granted by this Court.

Police commissioner Stroia testified that on February 22, 1954, he had an interview and conversation with plaintiff in plaintiff's office in the city hall; that during this conversation the plaintiff became very angry and in a loud and threatening voice stated that he did not like the way the commission operated and further that 'if they (the commission) don't leave me alone, somebody's going to get hurt.' He further stated that the plaintiff criticized the commission's action in promoting one Lieutenant Gilman to the rank of inspector and said that the commissioners were a bunch of dummies and that if Commissioner Montry, or any other commissioner, stepped into the police station he would see to it that they were thrown out.

Commissioner Montry testified that after being informed by Stroia of the conversation between plaintiff and Stroia, he called plaintiff on the telephone and plaintiff confirmed what Stroia had told him and stated to Montry that if he would go to the police station he would meet him there in 10 minutes and would throw him out of the station. Montry also testified that plaintiff objected to and resented the commission's action in promoting Lieutenant Gilman and that plaintiff failed to cooperate with Gilman or to carry out the commission's orders that he give gilman a key to plaintiff's office.

Plaintiff testified that in his interview with Stroia, above referred to, he was emotionally upset and admitted that he 'flew off the handle,' that he did say that Commissioner Montry 'should be thrown out' of the station, but couldn't recall whether he said he would throw him out. In regard to Gilman, plaintiff testified that he had never given him any orders after he was promoted as inspector, but later qualified this statement by saying: 'Any city license would come in, I would forward it to him, or investigation be made, I would forward it to him.'

In regard to the key episode, plaintiff admitted that he was requested on Saturday February 20, 1954, to give Gilman a key to his (plaintiff's) office, that he agreed to do so and stated that he would have done so on the following Monday, February 22, if he 'hadn't had the blow-up with Commissioner Stroia,' that he had no opportunity subsequent to said interview with Stroia to give Gilman the key for the reason that on the following morning (Tuesday, February 23) he was suspended from office.

The charter of the city of Ecorse provides for a police and fire commission consisting of 5 members to be appointed by the mayor, which commission 'shall have general control and management of the police department and fire department.' This charter provides:

'All appointments to positions as policemen and firemen shall be made by the commission. * * * The commission may discipline, suspend temporarily and discharge permanently, any member of the police or fire department for any cause which the commission in the exercise of their discretion deem sufficient, provided, however, that neither the chief of the police department nor the chief of the fire department, nor any member of the police or fire forces except a probationary member shall be dismissed unless a formal complaint of the cause or causes of his suspension or removal be served upon him, and after trial and conviction by the commission sitting as a trial board. The decision of the commission shall be final.'

A police manual was in effect at the time of the hearing providing that any member of the department may be dismissed when charged and found guilty of insubordination or disrespect toward a superior officer, criticizing department orders, overbearing, oppressive or tyrannical conduct in the discharge of duty, or any other acts or omission contrary to good order and discipline.

Plaintiff does not endeavor to justify his behavior of February 22 toward Stroia and Montry, but attempts to take same out of the realm of disciplinary judgment by urging that such behavior was not such as affected the public welfare. In this regard plaintiff quotes from Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, § 457, as follows:

'Where the removal is to be for official misconduct or for misfeasance or mal-administration in office, the misconduct which shall warrant a removal of the officer must be such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual.'

Plaintiff also calls this Court's attention to the case of Carroll v. City Commission, 265 Mich. 51, 251 N.W. 381, 383. In this case the police chief of Grand Rapids was removed by the city commission for alleged official misconduct and insubordination. The order of removal was vacated upon an appeal to this Court and in its opinion this Court said that the alleged insubordination was not based upon any act that had to do in any way with the discharge of official duties, and stated:

'He could not be captiously removed on trivial or technical grounds. If he was to be removed at all, it must be removal for cause, and that which is charged as a reason or justification for removing one from office for cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office. It must be something which in a material way affects the rights and interests of the public.'

In Fraternal Order of Police v. Lansing Board of Police & Fire Commissioners, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W.2d 310, 311, this Court commented upon the right and duty of the commissioners to control the police force and see to it that discipline was maintained, by stating:

'The charter of the city of Lansing [chap. 14, § 212] specifically gives the Board 'entire control of the police force,' and it is thus responsible to the...

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5 cases
  • Duluth, S.S. & A.R. Co. v. Michigan Corp. and Securities Commission
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • September 10, 1958
    ...Bay Transit Co. v. Michigan Corporation & Securities Commission, 319 Mich. 14, 29 N.W.2d 303. See, also, Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Commission, 345 Mich. 214, 75 N.W.2d 841. We do not find the 'error' or 'incorrectness' referred to in the Hoskins case, supra. There was competent evidence......
  • Rinaldi v. Civil Service Commission, City of Livonia
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • May 18, 1976
    ...a higher standard of conduct of its officers than a civilian employer demands of its employees. See Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Commission, 345 Mich. 214, 219--220, 75 N.W.2d 841 (1956). A police officer, intent on retaining his position on the force, can expect that he will be held to a ......
  • Paquin v. City of St. Ignace
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • October 19, 2017
    ...Coursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publishing Corp. , 40 Ill.2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968) ; see also Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Comm. , 345 Mich. 214, 219, 75 N.W.2d 841 (1956) (noting that the control of a police department was a function of a local governmental entity). In light of th......
  • Cicotte v. Damron, 76
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • May 14, 1956
    ...connection with the powers and authority of the police and fire commission, was recently before this Court in Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Commission, 345 Mich. 214, 75 N.W.2d 841. In that case decision turned on the question whether the commission, acting as a trial board in holding a hea......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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