Royal Zenith Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1984
• Citation: 483 N.Y.S.2d 993,473 N.E.2d 243,63 N.Y.2d 975
• Parties: , 473 N.E.2d 243 ROYAL ZENITH CORPORATION, Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 993

483 N.Y.S.2d 993

63 N.Y.2d 975, 473 N.E.2d 243

ROYAL ZENITH CORPORATION, Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 13, 1984.

Arthur N. Brook and Howard D. Avrutine, New York City, for appellant.

Richard M. Gates, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 98 A.D.2d 613, 469 N.Y.S.2d 351, should be affirmed, with costs.

Appellant, Royal Zenith Corporation, claiming that a printing press in transit to its customer had been damaged while in the custody of Container Service Company, a trucker, commenced an action for damages against Container, a foreign corporation. In accordance with Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312, jurisdiction over Container was secured by attachment of a liability insurance policy issued to Container by respondent, Continental Insurance Company, a New York corporation. Respondent disclaimed coverage, and neither Container nor respondent appeared in defense of the action, which in 1977 proceeded to a default judgment against Container. Following the failure of either Container or respondent to satisfy the judgment, appellant commenced the instant action to enforce the judgment directly against respondent under section 167 (subd. 1, par. ) of the Insurance Law. During the pendency of this action, the Supreme Court ruled in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516, that a Seider attachment, as the basis for personal jurisdiction, was unconstitutional. Appellant thereafter sought summary judgment dismissing respondent's defense based on its alleged disclaimer of coverage, and respondent cross-moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the default judgment appellant sought to enforce against it was a nullity because of an absence of personal jurisdiction over Container. Special Term denied both the motion and the cross motion; the Appellate Division modified to the extent of granting respondent's cross motion and dismissing the complaint. We now affirm.

A court is without power to render a judgment against a party as to whom there is no jurisdiction (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490), and a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack (see Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 488, n. 9, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 425 N.E.2d 851; Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 10, Comment f ). Because the attachment had no validity as a basis for personal jurisdiction over Container, it follows that the...