Rozgall v. Dorrance
| Decision Date | 17 May 1946 |
| Docket Number | 32035. |
| Citation | 23 N.W.2d 85,147 Neb. 260 |
| Parties | ROZGALL v. DORRANCE, Sheriff, et al. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. When it is sought to review the judgment of a district court no motion for a new trial having been filed, this court will examine the record to ascertain if the pleadings state a cause of action or defense and support the judgment or decree, but it will not go back of the verdict rendered by the jury or findings of fact made by the trial court to review anything done or any proceeding had.
2. In construing a statute, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular topic under which the language in question is found, and the intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a particular part considered separately.
3. Provided always that the interpretation of a statute is reasonable and not in conflict with legislative intent, it is a cardinal rule of construction of statutes that effect must be given, if possible, to the whole statute and every part thereof and it is the duty of the court, so far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Just as an interpretation which gives effect to the statute will be chosen instead of one which defeats it, so an interpretation which gives effect to the entire language will be selected as against one which does not.
4. The provisions of the Constitution relating to titles are to be liberally construed so as to admit of the insertion in a legislative act of all provisions which, although not specifically expressed in the title, are comprehended within the objects and purposes of the act as expressed in the title, and to admit all provisions which are germane, and not foreign, to the provisions of the act as expressed in its title.
5. Due process of law requires only that the accused be given sufficient notice of the nature of the charge against him in order that he may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
6. Filiation proceedings under sections 13-113 and 13-114 R.S.1943, are criminal in form at their inception for the purpose of service of process and obtaining jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of a defendant therein, but actually such proceedings are essentially civil in character and a preliminary hearing with finding of probable cause is neither necessary nor required.
7. The justice or judge obtains jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of defendant by the initial filing of a proper complaint, the issuance of warrant for his arrest, and its execution.
8. The trial of such a case on the merits is delegated entirely to the district court which acquires jurisdiction by the filing with the clerk of the district court of a transcript of the proceedings before the justice or judge, which discloses that the proceedings before him were based on a proper complaint, issuance of a warrant, arrest of the accused, and that an appropriate order was entered binding defendant to appear and answer or committing him to the county jail to be held to answer the complaint at the next term of the district court.
9. The summary criminal statutory forms and procedure, by which jurisdiction is obtained over the subject matter and the person in both courts, are borrowed from the criminal law for civil purposes. However, after the case is lodged in the district court by virtue of such process, the trial proceeds as in other civil actions, except as otherwise specifically provided by statute.
Kelso Morgan and Louis T. Carnazzo, both of Omaha for appellants.
Grenville P. North, of Omaha, for appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and PAINE, CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ.
This is a habeas corpus case and involves primarily the construction and validity of chapter 81, Laws 1941, p. 322, which now appear as section 13-101 to 13-116, inclusive, R.S.1943.
In conformity with section 13-113, R.S.1943, a complaint was filed in the county court of Douglas County by an unmarried woman stating on oath that petitioner, Carl W. Rozgall, made defendant therein, was the father of her child born out of wedlock. A warrant was duly issued and being thereby apprehended petitioner was brought before the county court to answer the complaint. On April 18, 1945, in conformity with section 13-114, R.S.1943, the county judge entered the following order:
On the same date petitioner filed this action in the district court for Douglas County against respondents, praying for a writ of habeas corpus and discharge from custody upon the alleged grounds that the proceedings had in the county court were void because the statute authorizing them was unconstitutional and because petitioner having been charged with a crime was not given a preliminary hearing with subsequent finding of probable cause.
The petition contained a copy of the statutory complaint filed, warrant issued with return, and final order of the county judge. The trial court forthwith issued a writ of habeas corpus. Respondents by return to the writ admitted the filing of the complaint, issuance of warrant, apprehension and detention of defendant under the order of the county judge, as alleged by petitioner, but asserted that the proceedings were valid and being civil in character no finding of probable cause was necessary, as required in felony cases. After a hearing the trial court in its judgment simply found and adjudged without elaboration of reasons that petitioner was unlawfully imprisoned by respondents and ordered him discharged from custody. Respondents appealed to this court assigning as error substantially that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to law.
There is no bill of exceptions and respondents did not file a motion for new trial. In the absence of such a motion the only question presented for decision is whether plaintiff's petition stated a cause of action in support of the judgment entered. It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that 'When it is sought to review the judgment of a district court, no motion for a new trial having been filed, this court will look into the record to ascertain if the pleadings state a cause of action or defense and support the judgment or decree accordingly, but it will not go back of the verdict rendered by the jury or findings of fact made by the trial court to review anything done or any proceeding had.' Tait v. Reid, 91 Neb. 235, 136 N.W. 39.
Bearing the above rule in mind, we have examined the petition filed by petitioner and conclude that it did not state a cause of action or support the judgment of the trial court, therefore, respondents' assignment must be sustained.
It is argued by petitioner that the trial court did not pass upon constitutionality of the act, since that was unnecessary, but only determined that the county court never had jurisdiction, therefore, the district court could have none for trial on the merits. We are unable to agree with that contention because the decree of the trial court did not so recite and if all facts well pleaded in the petition, as distinguished from conclusions of law, are admitted the county court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of petitioner, who was lawfully in custody at all times involved, unless the act was held to be unconstitutional or a preliminary hearing with finding of probable cause was held to be jurisdictional. Of necessity then both questions are presented for decision.
In giving construction to sections 13-113 and 13-114, R.S.1943, primarily involved, and determining the validity of the proceedings at bar, we are required, contrary to the contention of petitioner, to examine all provisions of the act as distinguished from its separate parts. It has been aptly stated that 'In construing a statute, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular topic under which the language in question is found, and the intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a particular part considered separately.' 59 C.J., Statutes, s. 594, p. 993. It has also been stated with authority that 59 C.J., Statutes, s. 595, p. 995. See, also, Drainage District No. 1 of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb. 530, 300 N.W. 582.
It will be noted upon examination that, among other things, the act specifically and comprehensively provides three correlated and cumulative methods by which...
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