RTC Transport, Inc. v. Walton

• Decision Date: 06 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 12537-8-III,12537-8-III
• Parties: RTC TRANSPORT, INC., a Georgia corporation, Appellant, v. William H. WALTON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Helen Walton; Estate of Helen Walton; and Anthony Heckart and Jane Doe Heckart, husband and wife, Respondents, Anthony Darrell Smith and Jane Doe Smith, husband and wife, Defendants.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 386

72 Wn.App. 386

864 P.2d 969

RTC TRANSPORT, INC., a Georgia corporation, Appellant, v. William H. WALTON, Individually and as Personal

Representative of the Estate of Helen Walton;

Estate of Helen Walton; and Anthony

Heckart and Jane Doe Heckart,

husband and wife, Respondents,

Anthony Darrell Smith and Jane Doe Smith, husband and wife,

Defendants.

No. 12537-8-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 3.

Jan. 6, 1994.

Joseph D. Hampton, Seattle, James A. Perkins, Yakima, and Bogle & Gates, Seattle, for appellant

Harold B. Field, Murray, Dunham & Murray, Seattle, James D. Maloney, Weeks & Skala, Yakima, for respondents.

FRED R.

STAPLES, Judge Pro Tem. ^*

Yakima County Superior Court granted RTC Transport, Inc.'s motion to amend its negligence complaint for property damages to add a claim for cargo damages. The court then ruled the amendment would not relate back and summarily dismissed the new claim because the statute of limitation had run. RTC contends the court erred by dismissing the claim because (1) it was encompassed in the complaint and/or (2) the claim arose from the same vehicle accident, so it should have related back to the filing of the complaint. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 29, 1988, RTC, a common carrier, was transporting a cargo of cigarettes for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) from North Carolina to Kent, Washington. On that date, the RTC truck, driven by Anthony Smith, was involved in an accident on I-82 near Ellensburg, Washington. It was foggy and there was ice on the road. The RTC truck was struck from the rear by a car driven by Helen Walton. ¹ Shortly thereafter, a logging truck driven by Anthony Heckart (Heckart or respondent) collided with both vehicles. The RTC trailer and its cargo of cigarettes was damaged.

RJR made a claim against RTC for cargo damage in the amount of $60,026.36, representing the wholesale price of the cigarettes less salvage value. RTC paid RJR's claim in June 1988.

RTC filed an action against both respondents on September 26, 1989. The complaint alleged the following:

[Paragraph 4] On January 29, 1988, on Interstate 82, northbound, approximately six miles south of Ellensburg, Washington, plaintiff's property was damaged in an automobile/tractor-trailer [Paragraph 5] As a proximate result of defendants' negligence, plaintiff suffered property damages in an amount now thought to exceed $60,000.

collision which occurred as a result of the negligence of Helen Hagler Walton and Anthony Heckart.

(Italics ours.)

On December 22, 1989, Heckart submitted interrogatories to RTC, two of which posed the following questions:

10. Please state whether a claim is being made for the cargo of the trailer that was involved in the accident herein.

11. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 10 above is in the affirmative, please state the amount claimed, and how that amount is computed.

On May 18, 1990, RTC answered interrogatory 10 stating, "[y]es", and interrogatory 11 stating, "[s]ee documents previously supplied." Extensive discovery was conducted by respondents on the issue of damages, including taking depositions of persons in North Carolina and Georgia relating solely to the cargo loss.

On February 27, 1992, RTC filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for the cargo loss, arguing the proper measure of damages was the wholesale value of the cigarettes. Respondents filed counter motions for summary judgment on March 17, 1992, contending the cargo damage was measured by the manufacturing cost. For the first time, respondents also raised the issue that the complaint failed to state a claim for cargo loss because it only referred to damage to "plaintiff's property".

"Anticipating that the plaintiff will move to amend its complaint" for damages to the cigarettes, Heckart objected to any amendment as barred by the statute of limitation. As anticipated, RTC filed a motion to amend the complaint on April 1, 1992, to allege a claim for cargo damage, arguing it "related back" to the original complaint under CR 15(c).

The trial court ruled the amendment would be granted under CR 15(a), but it would not relate back under CR 15(c). On May 22, an order was entered granting Heckart's motion for summary judgment dismissing the cargo claim, holding

"as a matter of law" plaintiff's amended complaint would not relate back. On June 10, another order was entered granting Walton's motion for summary judgment. RTC timely appealed to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

RTC contends the court erred (1) in holding the plaintiff's original complaint did not state "a cause of action" for cargo damage and (2) in denying its motion to amend the complaint on the ground that the cargo claim did not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint. ²

ISSUES

Issue 1: Does the complaint state a claim for cargo damage? We conclude it does.

CR 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.

The current civil rules relating to pleadings were designed to accomplish the purpose of giving notice of a claim or defense. ³ The rules were designed to avoid the problem of a party losing a right because of a defective pleading. ⁴ If the adverse party needs a more definite statement for the purpose of responsive pleading, he may resort to CR 12(e). The burden of filling in the details is borne by the discovery process. 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice § 1215 (1990).

Respondents contend the complaint did not give "fair notice" of the claim for cargo loss. Heckart asserts the complaint needed "factual allegations about: (1) damage to RJR's cigarettes; (2) being the result of respondents' acts; (3) RJR having made a claim against RTC for damage to the cigarettes and; (4) RTC having involuntarily paid said claim to RJR." Walton makes substantially the same claim. In substance, respondents claim the complaint did not show RTC's capacity to sue because it did not aver that RJR assigned the cargo claim to RTC, and this is a condition precedent to recovery by RTC. They are mistaken.

CR 9(a) provides:

Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.

There is no need for the plaintiff to allege its capacity to sue for the cargo damage nor any need to allege conditions precedent to such capacity in the complaint. See Dyson v. King Cy., 61 Wash.App. 243, 809 P.2d 769, review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1020, 818 P.2d 1098 (1991). The rule requires the defendant to assert lack of capacity. Simon v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 895 F.2d 1304 (11th Cir.1990).

Walton challenges not only the capacity of RTC to sue, but also the liability of RTC to RJR under common carrier law. ⁵ Liability of a common carrier for cargo damage is governed by the "Carmack Amendment" to the Interstate Commerce Act, enacted in 1906, which provides:

[The] carrier [or connecting carrier] are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by [the carrier].

49 U.S.C. § 11707(a)(1) (1993). A carrier is liable to the shipper for all damage to the goods while in transit unless it can prove that it was not negligent and that the damage was caused by (a) an act of God, (b) public enemy, (c) an act of the shipper, (d) public authority, or (e) inherent vice or nature of the goods. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964). See also 14 Am.Jur.2d Carriers, ch. XVI, §§ 507 through 661 (1964). RTC was obligated to pay RJR for the cargo damage.

More importantly, RTC has a claim in its own right to sue for damage to the cargo. ⁶ RTC's liability to the consignor or consignee for the loss is immaterial. Whether RTC has paid the consignor or consignee for the loss is also immaterial.

As soon as goods are delivered to a carrier for transportation, the law vests in it a special property which authorizes it to maintain an action against any person who does any injury to the goods. In general, it may be said that a carrier may resort to any means for the protection of the property carried to which the owner could have recourse, and that it may recover for any loss of, or damage to, the property from the person responsible, even though the real owner may also have an action against the same wrongdoer [citingAmerican Tug Boat Co. v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 48 Wash.2d 117, 291 P.2d 668 (1955) in footnote 2]. Of course, a recovery and satisfaction by the carrier bars an action by the owner of the property for the same loss or damage. Likewise, recovery by the owner will bar a like recovery by the carrier which has paid the owner the amount of his loss, except to the extent that the action is for damages to the carrier's special interest in the property.

(Footnotes omitted. Italics ours.) 13 Am.Jur.2d Carriers § 233 (1964). This has been the law "for centuries". American Tug Boat Co. v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 48 Wash.2d 117, 125, 291 P.2d 668 (1955) (citing The W.C. Block, 71 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. ...