Ruback's Grove Campers Ass'n, Inc. v. Moore

• Decision Date: 14 June 2012
• Citation: 946 N.Y.S.2d 687,96 A.D.3d 1180,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04799
• Parties: RUBACK'S GROVE CAMPERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent, v. Robert MOORE et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

96 A.D.3d 1180
946 N.Y.S.2d 687
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04799

RUBACK'S GROVE CAMPERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent,
v.
Robert MOORE et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

June 14, 2012.

[946 N.Y.S.2d 688]

Englert, Coffey, McHugh & Fantauzzi, L.L.P., Schenectady (Peter V. Coffey of counsel), for appellants.

Lemery Greisler, L.L.C., Albany (James E. Braman of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., ROSE, LAHTINEN, MALONE JR. and GARRY, JJ.

ROSE, J.

[96 A.D.3d 1181]Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Nolan Jr., J.), entered January 5, 2011 in Saratoga County, which, among other things, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment declaring that the leases between the parties prohibit year-round residency on certain real property.

Plaintiff is a not-for-profit membership corporation that owns an 84–acre lakeside campground in the Town of Galway, Saratoga County known as “Ruback's Grove.” Defendants are members of the association who lease lots in the campground on a long-term basis. Plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment that defendants' leases prohibit them from year-round residency at the campground.¹ After joinder of issue, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion to the extent that it declared that the leases preclude year-round residency at the campground, and defendants appeal.

Paragraph 7 in each of defendants' leases provides that “the lot of land hereby leased shall be used as a campsite for the erection and maintenance of a camp or summer cottage, and for no other use whatsoever.” Defendants contend that the word “summer” does not limit their year-round use of the campsites, but merely describes the type of cottage that can be built. We are unpersuaded.

In interpreting the restrictive terms of a lease, we read it as a whole to determine its purpose and intent from the language employed and will enforce a clear and unambiguous agreement according to its terms ( see South Rd. Assoc., LLC v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 272, 277, 793 N.Y.S.2d 835, 826 N.E.2d 806 [2005];W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 566 N.E.2d 639 [1990];Baldo v. Patton, 65 A.D.3d 765, 766, 884 N.Y.S.2d 281 [2009] ). In doing so, we are mindful that restrictions on the use of land are not generally favored and will not be extended by implication beyond the terms of the restriction ( see Witter...