Rubeck v. Sheriff of Wabash County
| Decision Date | 27 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:92CV290AS.,3:92CV290AS. |
| Citation | 824 F. Supp. 1291 |
| Parties | Bonnie RUBECK, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF OF WABASH COUNTY, Larry Rice, Rich White, Mark Henderson, Harold Learned, Edie Gidley, and Sally Bennett, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
John W. Emry, Franklin, for plaintiff.
Caren L. Pollack, James S. Stephenson, Indianapolis, for defendants.
On May 7, 1992, plaintiff Bonnie A. Rubeck, appearing by counsel, filed a complaint purporting to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and invoking this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4). A motion for summary judgment was filed by defendants on March 10, 1993. On April 22, 1993, the plaintiff's counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.1993).
A thorough discussion of Rule 56 by the Supreme Court of the United States can be found in a trilogy of cases decided in 1986. See, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)1; and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). A material question of fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. Wainwright Bank v. Railroadmens Federal Sav., 806 F.2d 146 (7th Cir.1986). The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine material issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Center, 931 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir.1991), or upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Cusson-Cobb v. O'Lessker, 953 F.2d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir.1992). "The days are gone, if they ever existed, when the nonmoving party could sit back and simply poke holes in the moving party's summary judgment motion." Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1990).
During its analysis, this court must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brennan v. Daley, 929 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.1991). Furthermore, it is required to analyze summary judgment motions under the standard of proof relevant to the case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-255, 106 S.Ct. at 2512-2514.
For academic insight into Celotex and Anderson, see Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183, 194 (1987), where the author states:
The recent Supreme Court cases likely require that summary judgment be more readily granted.... This emerging trend signals a new era for summary judgment, one in which the old presumptions are giving way to a policy of balancing and efficiency, and the mechanism is more appropriate to double as a sufficiency motion —allowing some sort of trial itself on the paper record.
More recently Childress has written that Celotex and Anderson clarify that Rule 56 motions should not be hesitantly granted when appropriate. ... Any litigant dealing with summary judgment must be aware of this new trend, the Court's cases, their application in each circuit, and the direction they portend. Pretrial practice is a new ball-game.
Childress, A Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 343 (1989).
Recent object lessons applying these ideas are found in McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370-371 (7th Cir.1992); Karazanos v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1991); and Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 947 F.2d 269, 273-274 (7th Cir.1991).
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants explain that the plaintiff was booked into the Wabash County Jail on June 30, 1990. The plaintiff's jail record prepared on June 30th indicates that upon her admission to the jail that she suffered from a skin disease on her arms, legs, and hands. The booking officer noted on the medical screening questionnaire that the plaintiff was currently taking Cortisone cream and Hydroxine tablets. The defendants concede that after the plaintiff had been in the Jail for two or three days, she noted insect bites on her body. According to the defendants, the plaintiff made her first written request on July 2, 1990, in which she complained of an "extreme rash problem." The defendants maintain that although she did not have her medication with her originally, her mother eventually provided the jail officials with it and it was administered regularly beginning on July 3, 1990. On July 6, 1990, defendant Honeycutt indicated in the jail log that he felt that the plaintiff's rash was becoming infected, and required medical attention as soon as possible, and the plaintiff was taken to the Wabash County Hospital on July 7, 1990.
The plaintiff contends that shortly after her incarceration at the Wabash County Jail, she discovered insect bites all over her torso. The plaintiff explains that she had a preexisting condition of psoriasis before she entered the jail. The plaintiff maintains that her mother attempted to deliver hydrogen peroxide and other medications for her to the jail, but the defendants did not allow it. The plaintiff further maintains that she made repeated requests for medical help to the abovementioned defendants. In attempting to elicit medical attention, the plaintiff contends that she called attention to and displayed the insect bites to defendants Bennett and Gidley.
The plaintiff explains that she had approximately 100 bites which turned into open sores during her stay in the jail. She maintains that the sores were "swollen, red, puss ridden, and very painful." See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Accompanying the above described condition was nausea, fever, a loss of appetite, and sleeplessness. The plaintiff maintains that she made a number of written requests to jail officials, Finally, on July 7, 1990, the plaintiff began to vomit blood and was taken to Wabash County Hospital. Apparently, at the hospital, the plaintiff was only treated for her nausea and not the insect bites. Therefore, when she returned to the jail, she resumed her efforts to have her condition checked. In so doing, she requested to see the jail physician. According to the plaintiff, she also wrote a note directly to Henderson requesting to see the jail physician.
The basic standard of deliberate indifference is found in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). See also Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.1992), Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547 (7th Cir.1992), Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.1992), Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.1992), McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1265, 117 L.Ed.2d 493 (1992), Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.1991), Salazar v. Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.1991), Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.1991), Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir.1988), Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 394-95 (7th Cir.1988), and Felders v. Miller, 776 F.Supp. 424 (N.D.Ind.1991). See also Musgrove v. Broglin, 651 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ind.1986), and Burris v. Kirkpatrick, 649 F.Supp. 740 (N.D.Ind.1986).
The Seventh Circuit recently observed that "in order to show `deliberate indifference,' a plaintiff is required to prove that the prison official's action was deliberate or reckless in the criminal sense." Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.1990) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court has cited the Seventh Circuit's criminal recklessness standard with approval. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). In Franzen, the Seventh Circuit noted that punishment under the Eighth Amendment "implies at a minimum actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it." 780 F.2d at 653. See also Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896 (7th Cir.1990). Compare the insightful analysis of Judge Anderson in Gomm v. DeLand, 729 F.Supp. 767 (D.Utah 1990).
On June 17, 1991, in Wilson v. Seiter, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Justice Scalia, has revisited this issue under the Eighth Amendment. An extensive quotation therefrom is in order:
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