Rubino's Case
Decision Date | 28 November 1951 |
Citation | 328 Mass. 129,102 N.E.2d 64 |
Parties | RUBINO'S CASE. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. Hershfield, Lawrence, for claimant.
E. Z. Dymsza, Boston, E. C. McCabe, Boston, for insurer.
Before QUA, C. J., and WILKINS, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.
The employee appeals from a decree dismissing his claim for dependency compensation. He was injured on May 3, 1949, and has been receiving weekly total incapacity compensation. The question concerns the dependency of a wife and three children under the age of eighteen, who are in Italy, residing in a house owned by her. He emigrated to this country in January, 1949. The reviewing board adopted the findings and decision of the single member.
General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 152, § 35A, inserted by St. 1945, c. 717, as appearing in St. 1946, c. 553, provides:
'(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his injury. * * *
'(c) Children under the age of eighteen years if living with the employee at the time of his injury, or, if the employee is bound or ordered by law, decree or order of court, or by any other lawful requirement, to support such children, although living apart from them. * * *
'In all other cases questions of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the fact as the fact may be at the time of the injury. * * *'
In the report of the single member the following appears:
The use of 'therefore' shows that the denial of dependency compensation was based upon the finding that the employee had not sustained the burden of proof as to the fact of dependency. Mahoney v. C. & R. Construction Co., 311 Mass. 558, 42 N.E.2d 255.
1. So far as the wife is concerned, there was no error. Since she was not living with her husband at the time of the injury, Gorski's Case, 227 Mass. 456, 458, 116 N.E. 811, her dependency was not conclusively presumed under section 35A(a), but was a question of fact. The evidence did not require a finding that she was receiving support from the employee at the time of the injury. The employee's testimony as to payments could have been disbelieved. The finding was, in substance, that the wife had received no support from the employee since his arrival in this country. That was sufficient basis for a conclusion that she was not a dependent. Di Clavio's Case, 293 Mass. 259, 263, 199 N.E. 732.
The employee seeks to draw a distinction between section 35A and section 31 in that the latter section provides, in case of death of the employee, that payments are to be made to certain persons 'wholly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of [his] injury'. See Derinza's Case, 229 Mass. 435, 445-447, 118 N.E. 942. It is argued that the wording 'earnings' does not appear in section 35A. But that word also does not appear in section 32, which also relates to who are...
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