Rubio v. Swiridoff
| Citation | 165 Cal.App.3d 400,211 Cal.Rptr. 338 |
| Parties | Andora Ann RUBIO, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rudolf Henry SWIRIDOFF, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. F003568. |
| Decision Date | 07 March 1985 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
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We are faced in the instant case with the novel proposition that one who engages in a provocative quarrel with another and then drives rapidly away from the scene of the confrontation is liable in damages to the survivors of the victim of an automobile accident triggered by the other disputant who drove in a reckless fashion while influenced by the heat of passion thus enkindled. The legal rules we must apply to resolve the matter are well established, but we find no remotely similar factual precedent.
On October 29, 1981, plaintiff, through her guardian ad litem, filed a complaint for the wrongful death of her mother against Rudolf Henry Swiridoff (Swiridoff).
Swiridoff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted.
Swiridoff and Linda Karcie (Karcie) had been dating each other for approximately one and one half years. On September 30, 1978, Swiridoff was seen by Karcie's brothers with another woman. On October 1, 1978, Swiridoff telephoned Karcie several times, each time being met with an angry response. That evening Swiridoff went to a local bar and saw Karcie with another man. They exchanged "words". Swiridoff left and went to another restaurant/bar. Later, Karcie came into this establishment. They exchanged rude comments with each other in the parking lot. Swiridoff got into his Corvette and drove out of the parking lot "burning rubber".
Swiridoff headed north on Blackstone Avenue toward his home at approximately 70 miles per hour. Karcie got into her 1969 Pontiac and drove in the same direction on Blackstone Avenue at approximately 80 miles an hour heading to her home in Clovis. Along the way she passed Swiridoff. Just prior to Swiridoff turning off Blackstone Avenue toward his home he witnessed Karcie's car colliding with another car approximately a block and one-half away. He drove to the accident, helped Karcie out of the car and waited for the police.
Consuelo Rubio, plaintiff's mother, was a passenger in the car with which Karcie collided. She was killed in the crash.
Swiridoff was arrested on suspicion that he and Karcie were drag racing. They both denied participating in any type of race and plaintiff does not now assert that they were in fact racing at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff advances six arguments against the propriety of granting summary judgment in the instant case. However, since plaintiff properly concedes that "liability for negligent conduct may only be imposed where there is a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff ...," and since we determine that the requisite element of duty has not been demonstrated in the instant case, we need not deal with the other contentions.
A judgment of dismissal following an order granting summary judgment by the trial court will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (Brewer v. Home Owners Auto Finance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 337, 341, 89 Cal.Rptr. 231.) The rules for adjudication of a motion for summary judgment are well known. These rules are applied on appeal with all reasonable inferences considered in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 432, 437, 74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271.)
Plaintiff asserts that Swiridoff's duty of care "arose when he reasonably anticipated, should have anticipated, that his absence would cause or encourage his girlfriend to act negligently." "[Swiridoff] knew, or should have known, that everything [Karcie] did that night was in reaction to whatever he did; that she was playing a game of 'one-ups-manship' [sic ] ... that he was in control of their actions that night; and for all practical purposes, he was in the driver's seat of both automobiles." Thus Swiridoff caused Karcie to violate the general duty owed others by the driver of a motor vehicle on a public street.
Swiridoff argues there is nothing in the record that supports the contention that his driving off at a high rate of speed would cause Karcie to do the same. He asserts that plaintiff's proposition goes "beyond any established basis for finding the existence of a duty of care, and that finding such a duty under such circumstances would be contrary to the interests of justice and the administration of the judicial system."
In reply, plaintiff alleges "it is the continuing nature of the heated argument, and especially its history of immitation of the Respondent by his girlfriend, that establishes Respondent's duty of care herein."
Whether a duty exists is primarily a question of law.
(Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36.)
To prevail herein plaintiff must establish the requisite element of duty either on the theory that Swiridoff was guilty of nonfeasance in a situation where he was required to act, or of misfeasance.
For nonfeasance to be applicable where a party other than the defendant directly precipitated an injury-producing accident, there must exist a special relationship between the defendant and the person causing the harm, or between the defendant and the injured person (see 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 1973) Torts, § 649, p. 2928; Rest.2d Torts, § 815), for at common law tort liability for the acts of others did not generally exist. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 65, 271 P.2d 23.) Thus in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, a special relationship was found to exist in a wrongful death case between a mental patient and his psychiatrists, who were sued for failure to warn decedent of the patient's threats to kill her. The same principle was later applied to hold the physicians in Myers v. Quesenberry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733 liable to parties then unknown to them when they failed to warn their patient not to drive when emotionally overwrought and suffering from an uncontrolled diabetic condition.
No such special relationship existed either between Swiridoff and Karcie or between Swiridoff and Consuelo Rubio in the instant case. Karcie was merely a girlfriend of Swiridoff and was operating her own vehicle at the time of the accident. Rubio was a member of the general motoring public.
Plaintiff asserts that Swiridoff is liable herein because "... he was in control of [his and Karcie's] actions that night." If we view this contention as an attempt to argue the creation of a duty based upon nonfeasance in that Swiridoff should have exercised control over Karcie's conduct, given the heated nature of their argument and her alleged practice of one-upmanship, the law of this state is to the contrary, for our courts have refused to impose such a duty of control over the acts of another even when the party to be controlled is in a quasi-custodial setting. (Harland v. State of California (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 475, 142 Cal.Rptr. 201.) (Accord, Myers v. Quesenberry, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 894, fn. 3, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733.)
On the other hand, if we view the assertion as an argument that there was misfeasance in that Swiridoff was in fact in control of Karcie and thus of her automobile, then there was simply a failure to produce any evidence to support the a priori assumption of the existence of such control.
Since plaintiff cannot, on the facts of this case, prevail on a theory of duty founded upon nonfeasance we turn next to examine any bases which may exist for asserting misfeasance.
Swiridoff did two things on the night of the accident which plaintiff seems to be alleging constituted misfeasance. First, he engaged in a heated argument with Karcie. Second, he entered his automobile and drove rapidly away...
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