Rubright v. State
| Decision Date | 07 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D22-2008 |
| Parties | MATTHEW RUBRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Chris Helinger, Judge.
Deana K. Marshall of Law Office of Deana K. Marshall, P.A. Riverview, for Appellant.
Matthew Rubright appeals from the order summarily denying his motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The postconviction record reflects that in case number 2017-CF-12368, the State charged Mr. Rubright with attempted robbery. At some point before August 8, 2018, which was the day of trial, the State offered Mr. Rubright a sentence of seventy-two months' imprisonment in exchange for his guilty plea.[1] Mr. Rubright's counsel told the court that Mr. Rubright had rejected that offer and that he wanted to enter an open plea and defer sentencing so he could obtain an evaluation for the purpose of seeking a downward departure sentence. The trial court conducted the plea colloquy and accepted Mr. Rubright's no-contest plea.
On October 26, 2018, the State filed a notice that Mr. Rubright qualified as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). The prosecutor explained to the court:
This is - and I let the Defense attorney - I don't know if she gave you the situation. Basically, in preparing for this hearing I noticed that the Defendant qualified as PRR. Obviously, that wasn't something that was part of our plea discussions. But it was an open plea, but the Defendant wasn't aware of it at the time.
The court granted Mr. Rubright's subsequent motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.
On March 5, 2019, Mr. Rubright was again before the trial court for a change of plea hearing. The prosecutor informed the trial court that the State had offered Mr. Rubright a fifteen-year mandatory minimum PRR sentence in this case to be served concurrently with sentences in his three other pending cases[2] and that Mr. Rubright faced a maximum sentence of 120 years' imprisonment if convicted at trial of all his pending charges. Mr. Rubright chose to enter guilty pleas, and the trial court adjudicated Mr. Rubright guilty of each crime charged in the four cases and sentenced him as a PRR to fifteen years' imprisonment for the attempted robbery to run concurrently with terms of fifteen years' and five years' imprisonment for the second-degree and third-degree felony convictions in the other cases.[3]
Mr Rubright filed a rule 3.850 motion only in case number 2017-CF-12368. He alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him that he qualified as a PRR and therefore faced a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence when the State offered to accept his plea in exchange for a seventy-two month sentence. He further alleged that had he known that he faced a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence, he would have accepted the offer, and he would have been sentenced to seventy-two months' imprisonment for this offense.[4]
The postconviction court determined that Mr. Rubright pleaded a facially sufficient claim of deficient performance that was not conclusively refuted by the record but stated that it could not order the State to again extend the offer for seventy-two months' imprisonment because the State, not the trial court, has sole discretion to pursue a PRR sentence.[5] It ruled:
The record reflects that after the State filed its notice of intent to seek PRR sentencing, the Court addressed the voluntariness of Defendant's open plea and allowed him to withdraw it. This was the sole remedy available. When Defendant pleaded guilty again on March 5, 2019, he was aware of the maximum penalty he faced and the State's unwillingness to waive the PRR designation. After considering Defendant's motion, the State's response, and the record, the Court finds Defendant's motion should be denied.
This court recently addressed a similar ruling in Kohutka v. State, 343 So.3d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Mr. Kohutka alleged that he rejected a five-year plea offer after his trial counsel incorrectly advised him of the maximum sentence for his charge and that his counsel did not advise him that the State had filed notices of intent to seek an enhanced PRR and habitual violent felony offender sentence. Id. at 663. The postconviction court denied Mr. Kohutka's motion after an evidentiary hearing, ruling that the trial court's explanation of Mr. Kohutka's sentencing exposure on the day of trial and his decision that day to reject a less favorable offer prevented him from establishing prejudice. Id.
This court explained that the postconviction court erred by concluding that events occurring after Mr. Kohutka rejected the State's offer "overcame any prejudice that might have been caused by his counsel's deficiencies." Id. at 664. We reminded the postconviction court that "[i]n the context of ineffective assistance resulting in the rejection of a plea offer, '[p]rejudice . . . is determined based upon a consideration of the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what would have been done with proper and adequate advice.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. State, 189 So.3d 912, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)). This court also addressed the postconviction court's conclusion that Mr. Kohutka could not show prejudice because the only possible remedy would be to direct the State to again engage in plea negotiations.
Id. at 664-65. This court reversed the postconviction court's order and remanded for further proceedings.
The postconviction court's incorrect prejudice analysis in this case similarly requires this court to reverse the order summarily denying Mr. Rubright's motion and to remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we note that the postconviction record reflects that Mr. Rubright entered negotiated pleas in four cases. "[T]his court has recognized on numerous occasions, that a defendant cannot enforce a plea agreement against the State after withdrawing a plea." Small v. State, 249 So.3d 675, 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018); see also Taylor v. State, 132 So.3d 882, 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (); Ciambrone v. State, 938 So.2d 550, 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (); Moreland v. Smith, 664 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (). Should Mr. Rubright ultimately prevail on his motion and withdraw his negotiated plea in case number 2017-CF-12368, the State would no longer be bound by the terms of the negotiated agreement in case numbers 2017-CF-15379, 2018-CF-08888, and 20l8-CF-08889. The State could choose to withdraw from the agreement in those cases, and Mr. Rubright could face substantially longer terms of imprisonment.
We also note that Mr. Rubright was represented by counsel in the postconviction court, and the same attorney has filed documents in this appeal. On remand, the postconviction court shall provide Mr. Rubright the opportunity to consult with his postconviction counsel to ensure he understands the possible consequences should the postconviction court ultimately find that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in case number 2017-CF-12368.
Reversed and remanded.
I completely agree that Mr. Rubright's attorney's advice to reject the State's seventy-two-month plea offer in order to pursue an open plea constituted deficient performance of such a degree that it violated Mr. Rubright's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Constrained by the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Florida Supreme Court, I must also concur with our court's decision to remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to address the prejudice Mr. Rubright suffered.[6] See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Alcorn v. State, 121 So.3d 419 (Fla. 2013). As the Supreme Court stated in Lafler:
[I]f a mandatory sentence confines a judge's sentencing discretion after trial . . . the proper exercise of discretion to remedy the constitutional injury may be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal. Once this has occurred, the judge can then...
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