Rucker v. Gandy
| Decision Date | 06 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 60768,60768 |
| Parties | RUCKER et al. v. GANDY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Robert C. D. McDonald, Atlanta, H. Norwood Pearce, Columbus, for appellants.
Michael Agnew, Columbus, for appellee.
Gandy was a warrant officer in the U. S. Army, assigned to the Finance Office at Fort Benning. In November, 1973 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Wadsworth (Finance Officer) changed a military position in the Finance Office to a federal civil service position in the grade of GS-9. The names of two civil service employees at Fort Benning were submitted to LTC Wadsworth by the civilian personnel office as "best qualified" for the position when it was advertised. LTC Wadsworth rejected these two applicants.
Three months after the position was changed from a military to a civilian position (February, 1974), Gandy retired. He had taken a federal civil service examination prior to retirement and his name was placed on the federal civil service register in Macon. When no persons acceptable to LTC Wadsworth were found at Fort Benning, the vacancy was advertised army-wide. In response to this advertisement, Gandy's name was submitted by the Macon office; his was the only name submitted and LTC Wadsworth selected Gandy for the job in March, 1974. However, as Gandy had been retired for less than six months, the Dual Compensation Act (78 Stat. 484, 5 U.S.C. § 62) prohibited his employment in the federal civil service within 180 days after retirement without a waiver from the Department of the Army. Gandy's application for such a waiver was denied, and he was never thereafter employed at Fort Benning.
Gandy filed the instant action alleging that the individual defendants (each a union representative or union official), the defendant American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) and Local 54 of AFGE conspired to deprive him of federal employment; to impair his reputation among prospective government employers; and to subject him to embarrassment and scorn.
1. In regard to libel, Gandy relies on letters written by the president of the local union at Fort Benning to other union officials, to Senator Herman Talmadge, to Congressman Jack T. Brinkley, and a letter from the national vice president of the AFGE Fifth District to the Commanding General at Fort Benning. However, none of the letters contain any statements which could be considered libelous of Mr. Gandy, and the letters to Senator Talmadge and Congressman Brinkley do not relate to Gandy; rather, they relate to a totally unrelated complaint of another civil service employee. Further, there is no evidence that anything the defendants said or wrote caused Gandy to be deprived of a job at Fort Benning or elsewhere in federal civil service. On the contrary, he was deprived of his job at Fort Benning by Department of the Army (Army headquarters in Washington, D. C.), who denied Gandy's request for a waiver of the 180 day waiting period after his retirement. The request was denied because "management" at Fort Benning had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it had not given undue preference to Gandy, as required by the Dual Compensation Act, supra. In the same letter to officials at Fort Benning, Department of the Army prohibited Gandy's future appointment to a position at Fort Benning without prior approval from the Department of the Army. There is no indication that the information forming the basis of Department of the Army's decision in this matter came from any defendant in the case.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the statements were libelous per se, Code Ann. § 105-709(2) provides that statements made in the performance of a private duty, either legal or moral, are deemed privileged communications. The statements in the instant case were made by union officials who believed inequities were occurring in employment practices at Fort Benning, and were based on complaints and other information received by such officials. As union officials, we believe the individual defendants had a duty to report such alleged inequities to military authorities and senior union officials so such inequities could be investigated and corrected, if necessary. Under such circumstances the communications were...
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Smith v. Turner
...§ 51-5-5. When the charge is a privileged communication, a lack of actual malice bars recovery. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-5; Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga.App. 104, 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981). Charges concerning "the acts of public men in their public capacity and with reference thereto" are privileged communic......
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Green v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc.
...331 (1986). There is a total lack of evidence of any such malice. Williams, supra at 812(3), 386 S.E.2d 665; Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga.App. 104, 106(1), 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981). (c) Plaintiffs also contend that trial should have been allowed due to compelled self-publication to potential employ......
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Zielinski v. Clorox Co.
...reversed. All the Justices concur. 1.Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 227 Ga.App. 760, 490 S.E.2d 448 (1997). 2. See Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga.App. 104, 105, 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981) ("Privilege is a defense to printed or spoken defamation, and lack of malice in cases of privileged communications will b......
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Richardson v. King, 67299
...we find that appellee met the burden of proving that his communication was conditionally privileged. See generally Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga.App. 104, 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981). Compare Melton v. Bow, 145 Ga.App. 272, 243 S.E.2d 590 (1978), aff'd 241 Ga. 629, 247 S.E.2d 100 (1978). Appellee's evi......