Rucker v. Smoke

• Decision Date: 15 October 1892
• Citation: 16 S.E. 40,37 S.C. 377
• Parties: RUCKER. v. SMOKE et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

16 S.E. 40

37 S.C. 377

RUCKER.

v.SMOKE et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Oct. 15, 1892.

PRINCIPAL and agent — LIABILITY FOR agent's Acts—Exemplary Damages.

a principal is liable for exemplary damages on account of a wrongful, wanton, or ma licious act done by his agent within the scope or his agency, though such act be not previously authorized or subsequently ratified by him.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Lexington county; James Aldrich, Judge.

Action by F. B. Rucker against J. A. Smoke and F. J. Buyck for trespass. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant Buyck appeals. Affirmed.

C. G. Dantzler, for appellant.

Andrew Crawford and Melton & Melton, for respondent.

McIver, C. J. This case, briefly stated, is as follows: The defendant Buyck, holding a chattel mortgage on a mule in the possession of the plaintiff, placed the same in the hands of the defendant Smoke, with instructions to seize the mule and dispose of the same according to law. Acting under this authority, Smoke went to plaintiff's premises, and demanded possession of the mule, with which demand plaintiff refused to comply, whereupon said Smoke broke open the stable of plaintiff, and carried off the mule. Thereupon this action was commenced, to recover damages for the trespass alleged to have been committed. The plaintiff having recovered judgment, the defendant Buyck alone appeals upon the several grounds set out in the record. The first and second grounds having been abandoned, it remains only to consider the third and fourth, which are as follows: " Third. Because his honor erred in charging the jury that, if possession of the property was denied to Smoke as the agent of F. J. Buyck, and if, instead of obtaining that possession peaceably and lawfully, he resorted to a breach of the peace and violation of the criminal law, and went in there with a high band, and took the property, then he was violating the law of the land, and he is responsible, if nothing else is shown, for that violation; and the principal is equally liable with him. Fourth. Because his honor erred in charging the jury, in connection with the last above alleged error, that, ' If you conclude that the defendants acted wrongfully, as I have tried to explain the law to you, it is a question of fact for you to say whether they did it in an insulting manner, with a high hand. These are questions of fact for you to pass upon. If you find that these defendants did do so, why, then, it is in your sound discretion to assess what damages should be inflicted upon them.' And in charging the jury that exemplary or vindictive damages (smart money) could be found against the defendant F. J. Buyck on account of the wrongful acts of his agent beyond the scope of his authority." Counsel for appellant, in his argument here, claims that there are but two question raised by this appeal: First. Whether the appellant, Buyck, is liable for exemplary damages on account of the wrongful, wanton, or malicious acts of his agent, Smoke, unless done by his previous authority or subsequently ratified by him. Second. Is he liable for such acts of his agent beyond the scope of his authority? It seemsto us that there Is no foundation for the second question. As we read the charge of his honor, Judge Aldrich, which is set out in the "case, " we do not find that the Jury were instructed that Buyck, the principal, could be held liable, either in exemplary or any other kind of damages, for any act done by the agent, Smoke, beyond the scope of his authority. On the contrary, the jury were expressly instructed that, to make Buyck liable for any act done by Smoke, such act must be within the scope of his agency, as is shown by the following language taken from the charge: "And just here the maxim of the law is that whatever is done by the agent of another is done by the principal, if done within the scope of his agency;" and again, " whatever of wrongdoing Smoke was guilty of, his principal, Mr. Buyck, would be responsible for, —that is, if it was done within the scope of his agency." So, too, the instruction which is made the basis of the third ground of appeal is substantially a quotation from the latter part of a connected sentence in the charge, which commences with the following interrogation: ...