Rucker v. State
| Decision Date | 01 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 39057,39057 |
| Parties | RUCKER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John N. Crudup, Gainesville, for Willie Junior Rucker.
Jeff C. Wayne, Dist. Atty., Gainesville, Bruce Udolf, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Virginia H. Jeffries, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Willie Junior Rucker was indicted in Hall County, Georgia, in May 1982 for the murder of Arnold Pierre. A jury found Rucker guilty of murder and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Rucker appeals, enumerating eleven errors of law. We affirm.
The body of Arnold Pierre was found in the parking lot of a restaurant in Hall County at approximately 2:30 a.m. on April 10, 1982. The victim had been shot to death. When police arrived a few minutes later in response to a telephone call, they recovered a small amount of money from Pierre's clasped hand and one white tennis shoe near his feet. Investigators from the sheriff's department photographed the body and bloody automobile tire tracks leading from the scene.
Rucker and Pierre had been drinking together earlier in the evening, and tests showed Pierre's blood to contain .39 per cent alcohol by weight. An expert testified that such an amount would render most persons unconscious, but that it was not generally a fatally high blood alcohol level. Rucker's aunt testified that he and Pierre had been at her home at about 2:00 a.m., and that both were drunk. She also testified that the two had a dispute over a debt allegedly owed by Rucker to Pierre. When they left her house Pierre wore one white tennis shoe and carried the other.
Police began questioning persons who they suspected might have knowledge of the incident. They quickly concluded that Rucker was involved and located his car in front of his house at about 6:00 a.m. Police spoke to Rucker's wife at the door of the house and she admitted them in order to question Rucker, who was asleep inside. Police testified that when Rucker's wife informed him of their presence, Rucker reached under his bed for a shotgun. Rucker was quickly disarmed, then arrested and advised of his Miranda rights.
Several items of physical evidence were recovered other than the shotgun. A white tennis shoe like the one worn by Pierre was found on the floor of Rucker's car, and blood samples were taken from slacks worn by Rucker at the time of his arrest. An expert testified that this blood was shown by enzyme tests to be of the same type as Pierre's, a type occurring in only 9.6% of the population. The expert also testified that the blood was definitely not Rucker's. In a pocket of Rucker's jacket police found a spent shotgun shell. An expert testified that it had been fired from the shotgun Rucker had reached for beneath his bed.
Following the arrest, police took Rucker from his home to the Northeast Georgia Medical Center in Gainesville, where he signed a consent form and allowed blood to be withdrawn for testing. The blood was handled normally and mailed to the state crime laboratory in Atlanta. It was received there on April 16, 1982, and analyzed for alcohol content and found to contain .21 percent alcohol by weight. The packaging and label of the blood sample were intact on arrival and showed no sign of tampering.
At the time of his arrest, Rucker stated that he had been with Pierre the previous evening but he did not remember that Pierre had been shot. Rucker made another statement at the Hall County jail about two hours later after once again being advised of his right to remain silent. He said that he had known Arnold Pierre for several months. At first he did not remember going to his aunt's with Pierre the evening before, but when police confronted him with his aunt's report that the two were at her home together he said, "if that's what she says then it must be true." He seemed to remember little else about the episode.
At trial Rucker testified that he had gotten to know Pierre when they were in jail together. Rucker's trial testimony was much more orderly and coherent than the statements given police the morning of his arrest. From the witness stand he narrated the events of the night in question. He picked up Pierre at about 1:30 a.m. in his car. Both men were very drunk. Rucker paid Pierre a twenty dollar debt he owed and they drove to the house of his aunt, Nellie Welborn. Pierre insisted that Rucker take him home, but Rucker refused. Pierre jumped on Rucker and began to beat him, but Nellie Welborn separated them and the fight ended. When Rucker prepared to leave, Pierre followed him outside, continuing to insist that Rucker give him a ride home. The argument continued as they got into the car together. Rucker remained adamant in his refusal and pulled off the road at Chico's Chicken restaurant. Describing the scene, Rucker testified that Rucker contends that Pierre tried to grab the gun from him and in the struggle, Pierre was shot accidentally.
After Pierre was shot, Rucker pulled him from the car and drove home. He arrived at about 2:45 a.m. and went to bed. Before retiring he placed the gun under the bed.
1. Appellant submits that it was error to admit as evidence a vial of blood taken from him without showing an unbroken chain of custody of the vial. Rucker's principal contention is that the vial was sent from the Northeast Georgia Medical Center in Gainesville to the Georgia State Crime Laboratory in Atlanta via the U.S. Mail and that any number of persons could have tampered with the blood.
In Patterson v. State, 224 Ga. 197(2), 160 S.E.2d 815 (1968), we considered this question and determined that where, as here, the blood sample is handled in a normal course of testing and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood tested was other than that taken from the defendant, the evidence of tests on such blood is admissible. There was testimony in the present case that the vial's seal was intact on arrival in Atlanta and that there were no visible signs that it had been altered or the blood inside adulterated. A mere suspicion is insufficient to exclude the sample. The circumstances of the case need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample. This has been accomplished in the present case. Therefore, we find no merit in this enumeration.
2. Rucker argues that the state failed to establish the cause of Pierre's death; thus the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. The medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Pierre testified that in his opinion the cause of death was a shotgun blast to the neck and chest. We find that there was sufficient evidence of the cause of Pierre's death to support the verdict of the jury in this case. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
3. Appellant submits that it was error to admit into evidence over objection a photograph of the deceased showing the fatal wound, because the picture was inflammatory and prejudicial. We have many times held that...
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