Rudd v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 14 July 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 15155,15155 |
| Citation | 232 S.W.2d 121 |
| Parties | RUDD v. WALLACE et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Christopher & Bailey, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Price Daniel, Attorney General of Texas, and Durward M. Goolsby, Assistant, for appellees.
The appeal is from an order of the trial court denying an application for a temporary injunction.
Appellant Rudd, plaintiff below, alleged that he was engaged in the business of leasing buses, that such was a lawful business, and that it was not subject to regulation by the Railroad Commission of Texas under the provisions of Article 911a, Vern.Tex.Civ.St. Named as defendants were the Railroad Commission of Texas and its three members, and certain named enforcement officers for said Commission. The amended petition described in detail the manner of leasing such buses, and denied that plaintiff performed certain specified functions ordinarily performed by common carriers of passengers. The petition alleged that the defendants and each of them were asserting a right to regulate plaintiff's business and to require him to obtain from the Railroad Commission a certificate of convenience and necessity under the provisions of Article 911a, and were threatening plaintiff with prosecution and imposition of fines and penalties for alleged violation of Article 911a, and further alleged that in so doing the defendants were acting beyond the scope of any authority conferred upon them by the law and that defendants were trespassing upon plaintiff's civil rights and property. The petition alleged that defendants were also threatening the lessees of such buses with criminal prosecution and imposition of fines and penalties in an effort and conspiracy to destroy plaintiff's business. It was further alleged that since the filing of the present suit the Attorney General of Texas, purporting to act upon the request of the Railroad Commission, had instituted a suit in the District Court of Travis County, seeking to enjoin plaintiff and to recover penalties. It was alleged that an enforcement officer of the Commission had harassed a named driver of one of plaintiff's buses at a specified time and place and had required the bus to be stored in Brownsville and had forbidden the driver to move it.
The prayer of the petition was that the defendants, and all of their agents, servants, representatives, etc., be temporarily enjoined from interfering with plaintiff in the conduct of his business as described in the petition, and from interfering with the use of said buses when leased to third persons, and from filing suits or complaints of any character and from further prosecuting suits already filed, until the present case had been finally determined. The petition also prayed for adjudication upon final trial that plaintiff's business, as described in the petition, was not subject to regulation by the Railroad Commission under any provision of existing law, for permanent injunction, and for general relief.
The evidence adduced at the hearing on the application for temporary injunction, including testimony of plaintiff and others concerning the leasing of buses, covers two hundred pages in the statement of facts. The trial court filed separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact pertained largely to the leasing of certain buses on April fifth and April tenth of 1950. Plaintiff testified, and the trial court so found, that plaintiff held a certificate from the Railroad Commission which authorized him to make what were called 'charter' trips from certain points within Tarrant County, but not from other points.
The two conclusions of law filed by the court read as follows:
'1. That there is no distinction between the trips of the motor-propelled vehicles in issue, over the public highways of the State of Texas, from Denton, Texas, and return, as 'Charter' of 'Special Party' trips, as those terms are defined in General Orders Nos. 56 and 56-A of the Railroad Commission of Texas and the purported leases by S. A. Rudd.
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