Ruddock v. Ohls

• Decision Date: 29 March 1979
• Citation: 154 Cal.Rptr. 87,91 Cal.App.3d 271
• Parties: Christina Joanne RUDDOCK, a minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Darrel Leon OHLS, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 4165.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 87

154 Cal.Rptr. 87

91 Cal.App.3d 271

Christina Joanne RUDDOCK, a minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Darrel Leon OHLS, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 4165.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

March 29, 1979.

As Modified April 30, 1979.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gregory W. Baugher and James Ching, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant.

Strauss, Neibauer & Anderson, Modesto, and John J. Hollenback, Jr., Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

OPINION

CREEDE, ^* Associate Justice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Darrel Ohls and his wife, Diane E. Ohls, were divorced in Oregon on September 21, 1971. In its divorce decree, the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, for the County of Linn, action No. 39484, entitled "Darrell L. Ohls, Plaintiff, vs. Diane E. Ohls, Defendant," made a finding that respondent "is not the father of the minor child, CHRISTINA JOANNE RUDDOCK, born March 24, 1969, and support for said child is hereby denied." Both parties appeared in person with counsel at a trial of the action on June 29, 1971, at which evidence was heard and considered by the court. The decree further stated, ". . . that from the evidence it is possible to find that plaintiff is Christina's father, but that to so declare, in the absence of certainty, would be to do Christina a great disfavor, and the Court not being inclined to thrust upon an innocent child a father who denies such relationship; . . ." The child was not a named party to the Oregon action nor was a guardian ad litem appointed. The decree suggests the issues of paternity and child support were fully litigated, but the record does not include a summary of the evidence before the Oregon court.

Christina Ruddock was born on March 24, 1969. ¹ Five months later, her mother married respondent Darrel Ohls.

The present action was instituted on June 17, 1977, in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County when Diane E. Ohls, the mother of Christina Ruddock, petitioned the court to appoint a guardian ad litem in order to bring an action to establish that respondent was the father of Christina. A guardian ad litem from the Stanislaus County District Attorney's office was appointed and a complaint filed to establish the parent-child relationship between appellant and respondent and seeking support pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11479 and Civil Code sections 7000 et seq. Respondent pleaded the Oregon decree and moved to strike the complaint asserting paternity had been adjudicated previously in Oregon. The court granted the motion and appellant Christina Ruddock, through her guardian ad litem, appeals from the order striking the complaint.

ACCORDING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE OREGON DECREE OF NONPATERNITY, IT IS BINDING UPON THE PARTIES BUT DOES NOT RESOLVE THE INDEPENDENT RIGHTS OF THE MINOR CHILD.

1] California is required to recognize the Oregon judgment as determinative of respondent's nonpaternity of appellant Christina Ruddock as between the parties to the Oregon divorce action, Darrel L. Ohls (respondent) and appellant's mother, Diane E. Ohls. Christina was not joined as a party nor was a guardian ad litem appointed.

",3] It is well settled that once a valid judgment has been rendered it must be accorded full faith and credit by every other court within the United States even though the cause of action upon which the judgment was based is against the law and public policy of the state in which enforcement is sought. (Citations.)" (Biewend v. Biewend (1941) 17 Cal.2d 108, 111-112, 109 P.2d 701, 704; McGuire v. Brightman (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 776, 782, 145 Cal.Rptr. 256; Thorley v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 907-908, 144 Cal.Rptr. 557.) Therefore, the determination of the Oregon court is binding upon the courts of California if Oregon had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, the parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the court rendered a final judgment. (Miller v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 923, 930, 151 Cal.Rptr. 6, 587 P.2d 723.) A party confronted with the bar of a foreign judgment has the right to show that it was in excess of jurisdiction or affected by fraud if those issues were not expressly litigated in the foreign state. (Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675, 680, 119 Cal.Rptr. 692, and cases cited therein.)

4] The issue presented is essentially not one of jurisdiction but of res judicata with the concomitant consideration of identity of parties, issues and privity. The Oregon court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the husband and wife, but lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonparty minor child. Respondent seeks to bind the minor by the judgment on the basis the mother was acting in a full representative capacity with complete identity of interest. Under California law children who are not parties to a divorce action still may be bound by some aspects of a marital dissolution proceeding if the interests of the child are adequately represented by one of the parents.

In Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 126 Cal.Rptr. 805, 544 P.2d 941 the children of divorced parents brought an independent action against their father for past child support and misappropriation of trust assets. A property settlement agreement of the parents was incorporated in the decree of divorce providing that the father would pay the difference between $84 a month received by each child from a testamentary trust established by their paternal grandfather and $125 a month, with corresponding future credit on the support obligation if the trust income exceeded the agreed amount of child support. The court held the divorce decree foreclosed relitigation of the validity of long-standing support orders because the mother had acted in a representative capacity with identity of interest to those of the children and in all respects represented the "same legal right." (Id., at p. 951, 126 Cal.Rptr. 805, 544 P.2d 941.)

,6] The interest of a mother in proving paternity may be coextensive with the interest of the child to have paternity determined and support provided in some circumstances. There is nothing in the record showing that the Oregon proceeding was one in which, to use the language of Armstrong, appellant's mother being entrusted with her care and maintenance acted as "a proper representative (for) (her) interests" (Armstrong, supra, at p. 951, 126 Cal.Rptr. at p. 810, 544 P.2d at p. 946). If a judgment determining the existence of the parent-child relationship is to be binding upon the nonparty minor child, respondent has the burden of proving the minor was a party to the action or in some other manner is bound prospectively by the findings and judgment in the parents' marital dissolution action.

A MINOR CHILD IS NOT FORECLOSED FROM ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP BY A DECREE OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION IN WHICH SHE HAS NOT JOINED AS A PARTY IN INTEREST.

,8] A parent may not waive on behalf of children amounts reasonably due for present or future support, but between themselves an agreement is binding. (Hunter v. Hunter (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 576, 583, 339 P.2d 247.) While parents by their conduct or agreement cannot impair a child's right to reasonable support, the parties may by agreement or waiver determine the manner in which reimbursement is received for sums already expended for their support in the past. (Graham v. Graham (1959)) 174 Cal.App.2d 678, 684, 345 P.2d 316; Kaminski v. Kaminski (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 563, 566-567, 87 Cal.Rptr. 453.) In contrast to enforcement of a child's right of a present or past support obligation, the establishment of the parent-child relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be equated in importance with personal liberty and the most basic of constitutional rights. To hold a child bound prospectively by a finding of nonpaternity in a divorce action in which the child was not a party would be to allow the conduct of the mother to foreclose the most fundamental right a child possesses in our system of jurisprudence.

Considering present-day realities, not every question of paternity raised and decided in a marital dissolution action involves a full adversary hearing on the subject. It is not uncommon for such an issue raised in the pleadings to be decided pro forma because the mother is reticent to be subjected to scrutiny about past dalliances. The emotional experience and psychological trauma of having one's personal life unveiled can act as a deterrent. Guilt feelings over the dissolution, favorable concessions on support or property can influence the vigor with which the paternity question is presented to the court. (See Everett v. Everett (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 65, 71, 129 Cal.Rptr. 8.) The availability of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) may relieve the financial motivation for energetic pursuit of the responsible father. Lastly, the mother may have ambivalent feelings about having the child tied to a past relationship or about having to deal with the father on visitation and support. These considerations would require a review of the record to determine whether the mother acted in a proper representative capacity, and while not requiring a reweighing of the evidence, would nevertheless be a form of collateral attack.

9] We hold that in dealing with the prospective rights of a minor child to establish paternity, the child, if not formally a party, is not bound by a paternity determination in a marital dissolution action. The court is not required to be unaware of the prevalence of nonmarital and extramarital relationships in today's society (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 683, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106). To bind the child by the discretion or indiscretion, as the case may be, of the mother in choosing cou...