Rudy's Limousine Service, Inc. v. Commissioner

• Citation: 826 A.2d 1161
• Decision Date: 15 July 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 23013).
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: RUDY'S LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC. v. COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ET AL.

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RUDY'S LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC. v. COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ET AL.

(AC 23013).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 25, 2003.

Decided July 15, 2003.

OPINION:

PETERS, J.

Anyone who wants to operate a vehicle in livery service in Connecticut must first obtain a permit from the department of transportation. In deciding whether to grant an application for such a permit, the Connecticut department of transportation (department) must decide whether the proposed service will improve "public convenience and necessity." General Statutes § 13b-103 (b). The principal issue in this appeal is whether this standard provides the department with sufficient guidance to satisfy the principle of separation of powers mandated by the Connecticut constitution. A secondary issue is whether the department properly applied this standard under the circumstances of this case. Without addressing the constitutional issue, the trial court concluded that the department had applied the standard properly. Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicant's appeal. Although we find it prudent to resolve the constitutional issue, we affirm the judgment of the court.

On July 26, 2000, the plaintiff, Rudy's Limousine Service, Inc., filed an application with the defendant department for authorization to operate sixty-one additional livery vehicles intrastate.¹ On May 18, 2001, after public hearings, the department granted the plaintiff's application in part, permitting the operation of five additional vehicles intrastate, rather than the requested sixty-one. The department concluded that the "maximum amount of vehicles that would improve the public's convenience and necessity . . . would be five."

In the plaintiff's appeal to the trial court, it claimed that (1) § 13b-103 (b) lacks the constitutionally required standards to guide the department in making determinations about permits to operate livery vehicles, and (2) the department improperly applied the "public convenience and necessity" standard to the plaintiff's application. The court declined to address the plaintiff's facial constitutional challenge of § 13b- 103 (b) on the ground that a party who has sought a benefit under a particular statute cannot subsequently challenge that statute's validity in the same proceeding. On the merits, the court concluded that the department had properly applied the standards set forth in § 13b-103 (b). The plaintiff has appealed.

The record discloses the following undisputed facts. The plaintiff is a livery operation with headquarters in Greenwich. Its business has grown steadily and, at the time of the department's decision, was worth approximately $ 15.6 million. It operates a fleet of ninety vehicles, which are primarily used for interstate trips to transport passengers to places such as casinos, airports, dances and corporate headquarters. At the time of the plaintiff's application, twenty-six of its vehicles were licensed to provide intrastate services.

On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the judgment of the trial court on three grounds.² It claims that (1) § 13b-103 (b) is an unconstitutional delegation of power because the statute does not contain a clear legislative principle to guide the department in addressing applications for intrastate livery vehicle permits; (2) the trial court applied an improper standard of review in adjudicating its administrative appeal; and (3) the department improperly applied the standards delineated in § 13b- 103 (b) in the circumstances of this case. The department asks us to affirm the court's judgment in all respects.

Because, at this juncture, each of the plaintiff's claims raises issues of law, our review is plenary. Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 344, 805 A.2d 735, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 922, 812 A.2d 864 (2002); see also Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114, 122, 788 A.2d 83 (2002).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the limitations contained in § 13b-103 (b) are unenforceable because the statute lacks constitutionally required standards. In so doing, the plaintiff maintains that the trial court improperly declined to consider this claim on its merits.

The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly ruled that the plaintiff could not raise a facial constitutional challenge of § 13b-103 (b) in an administrative appeal under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. The court stated that "it is settled law that a party who has sought relief under a statute or ordinance may not challenge its constitutionality in the same proceeding. See Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 628, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985); J & M Realty Co. v. Norwalk, 156 Conn. 185, 191, 239 A.2d 534 (1968)."³ Because of cases decided after those upon which the court relied, we disagree with its holding. In our view, the plaintiff's facial constitutional claim was properly before the court in this case.

Under the UAPA, a party may appeal the decision of an agency to the Superior Court. The court is required to affirm the decision of the agency "unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions . . . ." General Statutes § 4-183 (j).⁴ A party may also file a declaratory judgment action with the agency "as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency." General Statutes § 4-176 (a).⁵ After a ruling by the agency, or a decision by the agency not to issue a ruling, the party may then file a declaratory judgment action with the trial court. General Statutes § 4-175 (a).⁶

We have not found, nor have the parties cited, any cases under the UAPA that directly address whether a party may raise facial challenges to a statute's validity in an administrative appeal. Our Supreme Court, however, has discussed the rule governing the adjudication of constitutional issues raised in administrative appeals that do not fall under the UAPA.

For many years, Connecticut courts have held that a person cannot seek a benefit under a particular statute and then, in the same proceeding, challenge the statute's constitutionality. See, e.g., Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 428, 115 A.2d 328 (1955), cited in Carofano v. Bridgeport, supra, 196 Conn. 628.

Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 209 Conn. 544, 552 A.2d 796 (1989), advised litigants to pursue a claim of facial unconstitutionality by way of a declaratory judgment action rather than by an appeal from the denial of an application under that statute. Id., 563. It reasoned that the determination of the validity of a statute was a matter of interest not only to the litigant but also to other persons who might be affected by the statute.⁷ Id.

In Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 245 Conn. 551, 715 A.2d 46 (1998), a tax appeal raised under General Statutes § 12-119, the Supreme Court overruled Cioffoletti. The court held that, in an administrative appeal from a contested administrative decision, the appellant could raise a facial constitutional challenge to the underlying statute. The court stated that the dispositive issue was whether third parties would be so affected by the tax assessment that they needed the kind of notice provided by a declaratory judgment action. The court concluded that, in that case, they did not need such notice. Id., 576. The court expressly overturned "the Cioffoletti rule requiring that facial attacks on the validity of legislation be brought in the form of declaratory judgment actions instead of administrative appeals." Id., 582.

The court based its conclusion on three reasons. It first held that Florentine and its progeny did not support the Cioffoletti rule because none of them had held that a declaratory judgment action was the exclusive procedural vehicle for a challenge to the constitutionality of a particular statute. Id., 579-80. Second, the court noted that it had previously permitted challenges to the constitutionality of a statute through actions other than declaratory judgment actions. Id., 580-81. Finally, the court decided that the concern for third party interests did not outweigh the legislature's decision to authorize statutory appeals as an avenue for relief. Id., 581-82.

Stafford Higgins casts great doubt on the principle that it is improper simultaneously to seek a benefit under a particular legislation and to challenge the validity of that legislation in the same proceeding. Like Stafford Higgins, this case does not place third party interests in jeopardy. Stafford Higgins is reinforced by Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 819 A.2d 803 (2003), in which the Supreme Court held that even though the workers' compensation board lacked jurisdiction to consider constitutional issues, a reviewing court had such jurisdiction. Id., 337-41.

We recognize that, unlike Stafford Higgins, the present case involves an administrative appeal under § 4-183 (j) rather than a statutory appeal under § 12-119. Similarly, this case is not an appeal from a workers' compensation board. We have, however, relied on cases arising in the context of appeals from other kinds of boards to decide the proper scope of UAPA appeals. See Mohican Valley Concrete Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 Conn. App. 45, 51, 815 A.2d 145 (2003).

Stafford Higgins and Rayhall strongly suggest that our older cases denying a litigant the opportunity to raise a facial constitutional challenge to a statute under which that litigant sought a benefit are no longer good law. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff's facial constitutional challenge to § 13b-103 (b) is properly before us.

II

We turn now to the merits...