Rufener v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

Decision Date20 August 1998
Docket NumberNo. 98-0086,98-0086
Citation221 Wis.2d 500,585 N.W.2d 696
PartiesJames R. and Kathleen RUFENER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent, d State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Jerry W. Martin, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, and Wisconsin Health Fund, Defendants.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Shawn R. Crain and Hope K. Olson of Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C. of Milwaukee.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Mark W. Pernitz and Jennifer S. Mirus of Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP of Madison.

Before VERGERONT, ROGGENSACK and DEININGER, JJ.

DEININGER, Judge.

James Rufener appeals a summary judgment dismissing State Farm Fire & Casualty Company from his personal injury action against Jerry Martin, State Farm's insured under a homeowner's policy. The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Martin's liability for Rufener's injuries was excluded by the "business pursuits" exclusion of the State Farm policy. We conclude that the activities that led to Rufener's injuries were "ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits," and therefore fall within an exception to the business pursuits exclusion. We therefore reverse the judgment dismissing State Farm as a party to the action.

BACKGROUND

Jerry Martin operated a part-time snowplowing business from his home, using his personal pickup trucks for the plowing. When Martin plowed, he attached to the back of his truck a salter/sander which spread salt or sand on parking lots and driveways. The salter/sander was heavy--about 650 pounds when empty--and Martin removed and reattached it to his trucks as necessary.

To facilitate the removal and reattachment of the salter/sander, Martin decided to attach a hoist to the rafters of his garage. James Rufener, Martin's co-worker at his regular full-time job, assisted with the installation of the hoist. Rufener and Martin temporarily nailed a 4" X 4" wooden beam to the rafters so that the location of bolts could be marked on it. As Rufener and Martin were removing the beam, Rufener fell from a ladder and was seriously injured. The record does not establish the precise cause of Rufener's fall.

Rufener sued Martin and State Farm, Martin's homeowner's liability insurer. 1 The State Farm policy contained a "business pursuits" exclusion common to homeowner's liability policies. This exclusion provides that coverage does not extend to liability for: "b. bodily injury or property damage arising out of business pursuits of any insured ." The business pursuits exclusion contains an exception, however, which is also common to homeowner's policies. The exception provides that the exclusion does not apply: "(1) to activities which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits." The trial court determined that the "business pursuits" exclusion precluded coverage under Martin's homeowner's policy, and that the exception did not apply to the activities that led to Rufener's injuries. The court granted summary judgment and dismissed Rufener's complaint against State Farm. Rufener appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of State Farm.

ANALYSIS

We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment using the same methodology as the trial court. See M & I First Nat'l Bank v. Episcopal Homes Management, Inc., 195 Wis.2d 485, 496, 536 N.W.2d 175, 182 (Ct.App.1995). That methodology is well known, and we need not repeat it here except to observe that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 496-97, 536 N.W.2d at 182; see also § 802.08(2), STATS. We also observe that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case Rufener. See Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis.2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1980).

The issue before us is the interpretation of the State Farm policy and its application to the facts of this case. Specifically, we must interpret the business pursuits exclusion and the exception to that exclusion, and determine whether either applies to Rufener's injuries. If the exclusion applies, Rufener's injuries are not covered by State Farm unless the exception also applies, in which case Rufener is covered after all. Rufener contends on appeal that he is covered because his injuries did not arise out of Martin's business pursuits, and therefore the business pursuits exclusion does not apply. He also contends that even if the exclusion applies, he is nevertheless covered because the activities that led to his injuries were "ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits," so that the exception to the exclusion applies.

The interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of law which we review de novo. See Oaks v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 195 Wis.2d 42, 47, 535 N.W.2d 120, 122 (Ct.App.1995). Our goal in interpreting the language of the policy is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. See Sprangers v. Greatway Ins. Co., 182 Wis.2d 521, 536, 514 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1994). Because the business pursuits exclusion seeks to limit liability, any ambiguity in it must be construed against the insurer. See Bartel v. Carey, 127 Wis.2d 310, 314, 379 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Ct.App.1985). However, "a policy may not be construed to bind the insurer to a risk which it did not contemplate and for which it received no premium." Id. at 314-15, 379 N.W.2d at 866.

The facts material to the coverage issue are not disputed, although the parties disagree about the cause of Rufener's injuries. Rufener contends his injuries were caused by Martin supplying him with a defective ladder. State Farm contends that the record does not show that the ladder was defective before the accident. This dispute is not material, however, because our analysis of the coverage issue does not depend on whether Rufener's injuries were caused by Martin supplying a defective ladder. For the purpose of this appeal, all that matters is that Martin may have been negligent in some way that contributed to Rufener's injuries. This much is adequately supported by the record when we view it in the light most favorable to Rufener, the non-moving party. See Grams, 97 Wis.2d at 338-39, 294 N.W.2d at 477.

Thus, we begin with the business pursuits exclusion itself. We conclude, as did the trial court, that it applies to Martin's liability for Rufener's injuries. The exclusion applies to "bodily injury arising out of the business pursuits of any insured ." Martin's snowplowing operation was a business pursuit under the two-prong test adopted in Bertler v. Employers Ins., 86 Wis.2d 13, 21-22, 271 N.W.2d 603, 607-08 (1978). Martin had been engaged in the snowplowing business for twenty-two or twenty-three years thereby satisfying the continuity requirement. Martin's intent in operating his business was to make money, thereby satisfying the profit motive requirement. That Martin worked full-time in another job is of no importance, because part-time businesses are businesses for the purposes of the exclusion, so long as they meet the requirements of the Bertler test. See Williams v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 180 Wis.2d 221, 230 & n. 3, 509 N.W.2d 294, 298 & n. 3 (Ct.App.1993).

Rufener's injuries "arose out of" Martin's snowplowing operation even though Martin was not plowing snow at the time. "The words 'arising out of' in liability insurance policies are very broad, general, and comprehensive; and are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from. All that is necessary is some causal relationship between the injury and the event not covered." Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis.2d 130, 137, 226 N.W.2d 414, 418 (1975); see also Bartel, 127 Wis.2d at 315, 379 N.W.2d at 867 (applying broad interpretation of "arising out of" to business pursuits exclusion). Rufener's injuries have "some causal relationship" to Martin's snowplowing business, and therefore they fall within the business pursuits exclusion in Martin's homeowner's policy. Thus, Rufener's injuries are not covered unless the exception to the exclusion applies.

We consider first whether the language of the exception to the business pursuits exclusion is ambiguous. A policy provision is ambiguous when "reasonably susceptible to more than one construction from the viewpoint of a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence in the position of the insured." Cardinal v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 166 Wis.2d 375, 383, 480 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1992) (citations omitted). If the exception is ambiguous, any doubts about the scope of coverage must be resolved in Rufener's favor. See Bartel, 127 Wis.2d at 314, 379 N.W.2d at 866. The exception to the business pursuits exclusion has been heavily litigated in many jurisdictions with varying results that cannot be fully reconciled. See David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Business Pursuits" Exclusion Provision in General Liability Policy, 35 A.L.R.5th 375 (1996). As many courts have already discovered, the exception is often awkwardly worded and its meaning is not obvious. Cf. Thoele v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 39 F.3d 724, 730 (7th Cir.1994) ("we are more than a little puzzled as to why insurers have not attempted a better articulation of the exception"). Under Wisconsin law, however, our interpretation of the exception to the business pursuits exclusion is guided by Bartel v. Carey, 127 Wis.2d 310, 379 N.W.2d 864 (Ct.App.1985). We conclude that the exception to the business pursuits exclusion is not ambiguous, and that its meaning is established by Bartel.

In Bartel, a "road band" was transporting its musical equipment to an engagement when the trailer containing the equipment...

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