Ruff v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 25 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | 2011-SC-000640-MR |
| Parties | ALEXANDER L. RUFF APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Alexander Ruff appeals as a matter of right from a Judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court convicting him of wanton murder and first-degree robbery. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Finding an aggravating factor of first-degree robbery, the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole or probation for twenty-five years, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. Ruff raises three issues on appeal: (1) the Commonwealth's peremptory strike of an African-American juror constituted a Batson violation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from Ruff and statements made during a traffic stop; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to officers after the arrest. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
On November 24, 2008, Alexander Ruff entered the New York Fashions clothing store in Louisville, Kentucky, with the intent to rob the store and its customers. Ruff was accompanied that day by John Benton and Kendrick Robinson. With tee-shirts tied around their faces and armed with handguns, Ruff and Benton entered the store while Robinson waited in a nearby vehicle. Ruff fired a single shot into the ceiling and ordered the people inside to get on the ground and surrender their wallets and cash. Ruff fired the gun again, this time striking store owner Mohamed Abderlrahman in the abdomen. Ruff and Benton then collected the customers' wallets and fled in Robinson's car. Abderlrahman died as a result of internal bleeding caused by his injury.
Four days later, Louisville Metro Police Department ("LMPD") Officers Christopher Sheehan and Benjamin Lunte, while on narcotics patrol, stopped a vehicle driven by Ruff's girlfriend, Chesica White, for an unreadable temporary tag. Ruff happened to be seated in the passenger seat when the officers approached the vehicle. After White and Ruff exited the vehicle, Ruff suddenly fainted and fell to the street. The officers testified that, suspecting that Ruff had swallowed narcotics, they obtained consent from White to search the vehicle. White disputed that she gave consent. Officer Sheehan found a 45-caliber handgun and a garbage bag full of clothing under the passenger seat of the car. Ruff admitted ownership of the gun and clothing. He was then arrested on unrelated charges and transported to an LMPD substation for questioning.
That evening, Ruff was questioned and placed in jail on the unrelated charges. Five days later on December 3, Ruff was transported to the LMPD homicide office for further questioning. He once again returned for questioning on December 5. Over the course of his interviews with LMPD detectives, Ruff admitted to being involved in the New York Fashions robbery, and implicated Benton and Robinson as co-conspirators.
Ruff was indicted by a Jefferson County Grand Jury on one count of murder and three counts of robbery. His motions to suppress evidence found and statements made during the vehicle stop and subsequent statements at the LMPD office were denied. At trial, Ruff took the stand in his own defense. He confessed to his involvement in the robbery and shooting, including taking customers' wallets and firing his weapon in Mohamad Abdelrahman's direction. The jury convicted Ruff of wanton murder and first-degree robbery.1 Finding an aggravating factor of first-degree robbery, the jury returned a sentence of life without the benefit of parole or probation for twenty-five years. The trial court sentenced in accord with the jury's recommendation, and this appeal followed.
Ruff challenges the Commonwealth's use of a peremptory strike to dismiss an African-American juror as violative of the United States SupremeCourt's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Specifically, Ruff asserts that the trial court erred when it accepted the Commonwealth's race-neutral reason for striking the African-American juror when his answers were substantially similar to those offered by Caucasian jurors who were not stricken. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483 (2008) (). We review a trial court's denial of a Batson challenge for clear error. Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 302 (Ky. 2008).
During individual voir dire, the trial court asked an African-American potential juror ("Juror #475406") if he could "consider the entire range of possible punishment" for the defendants. He replied that he could not. When the trial court asked him what punishment he could not consider, Juror #475406 responded that he could not consider the death penalty.2 The trial court went on to ask Juror #475406 if "regardless of what the evidence or the law might be" if he would not consider the death penalty, and he replied: "I would have to consider it, but I wouldn't want to." The Commonwealth then continued the individual voir dire, eventually asking Juror #475406 directly if he could consider the death penalty. Juror #475406 replied, "Like I said, man, I'm a firm believer in second chances, and the death penalty is not one of them." The Commonwealth then moved to strike Juror #475406 for cause,arguing that he was "substantially impaired" in that he could not consider the death penalty as a possible punishment. The trial court deemed it a "close call," but ultimately denied the Commonwealth's motion to strike for cause, finding that "[Juror #475406] could, if directed, follow the evidence and law." The Commonwealth exercised a peremptory strike against Juror #475406.
As provided in Batson v. Kentucky, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the racially discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. 476 U.S. at 89; see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478 (citing United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1994)) ("[T]he constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose."). When a Batson challenge is raised, a three-step process is undertaken to address the alleged violation:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.
552 U.S. at 476-77 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Ruff joined Benton's Batson challenge to the Commonwealth's use of a peremptory strike against Juror #475406. Defense counsel remarked that before the exercise of peremptory strikes, the percentage of African-Americans in the venire had been decreased from nine-percent to five-percent. In striking Juror #475406, the number of African-Americans remaining in the pool was reduced to one. Defense counsel reasoned that with the possibility of therandom draw-down removing the final African-American from the venire, there was a "substantial chance of having an all Caucasian jury" in a case with three African-American defendants. The trial court found that this established a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under Batson.3
We now turn to the second step in the Batson inquiry: the Commonwealth's race-neutral explanation for exercising the peremptory strike. The Commonwealth maintained that Juror #475406's views on the death penalty, particularly the fact that he was not rated "death-qualified" per the prosecutor's system of rating jurors, led to his peremptory strike. His occupation as a minister was also offered as a race-neutral basis for exercising the peremptory strike. The Commonwealth's explanation was sufficient to allow the trial court to consider it in light of Ruff's Batson challenge. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (). The trial court reviewed its notes on Juror #475406, again remarking that he was a "close call" in reference to theCommonwealth's earlier motion to strike for cause. Ultimately, the trial court accepted the Commonwealth's race-neutral explanation and denied the Batson challenge.
In evaluating the Batson challenge, a trial court must consider all circumstances bearing on racial animosity, including "inconsistencies in the treatment of the stricken juror and similarly situated jurors outside the suspect class." Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 602 (Ky. 2010) (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478). Ruff now claims that the trial court's finding...
To continue reading
Request your trial