Ruff v. County Of Kings

• Decision Date: 24 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. CV-F-05-631 OWW/GSA.,CV-F-05-631 OWW/GSA.
• Citation: 700 F.Supp.2d 1225
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Daniel E. RUFF, Plaintiff,v.COUNTY OF KINGS, et al., Defendants.

700 F.Supp.2d 1225

Daniel E. RUFF, Plaintiff,v.COUNTY OF KINGS, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-F-05-631 OWW/GSA.

United States District Court E.D. California.

March 24, 2010.

Kevin Gerard Little, Law Office of Kevin G. Little, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff.

James Darvin Weakley, Leslie M. Dillahunty, Weakley Arendt & McGuire, LLP, Fresno, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES (Doc. 211) AND AWARDING COSTS

OLIVER W. WANGER, District Judge.

Before the Court are Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Plaintiff's bill of costs, and Defendants County of Kings and Mark Sherman's opposing bill of costs.

A PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.

Plaintiff Daniel Ruff moves for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $217,365.00.

1. Governing Standards.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections ... 1983 [or] 1985 ... of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. ...

“ ‘In determining what a reasonable attorneys' fee entails, the district court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).’ ... ‘The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is (1) the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation (2) multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’ ... The resulting figure is known as the ‘Lodestar.’ ” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1040 (E.D.Cal.2007). Although there is a strong presumption that the lodestar represents a reasonable fee, Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992), the district court has the discretion to exclude from the initial fee calculation hours that were not reasonably expended, for example, cases that are overstaffed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hensley held:

Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission. ‘In the private sector, “billing judgment” is an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority.’....

Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. As explained in Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 991 (9th Cir.1988):

Many factors previously identified by courts as probative on the issue of ‘reasonableness' of a fee award, see e.g., Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 ... (1976), are now subsumed within the initial calculation of the lodestar amount. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 ... (1984) (‘the novelty and complexity of the issues,’ ‘the special skill and experience of counsel,’ the ‘quality of the representation,’ and the ‘results obtained’ are subsumed within the lodestar); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 ... (1986), rev'd after rehearing on other grounds, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 ... (1987) (an attorney's ‘superior performance’ is subsumed).

See also

Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1986). As the Clark court explained:

[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that adjustments, both upward and downward to the lodestar amount are sometimes appropriate, albeit in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases ... Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901, 104 S.Ct. 1541 ... The possibility of adjustments to the lodestar amount necessitates an analysis of various factors that could justify an adjustment. In this circuit, the relevant factors were identified in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.1975). Although several of these factors are now considered to be subsumed within the calculation of the lodestar figure ..., review of the Kerr factors remains the appropriate procedure for considering a request for a fee-award adjustment.

Id. The Kerr factors, as modified by Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir.1993), are:

(1) the time and labor required of the attorney(s);

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented;

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney(s) because of the acceptance of the action;

(5) the customary fee charged in matters of the type involved;

(6) any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;

(7) the amount of money, or the value of the rights involved, and the results obtained;

(8) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney(s);

(9) the ‘undesireability of the action;

(10) the nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney and the client;

(12) awards in similar actions.

Id.; see also Rule 54-293(c), Local Rules of Practice.

The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support of those hours worked. Hensley, supra at 433, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1987).

2. Partial or Limited Success.

Defendants argue that the award of attorney's fees should not include time incurred on issues not presented to the jury or incurred on issues as to which Plaintiff did not prevail.

“The extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Hensley, id., 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Hensley prescribed a two-step process for calculating attorney's fees in a case of partial or limited success. A Court must consider (1) whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded,” and (2) whether “the plaintiff achiev[ed] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Hensley, id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Deductions based on limited success are within the discretion of the district court. Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923, 123 S.Ct. 1574, 155 L.Ed.2d 313 (2003). As explained in Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir.2005):

The first step requires the district court to determine whether the successful and unsuccessful claims were unrelated ... “[C]laims are unrelated if the successful and unsuccessful claims are “distinctly different” both legally and factually,” ...; claims are related, however, if they ‘involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.’ ... At bottom, ‘the focus is on whether the unsuccessful and successful claims arose out of the same “course of conduct.” ’ ... If they did not, the hours expended on the unsuccessful claims should not be included in the fee award....

If, however, ‘the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then the court must apply the second part of the analysis, in which the court evaluates the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.’ ... ‘Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.’ ... When ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, [however,] the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.’ ... Nonetheless, a plaintiff does not need to receive all the relief requested in order to show excellent results warranting the fully compensatory fee.

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleged causes of action for violation of Section 1983, 1985(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 15, and for declaratory judgment. By Memorandum Decision filed on September 17, 2008, 2008 WL 4287638 (Doc. 92), the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment takings claim on the ground of ripeness and alleged delay in processing Plaintiff's application and dismissed Plaintiff's antitrust claim because controlling Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority establish as a matter of law that Defendants are entitled to immunity from antitrust liability alleged in the FAC.

The Court granted summary judgment for Defendants with regard to Plaintiff's claim that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race by amending the General Plan and granted summary judgment for Defendants to the extent Plaintiff's claim of denial of procedural due process was based on the failure to mail notice specifically to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff proceeded to trial on his claims of violation of his rights to procedural and substantive due process and of denial of equal protection of the laws. The jury found that Plaintiff “proved by a preponderance of the evidence” that Defendants William Zumwalt and Sandy Roper “violated [Plaintiff's] right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment” and that Plaintiff “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation of his right to procedural due process by any defendant was a cause of harm or damage” to Plaintiff. The jury found that Plaintiff had not proved that any of the individual defendants violated Plaintiff's right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment or violated Plaintiff's right to equal...