Ruff v. Doty

• Citation: 1 S.E. 707,26 S.C. 173
• Parties: RUFF v. DOTY and others.
• Decision Date: 28 February 1887
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

1 S.E. 707

26 S.C. 173

RUFF v. DOTY and others.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 28, 1887

Appeal from circuit court, Fairfield county.

D Augustus Straker, for appellant.

Douglass & McCants, for respondents.

SIMPSON C.J.

The defendants Doty and Walker, some time in 1881, instituted regular proceedings in the court of common pleas for Fairfield county for the foreclosure of a mortgage held by them on the plaintiff, covering the land in dispute. To this proceeding the plaintiff appeared, and employed counsel to defend. The cause was referred to a referee, and, upon his report coming in, judgment was obtained, to-wit, on the twenty-second September, 1881, after which, to-wit, on the first Monday in November, 1882, the land was sold by the clerk of the court, under its order for foreclosure, at which sale the defendant A. F. Ruff purchased the same for the sum of $150, who is now in possession. The action below was instituted in May, 1885, to vacate the foreclosure judgment to set aside the sale thereunder, to put the plaintiff in possession of the land, and to annul the mortgage which covers the land. This demand in the complaint is based upon allegations therein, in which plaintiff alleges that the defendants obtained said mortgage by falsely representing to him that it was a mortgage simply of the crop to be made on the land, and two mules, and a cow and calf, and, not being able to read handwriting, (though he can sign his name,) he executed it as represented to him; and he further alleges that the personal property embraced in the mortgage had been sold before the foreclosure proceedings, the proceeds of which, with a payment made by him upon the debt intended to be secured, had more than satisfied said debt. Upon these allegations he demanded as above stated.

An answer was put in denying these allegations; and when the case was called for trial, the defendants interposed an oral demurrer, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer his honor, Judge T. B. FRASER, presiding, sustained and therefore dismissed the complaint with costs. The appeal involves the correctness of this order, to-wit: Did the complaint below contain a cause of action?

The object of the action, as stated above, was to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, the sale thereunder, the mortgage, and to obtain a decree that plaintiff be let into the possession of the land. Now, to entitle the complaint to stand as constituting a cause of action, the facts alleged should be sufficient to accomplish some or all of the results desired, or some other result redressing the wrong complained of, and at the same time competent to be heard and considered on the trial of the cause. Examining the complaint under this principle, no doubt the facts alleged were amply sufficient to vacate the mortgage originally, because there is a distinct charge of imposition, misrepresentation, and deceit, whereby the plaintiff, not being able to read, was induced to execute a mortgage covering his land, when he asserts that he understood it to be merely a lien on his crop to be made on the land. No doubt, too, had these facts been interposed as a defense to the foreclosure suit, especially with the addition that, before said suit, the debt intended to be secured by the mortgage had been actually paid by the sale of other mortgage property, such defense, if proved, would have defeated the foreclosure.

But this proceeding is not one to vacate the mortgage, as an original proceeding against it, nor were the facts alleged in the complaint set up as a defense to the foreclosure action, when the plaintiff had full opportunity to set it up. But the single question here is, admitting the allegations and their force and effect, could the plaintiff avail himself of them in this direct proceeding, after having suffered the mortgage to be adjudicated, the amount due thereunder to be ascertained, the land to be sold, and an innocent purchaser to enter into possession, without protest or complaint made? So far as vacating the sale, and the question of dispossessing A. F. Ruff, defendant, is involved, we think the principle of the case Le Conte v. Irwin, 19 S.C. 554, is authority against it. That was a case recently decided by this court, and the principle applied there we think applies here, and we need not consume time in discussing or attempting to sustain that principle. It is authority for us, and is conclusive upon so much of the appeal. Le Conte v. Irwin, 19 S.C. 554.

But the whole appeal is resisted on the ground that all the matters relied on by appellant are either res adjudicata in the foreclosure suit, or might have been, so far as to preclude the plaintiff from ever afterwards raising them against the mortgage or its foreclosure; and in that view, his honor was right in dismissing the complaint, on the ground that plaintiff had no cause of action against any of the parties defendant. The doctrine of res adjudicata is a very fruitful subject. Much has been written on it by text writers, and many decisions thereon can be found, not only in our courts, but in the courts of other states, and we might say much upon it here. But what is needed, as we conceive, in a judgment of a court of final resort, especially one governed by precedents, like ours, is not elaborate essays, however tempting, but clear and distinct determination of the exact questions involved, with the authorities relied on noticed, and briefly explained when necessary.

Now, in the matters before us, we have two cases in our reports recently decided by this court, which we think, when considered and applied here, will conclude this appeal against the appellant on the questions involved, to-wit: The cases of Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35, and Fraser v. Charleston, 19 S.C. 384. In the first of these cases one Bates brought action to recover possession of a tract of land from one Hart. Hart resisted, on the ground that he held under a conveyance, from the same party under whom...