Ruff v. Wilson Logistics, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2022
• Docket Number: 3:22-cv-00988-WHO
• Parties: BRIAN THOMAS RUFF, Plaintiff, v. WILSON LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

BRIAN THOMAS RUFF, Plaintiff, v. WILSON LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-00988-WHO

United States District Court, N.D. California

May 12, 2022

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO REMAND AND TRANSFER RE: DKT. NOS 12, 18

William H. Orrick United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Brian Thomas Ruff, an interstate trucker, filed this putative wage-and-hour class action against defendant Wilson Logistics, Inc. (“Wilson”). Ruff moves to remand the case to state court on the ground that Wilson has not shown that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Wilson moves to transfer this case to the Western District of Missouri based on forum selection clauses in the parties' contracts. Both motions are denied. Wilson has shown that Ruff placed more than $75, 000 in controversy. The claims are not governed by a valid forum selection clause and the factors governing transfer weigh in favor of keeping the case here.

BACKGROUND

Ruff is a California citizen. Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt No. 1-1] ¶ 11. Wilson is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Springfield, Missouri. Notice of Removal (“Not.”) [Dkt. No. 1] 2. There is no dispute regarding the parties' citizenship. Ruff worked for Wilson between November 5, 2020, and April 21, 2021. Compl. ¶ 11; see also Opposition to Motion to Transfer (“Tran. Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 14] 1 (citing Declaration of Brian Thomas Ruff (“Ruff Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 14-1] ¶ 2). According to Ruff, Wilson violated the California Labor Code by (among other things) failing to compensate him and other employees for all hours worked provide them meal and rest breaks, and provide them accurate wage statements. See Compl. ¶ 4. He also brings derivative claims for unfair competition. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.

Ruff alleges that he worked for Wilson performing transportation services as a truck driver; he worked for specific shifts on a per-load basis and recorded his hours using a digital system in the trucks that he operated. Id. ¶ 22. Ruff and Wilson entered into two “Independent Contractor Operating Agreements” that contained forum selection clauses. See Tran. Oppo. 2 (citing Ruff Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). Those clauses provide,

This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the United States and of the State of Missouri, excluding the choice-of-law rules of Missouri. The parties agree that any legal proceedings between the parties arising under, arising out of, or relating to the relationship created by this Agreement, including arbitration proceedings discussed below, shall be filed and/or maintained in Springfield, Missouri or the nearest location in Missouri where such proceedings can be maintained.

See Motion to Transfer Case (“Tran. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 12] 4 (citing Declaration of Rhonda Thornton (“Thornton Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 12-1], Exs. 1, 2). These contracts-including their forum selection clauses-were conditions of Ruff's employment with Wilson and were both signed after January 1, 2017. See Tran. Oppo. 1-2 (citing Ruff Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). Ruff was not represented by counsel when he signed either agreement, and he alleges that he “primarily lived and worked in California” while working for Wilson. Id.

Ruff brings claims for a “systemic pattern of wage and hour violations under the California Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders.” Compl. ¶ 28. He seeks monetary relief for unpaid wages and benefits; interest; attorney's fees, costs, and expenses; and penalties pursuant to the California Labor Code. Id. ¶ 5. He also seeks injunctive relief and restitution for unfair competition. Id. ¶ 6.

On December 21, 2021, Ruff filed suit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated against Wilson in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Alameda. He asserts nine claims: (1) failure to pay minimum wages, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to provide meal periods, (4) failure to provide rest breaks, (5) failure to pay wages upon separation of employment, (6) failure to furnish accurate and itemized wage statements, (7) failure to reimburse all business expenses, (8) unlawful deduction of wages, and (9) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Id. ¶¶ 39-112. Wilson filed an answer in state court, raising the issue of improper venue. Dkt. No. 7 at 3. Wilson then removed the case to this court, premised on diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. MOTION TO REMAND

Generally, a case can be removed from state to federal court only when the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The defendant has the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2011). Removability is “generally determined as of the time of the petition for removal.” Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Industry Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), federal diversity jurisdiction exists when each plaintiff is a citizen of a different state from each defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. Natural persons are the citizens of the state in which they are domiciled-that is, the state in which they reside with intent to remain permanently. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Corporations are citizens of the state where they are incorporated and the state where they have their principal place of business. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 81 (2010).

Generally, “[i]f removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a), the sum demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). Where “it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing-by a preponderance of the evidence-that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013)). “[T]he defendant's amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014). “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant's liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. MOTION TO TRANSFER

The general federal venue statute provides that “[a] civil action may be brought in-(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

A party moving to transfer venue may do so under either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406, depending on whether the initial venue is proper. If the initial venue is proper, the moving party seeks a discretionary transfer under Section 1404(a), which provides that a district court may transfer the case to any other district in which the case could have been originally filed “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” or “in the interest of justice.” If the initial venue is improper, the moving party seeks a mandatory transfer under Section 1406, which provides that a district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer the case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”

Under Section 1404(a), courts generally balance a number of factors, including,

(1) plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of access to the evidence, (5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, (6) feasibility of consolidation of other claims, (7) any local interest in the controversy, and (8) the relative court congestion and time of trial in each forum.

Martinez v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-05479-WHO, 2019 WL 6727837, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2019) (quoting Barnes & Noble v. LSI Corp., 823 F.Supp.2d 980, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2011)); see also Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000); Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). “The party moving for transfer of a case bears the burden of demonstrating transfer is appropriate.” Saunders v. USAA Life Ins. Co., 71 F.Supp.3d 1058, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Davila, J.).

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO REMAND

Ruff argues that Wilson failed to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. See Motion to Remand (“Remand Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 18] 1. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that more than $75, 000 has been sufficiently shown to be in controversy.

A. Standard

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree on the proper standard for assessing the sufficiency of jurisdictional allegations. Ruff argues that Wilson is required to submit “summary judgment-style” evidence to support its position. See Remand Mot. 1. Wilson contends that this evidence is not necessary, but that it has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Ruff's claims exceed the more-than-$75, 000...