Ruff v. Young

• Decision Date: 01 October 1945
• Docket Number: 39416
• Parties: Emilie Ruff, Winnifred Hencher, Elmer Bauer, Raymond Bauer, and Vernon Bauer, Appellants, v. Louis A. Young, Jr., and E. M. Williams, Public Administrator of Jefferson County, Missouri, having in charge the Estate of Louis Young, Sr., Deceased
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

190 S.W.2d 208

354 Mo. 506

Emilie Ruff, Winnifred Hencher, Elmer Bauer, Raymond Bauer, and Vernon Bauer, Appellants, v. Louis A. Young, Jr., and E. M. Williams, Public Administrator of Jefferson County, Missouri, having in charge the Estate of Louis Young, Sr., Deceased

No. 39416

Supreme Court of Missouri

October 1, 1945

Rehearing Denied November 5, 1945.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court; Hon. Norwin D. Houser Judge.

Affirmed.

Sam M. McKay and R. E. Kleinschmidt for appellants.

(1) Where the petition does not definitely allege mental incapacity of testator or grantor, but merely alleges the same as an element of undue influence or fraud, the issue of mental incapacity is not in the case. Byrne v Byrne, 250 Mo. 652, 157 S.W. 609. (2) Subsequent declarations of a testator or grantor are not competent to prove the execution of the instrument or the presence or absence of undue influence, nor competent for any purpose except on the issue of mental incapacity, when same is properly an issue in the case. Walton v. Kendrick, 122 Mo. 504, 27 S.W. 872; Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533, 109 S.W. 46; Gordon v. Burris, 141 Mo. 602, 43 S.W. 642; Minturn v. Conception Abbey, 227 Mo.App. 1179, 61 S.W.2d 352. (3) Since the decision in the case of Loehr v. Starke, 332 Mo. 131, 56 S.W.2d 772, it has been held that a mere confidential or fiduciary relationship does not raise a presumption of undue influence, shifting the burden of proof, but that if, in addition to such relationship, the grantee or devisee takes an active part in some way which caused or assisted in causing the execution of the deed or will, then there is such presumption, and the burden of proof does shift, though of course the presumption is rebuttable. Dimity v. Dimity, 62 S.W.2d 859; Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400; Larkin v. Larkin, 119 S.W.2d 351; Clark v. Powell, 175 S.W.2d 842. (4) Both before and after the decision in said Loehr-Starke case, this court has set aside deeds on the ground of undue influence where the evidence for plaintiffs was not nearly as strong as it is herein nor even as strong as the trial chancellor found the facts, in his memorandum opinion, against the grantee in this case. Martin v. Baker, 135 Mo. 495, 36 S.W. 369; Huett v. Chitwood, 252 S.W. 426; Morris v. Morris, 4 S.W.2d 459; Manahan v. Manahan, 52 S.W.2d 825; Dimity v. Dimity, 62 S.W.2d 859. (5) Equity ordinarily will follow the law and not hold party barred by laches from asserting claim before statute of limitations has run. Rhodus v. Geatley, 347 Mo. 397, 147 S.W.2d 631; Earley v. Ins. Co., 144 S.W.2d 860; Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 28; Breneman v. The Laundry, 87 S.W.2d 429; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 351 Mo. 8, 171 S.W.2d 565; Ruckels v. Pryor, 351 Mo. 819, 174 S.W.2d 185. (6) In an equity case, the trial is de novo in this court, with authority to pass on the weight of the evidence and render such decision as should have been rendered by the trial chancellor, regardless of any erroneous rulings on the evidence. Peikert v. Repple, 342, Mo. 274, 114 S.W.2d 999; Jones v. Peterson, 335 Mo. 242, 72 S.W.2d 76; Presbyterian Orphanage of Mo. v. Fitterling, 342 Mo. 299, 114 S.W.2d 1004. (7) The case should have been decided solely on the facts and the law pertaining to the issues of coercion, fraud and undue influence and without regard to the principle of laches, as to which there was neither pleading nor proof. Connell v. Jersey Realty & Inv. Co., 180 S.W.2d 49; Belleville Casket Co. v. Brueggeman, 182 S.W.2d 555. (8) Any false recital or any unusual clause in an instrument, or any unusual method of transacting the business, apparently done for effect and to give the transaction an air of honesty, is in and of itself a badge of fraud. Baldwin v. Whitcomb, 71 Mo. 651; Barber v. Nunn, 275 Mo. 655, 205 S.W. 14. (9) In an equity case, this court makes it own findings of both law and fact, and while it may defer to the findings of fact of the trial chancellor on conflicting oral testimony, it will not follow erroneous conclusions of law purportedly based thereon. Jones v. Peterson, 335 Mo. 242, 72 S.W.2d 76.

W. A. Brookshire and M. C. Matthes for respondents.

(1) Presumption is that deed in question was delivered to grantee on date of its acknowledgment and this presumption prevailed unless it was overcome by evidence to the contrary; it will also be presumed that deed was delivered from fact of possession thereof by grantee. Jefferson County Lbr. Co. v. Robinson, 121 S.W.2d 209; Aude v. Aude, 28 S.W.2d 665; Koewing v. Greene County Bldg. & Loan Assn., 38 S.W.2d 40. (2) Burden of proof was on plaintiffs to prove nondelivery of deed, and the evidence to sustain nondelivery had to be clear and convincing; all testimony on this question showed deed was delivered, therefore chancellor correctly found that issue against plaintiffs. Zumwalt v. Forbis, 163 S.W.2d 574; Klatt v. Wolff, 173 S.W.2d 933. (3) The deed was not testamentary in character, but fee simple title to premises described therein was conveyed to grantee, subject to life estate of grantors. Wimpey v. Ledford, 177 S.W. 302; McAlister v. Pritchard, 230 S.W. 66; Dawson v. Taylor, 214 S.W. 852. (4) Before plaintiffs were entitled to have the deed in question set aside on the ground of fraud, it was necessary that they prove by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the grantee made false representations to grantors, with intention of deceiving them; that grantors were deceived thereby; and were induced to act to their injury in reliance upon such representations. Inasmuch as plaintiffs wholly and completely failed to meet any of said requirements, the court properly found the issues on fraud in favor of defendant. Gockel v. Gockel, 66 S.W.2d 867; Gettings v. Jeffords, 239 S.W. 84; Gray v. Corder, 151 S.W.2d 1112. (5) In order to set aside a deed on the ground of fraud the evidence must go beyond a mere preponderance of the testimony and remove all reasonable doubt. Edginger v. Kratzer, 175 S.W.2d 807; Stubblefield v. Husband, 106 S.W.2d 419. (6) Before plaintiffs were entitled to have the deed set aside on the ground of undue influence, it was necessary for them to prove that defendant grantee exercised such influence over grantors as to constitute overpersuasion, coercion, force or deception, so as to break the will of grantors and substitute the will of another. Since the record is barren of any evidence showing exercise of undue influence, the deed was properly upheld on that question. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 168 S.W.2d 69; Hamilton v. Steminger, 168 S.W.2d 59; Ulrich v. Zimmerman, 163 S.W.2d 567; Fessler v. Fessler, 60 S.W.2d 17. (7) The law does not ban the influence which may spring from the natural affection of a parent for his child, and parents may, in the exercise of their free will, convey their property to one child to exclusion of others. Burgdorf v. Keeven, 174 S.W.2d 816; Lastofka v. Lastofka, 99 S.W.2d 46. (8) There was no evidence offered showing that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between grantors and grantee; neither did chancellor find that such a relationship existed. Hamilton v. Steininger, 168 S.W.2d 59; Lastofka v. Lastofka, 99 S.W.2d 46. (9) Burden of proving undue influence and fraud rested upon plaintiffs, which burden they failed to sustain. Horn v. Owens, 171 S.W.2d 585; Ulrich v. Zimmerman, 163 S.W.2d 567. (10) Courts should not cancel and annul a deed except in a clear case. The rule is well announced and established that setting aside a deed is exertion of the most extraordinary power of a court of equity. Lastofka v. Lastofka, 99 S.W.2d 46; Edinger v. Kratzer, 175 S.W.2d 807.

Bradley, C. Dalton and Van Osdol, CC., concur.

OPINION

BRADLEY

Action to set aside a deed to 160 acres of land in Jefferson County. Finding and judgment for defendants and plaintiffs appealed.

Louis Young, Sr., and his wife, Winnifred, were the grantors, and Louis Young, Jr. was the grantee. Plaintiffs Ruff and Hencher are daughters of the grantors; other plaintiffs are grandsons. Defendant Young is a son of the grantors and known as Louis Young, Jr. Defendant Williams is public administrator in charge of the estate of Louis Young, Sr. The term defendant hereinafter used, when meaning a defendant in the present case, has reference to defendant Young, and sometimes Louis Young, Sr. is referred to as the grantor, the father, and Young, Sr.

The grounds alleged for setting aside the deed are: (1) That it was probably not actually executed; (2) that it was not delivered; (3) that it was not supported by sufficient consideration; (4) that it was testamentary in character; and (5) that it was obtained by fraud, coercion and undue influence practiced upon grantor Louis Young, Sr. by defendant. The effect of the answer is a denial of all these alleged grounds.

Grantor Louis Young, Sr. purchased the land in 1910, and the deed was to him. All the family, the husband, wife, and children thereafter lived on the place until the girls married and moved away. Plaintiff Ruff was 19 years old when the farm was purchased in 1910; she married in 1912. Plaintiff Hencher was 10 years old in 1910; she married in 1921. Annetta Bauer, a deceased daughter of the grantors, and the mother of plaintiffs Bauer, married in 1904, prior to the purchase of the land. Defendant was 22 years old in 1910. He married in 1916, but continued to live on the place and in the house with his father and mother. He was away for about a year in the mail service in 1922 or 1923, but his wife and children remained with his father and mother on the farm. Through the years the daughters visited their parents often and no estrangement ever existed, and the usual affection for the grandsons also existed.

The deed was...