Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. WDQ–13–2744.
• Citation: 126 F.Supp.3d 521
• Parties: Lakesha RUFFIN, Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

126 F.Supp.3d 521

Lakesha RUFFIN, Plaintiff,

v.LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil No. WDQ–13–2744.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Northern Division.

Signed Aug. 24, 2015.

James Charles Strouse, Strouse Legal Services, Columbia, MD, for Plaintiff.

Denise Elizabeth Giraudo, John Steven Bolesta, Michael J. Murphy, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR., District Judge.

Lakesha Ruffin sued Lockheed Martin Corporation ("Lockheed") in the Circuit Court for Howard County for employment discrimination. ECF No. 2. Lockheed removed to this Court. ECF No. 1. Pending are Lockheed's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 36, and Ruffin's motion for leave to amend her complaint, ECF No. 44. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.2014). For the following reasons, Lockheed's motion will be granted; Ruffin's motion will be denied.

I. Background¹

In April 2008, Ruffin, an African–American female, began working at Lockheed as a Senior Systems Engineer. See ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 5, 41. While at Lockheed, Ruffin reported to Andrew Westdorp and Jill Andres, who are white. Id. ¶ 9.

In September 2008, Ruffin had "a shouting match" with a coworker, Nandita Kanjurith. Id. ¶ 13. Kanjurith "jumped at Ruffin, ... picked an argument, stood over Ruffin from behind and started a shouting match and physical movements of harm towards Ruffin." Id. Kanjurith told Ruffin "you are a loser," "[n]o one likes you here," "you are a waste of space," "[n]one of the coworkers like you," and "[g]et out of here." Id. Because of her behavior, Lockheed relocated Kanjurith to another office. Id. ¶ 14.

In October 2008, Steve McMahon, "Ruffin's Teamlead," complained to Andres about Ruffin's absences. Id. ¶ 15. As a result, on October 21, 2008, Ruffin was placed on a "Performance Improvement Plan (PIP)." Id. ¶¶ 10, 15. Her absences were caused by Ruffin's three hour commute (each way) from her home on the Eastern Shore. Id. ¶ 10. Ruffin was given 30 days to move closer to her work; she moved to Columbia, Maryland. Id. ¶ 11.²

During her 2008 annual performance review, Andres told Ruffin that she "sometimes comes across harshly to others," but did not substantiate this statement. Id. ¶ 19. Andres gave Ruffin an overall performance rating of "basic." Id. ¶ 18.³

After Ruffin was taken off the PIP, she complained that her co-workers were creating a "hostile work environment" and "sabotaging" her work. Id. ¶¶ 16, 51. In April 2009, she "reported receiving strange telephone calls at home." Id. ¶ 20. She believed that her co-workers were making the calls. Id. Ruffin's car was "keyed" in the Lockheed parking lot. Id. ¶¶ 17, 50.

During her 2009 annual performance review, Andres "rated Ruffin a successful contributor," but told her that she needed "to work on her people skills." Id. ¶ 22. In February 2010, Ruffin told Andres that her "workspace was tampered with" while she was in the restroom. Id. ¶ 20. Ruffin also claimed that Michael Buadoo, an African–American employee, had tampered with her thumb drive. Id. ¶ 26. Ruffin also made other accusations against co-workers around this time, but Andres "told her to try to address work related conflicts directly." Id. ¶ 23.⁴

On April 5, 2010, Ruffin initiated short-term disability leave until June 21, 2010. Id. ¶ 24. On July 13, 2010, Ruffin initiated a second short-term disability leave until September 27, 2010. Id. ¶ 27. When she was on leave, Andres "filed an internal complaint against Ruffin for disrupting the workplace with accusations against other co-workers." Id. ¶ 28.

In October 2010, Ruffin complained to the Ethics Department at Lockheed that Buadoo "exposed his chest and made inappropriate body movements towards her," but the Department "found no harassment." Id. ¶ 44.⁵ Buadoo also told Ruffin that she looked "like a piece of candy." Id. ¶ 46. On October 4, 2010, Andres gave Ruffin an "Employee Performance Notification," which "addressed" Ruffin's complaint about another co-worker attending a meeting that Ruffin believed she should not attend and "Ruffin hanging up on a telephone call with a program manager" when she was on leave. Id. ¶ 30. Ruffin "refused to acknowledge the EPN." Id. ¶ 31. On October 21, 2010, she requested "a reduced workload due to stress."Id. ¶ 34. On November 2, 2010, she initiated another medical leave. Id. ¶ 35.

On November 12, 2010, Andres suspended Ruffin for two weeks "for unprofessional tone, tardiness, missed ... deadlines[,] and disruptions to the work environment." Id. ¶ 36. During Ruffin's suspension, a customer complained about her. Id. ¶ 37. On December 9, 2010, Andres terminated Ruffin's employment because of "on-going performance issues, customer concerns, and her accusations against other workers." Id. ¶ 38.⁶

On July 6, 2011, Ruffin filed her EEOC Charge. ECF No. 36–2 at 4. Ruffin alleged discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, and disability, and retaliation. Id. In connection with her disability claim, Ruffin alleged that—in October 2010—she had "submitted a request for reasonable accommodation (transfer)," which Andres denied. Id. at 5. In March 2013, Ruffin received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. ECF No. 17–1 at 3.

On June 14, 2013, Ruffin sued Lockheed in the Circuit Court for Howard County, asserting claims of: (1) racial discrimination; (2) sexual harassment; (3) hostile work environment; and (4) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended ("ADA").⁷ ECF No. 2. On August 19, 2013, Lockheed was served with Ruffin's complaint. ECF No. 10. On September 17, 2013, Lockheed removed to this Court. ECF No. 1.

On May 15, 2014, the Court, inter alia, granted Lockheed's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 23.⁸ On January 7, 2015, the Court granted Ruffin's motion for reconsideration and reopened the case. ECF No. 33.⁹

On February 2, 2015, Lockheed moved for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 36. On February 3, 2015, a "Rule 12/56" letter was mailed to Ruffin. ECF No. 37.¹⁰ On February 9, 2015, James Strouse, Esq., entered his appearance for Ruffin. ECF No. 38.

On March 9, 2015, in lieu of opposing Lockheed's motion, Ruffin moved for leave to amend her complaint. ECF No. 44; see also id. ¶ 5. On March 26, 2015, Lockheed opposed Ruffin's motion. ECF No. 49.¹¹ Ruffin has not replied.¹²

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standards

1. Judgment on the Pleadings

The same standard of review applies to Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir.2002). Rule 12(b)(6) motions test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but do not "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.2006).

The Court bears in mind that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v. Rowe Price–Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325–26 (4th Cir.2001). Although Rule 8's notice-pleading requirements are "not onerous," the plaintiff must allege facts that support each element of the claim advanced. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764–65 (4th Cir.2003). These facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

This requires that the plaintiff do more than "plead[ ] facts that are ‘merely consistent with a defendant's liability’ "; the facts pled must "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The complaint must not only allege but also "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Whe[n] the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

2. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs that leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires. Leave should be denied only when amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, amount to futility, or reward the movant's bad faith.¹³ Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377, 390 (4th Cir.2008) ; Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Associates, 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir.2010). An amendment is futile if it would fail to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 917 (4th Cir.1995).

B. Ruffin's Claims

1. Race Discrimination (Count One)

Title VII provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). At trial, a plaintiff can prove her employer's discrimination through one of two methods. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir.2004). First, she may use "any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue," under "ordinary principles of proof." Burns v. AAF–McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, the Court applies the burdenshifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir.2010).

To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination,...